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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines various ways in which the University of the Western 
Cape (UWC) in Cape Town, South Africa, confronted the paradoxical post-
apartheid higher education policy of expansion of access to historically 
disadvantaged students and limited funds and how students addressed the 
resulting problem of ‘unmet financial need’. My case study is set within the 
broader context of the momentous political and social change in South Africa’s 
first decade of democracy and the transformation of higher education in that 
country between 1995 and 2005. I reconsider the general topics of student 
activism, student participation in university governance and student funding based 
on relevant and accessible scholarly literature. Eventually, Wright, Taylor and 
Moghaddam’s framework (1990) inspires a conceptual-analytical framework to be 
applied in the case study analysis, consisting of a typology of four ideal types of 
student action, namely, normative collective student action (Type 1), non-
normative collective student action (Type 2), normative individual student action 
(Type 3) and non-normative individual student action (Type 4).   
 
I adopt a qualitative case study approach and use a variety of data collection 
methods (such as interviews, official documentation and observation) to construct 
a case study database. Interviewees include members of the university 
management, university staff and students (both leaders and ordinary students). I 
interview diverse students in terms of their origin, race, gender, fields of study and 
levels of qualification, and political orientation. The interviewees include former 
student leaders in order to gain a historical perspective on the pre-1994 era. Staff 
interviews target mainly those members who were directly involved with student 
financial issues or who were responsible for making student funding decisions. I 
collected different types of documents, including Student Representative Council 
(SRC) annual reports, minutes, discussion documents, university annual reports, 
and university financial statements. I also have opportunity to observe various 
student activities on campus, including student meetings and workshops, where 
student funding concerns are discussed.  
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My study shows that UWC students combined collective normative and collective 
non-normative student actions in a complementary manner between 1995 and 
2000. This becomes evident in the analysis of the UWC 1998 student activism, 
which sought to assist about 7 000 students facing financial exclusion. This 
landmark series of protests and negotiations occurred in an institutional 
environment characterised by antagonistic relations between students and the 
university management, on the one hand, and an institutional leadership crisis, on 
the other hand.  
 
The absence of student activism is the most significant feature of UWC student 
politics between 2000 and 2005. The study shows that students solely relied on 
collective normative action, especially negotiations with the university authorities, 
to address their problem of unmet financial need. The SRC played a leading role 
in the negotiations, albeit without always receiving a mandate from the student 
body. This contributed to widening the social distance between the SRC and the 
student body and raised questions of legitimacy about SRC decisions, including 
those related to negotiations with the university management.  
 
At an individual level, some students continued to consult and entrust the SRC to 
address their financial need, while others bypassed the SRC and negotiated 
directly with the university officials. Students conducted individual negotiations 
on their problem of unmet financial need with Student Credit Management (SCM) 
office established in the wake of the 1998 activism, and the University’s Financial 
Aid Office. As part of the study, students shared their experience of how delays in 
the finalisation of registration due to debts and an inability to pay upfront fees 
affected them academically as well as psychologically. Some students had to wait 
for almost two months before they knew whether they should go back home or 
could continue their studies. Others continued to attend their classes so that they 
would not miss a lot while at the same time seeking a solution to their problem of 
unmet financial need. In this respect, the study uncovers personal hardships in the 
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lived experience of disadvantaged students as a consequence of higher education 
policy. 
 
Students also had to explore other alternatives. These included (a) establishing 
solidarity networks, which enabled them to share with other students who could 
afford study materials, laboratory coats, food and accommodation (whereby the 
latter would involve 'squatting' in hostel rooms); (b) drawing on student-family 
networks consisting of relatives, neighbourhood friends, and other community 
members; and (c) initiating support consisting of part-time jobs on and off 
campus, participating in the University’s work-study programmes, and in 
extracurricular activities. The study’s findings thus make an empirical 
contribution to knowledge. It has given voice to some of the 'unseen pains' of the 
transition and post-apartheid change in South African higher education.  
 
The conceptual framework developed and applied in the study has the potential to 
be used in future research to conceptualise student actions as political behaviours 
of disadvantaged group members in terms of different ideal types characterised by 
interrelatedness and interdependency. As the study shows, the framework 
warrants further development and use.  
 
The thesis ends with recommendations for future research, arguing for  (a) the 
need to understand more closely the manner in which higher education institutions 
determine study costs, (b) the development of reliable means testing, which is one 
of the great dilemmas facing higher educational policy in South Africa and other 
developing countries - determining and verifying the amount that an extended 
family can reasonably be expected to contribute to the higher education of family 
members; (c) the need for more historical and sociological analysis of student 
organisations (including the SRC) and their role in shaping post-1994 South 
Africa; and finally (d) the need for more systematic investigations into the 
apparent dearth of student activism between 2000 and 2005 in South Africa, as 
against the history of high levels of student activism prior to that.  
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I declare that Student Politics and the Funding of Higher Education in South 
Africa: The case of the University of the Western Cape, 1995-2005 is my own 
work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination to any 
other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated 
and acknowledged as complete references. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mlungisi B G Cele  
November 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
I am grateful and indebted to my supervisor and co-supervisor, Associate Prof. 
Teresa Barnes and Dr Thierry Luescher-Mamashela, for their patience, intellectual 
guidance and support throughout my studies. Your penetrating and sometimes 
‘hard and disturbing questions’ empowered and sharpened the way I approached 
and looked at issues. Your confidence and encouragement instilled in me a 
permanent sense of belief that the completion of this thesis was inevitable and just 
a matter of time. 
 
I am also grateful to numerous students who volunteered their time to share and 
engage me on the issues facing them. I learned a lot. I am convinced that our 
beloved country will always have a bright future. 
 
To Nangamso, my gorgeous wife and companion, this thesis belongs to you. I 
appreciate and thank you for your support, inspiration, encouragement, 
understanding and sacrifices that you made in order to allow for the production of 
this thesis. You were a pillar of strength that pushed me through the end. I love 
you. To all my beautiful kids, I thank you.  
 
I shall never forget my parents who sacrificed everything to give me an education. 
They had a vision for me to do better than them through education. They did not 
want me to experience similar horrors of living under conditions of squalor, be 
poor, unskilled and always disadvantaged. Their vision will remain forever and I 
shall always share it with others.  
 
I give thanks for the support of my colleagues. In particular, I thank you for the 
technical support that you provided.  
 
I dedicate this thesis to my late father, Nongabaza, aunts (Nyasa and Nelile) and 
friend and colleague, Charlton, all of whom would have been very proud of my 
achievement.  
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
AAU Association of African Universities 
AFEC Anti-Financial Exclusions Committee 
AGM Annual General Meeting 
ANC African National Congress 
ANCYL African National Congress Youth League 
ASAHDI Association of Vice-Chancellors of Historically Disadvantaged 
Institutions 
ASB Afrikaanse Studentebond 
ASF Afrikaanse Studentefront 
AZAPO Azania Peoples’ Organisation 
AZASCO Azanian Student Congress 
AZASO Azanian Student Organisation 
BEE Black Economic Empowerment 
BTF Broad Transformation Forum 
CEPD Centre for Education Policy Development 
CHC Central House Committee 
CHE Council on Higher Education 
COSAS Congress of South African Students 
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions 
CTP Committee of Technikon Principals 
DG Director General 
DoE Department of Education 
DUT Durban University of Technology 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GEAR Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy 
GNU Government of National Unity 
GSC General Student Council 
HBI Historically Black Institution 
HBT Historically Black Technikon 
HBU Historically Black University 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
HE Higher Education 
HEI Higher Education Institution 
HESA Higher Education of South Africa 
HSRC Human Sciences Research Council 
HWI Historically White Institution  
HWT Historically White Technikon 
HWU Historically White University 
IDT Independent Development Trust 
IIES Income and Expenditure Surveys 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
MDM Mass Democratic Movement 
MSA Muslim Student Association 
NCHE National Commission on Higher Education 
NEC National Executive Committee 
NECC National Educational Co-ordinating Committee 
NEPAD New Economic Partnership for African Development 
NIC National Industrialised Countries 
NSF National Student Front (or Nasionale Studentefront ) 
NSFAS National Student Financial Aid Scheme 
NUSAS National Union of South African Students 
NWG National Working Group 
OECD Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
PAC Pan-African Congress 
PASAMA Pan-African Student Movement 
PASO Pan-Africanist Student Organisation 
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme 
REAP Rural Education Access Programme 
RSA Republic of South Africa 
SACP South African Communist Party 
SANSCO South African National Student Congress 
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme 
SAPSE South African Post-Secondary Education 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
SASCO South African Student Congress 
SASO South African Student Organisation 
SATSU South African Technikon Student Union 
SAU South African Universities 
SAU-SRC South African Universities – Students’ Representative Council 
SAUVCA South African University Vice-Chancellors Association 
SCM Student Credit Management 
SDO Student Development Offices 
SRC  Student Representative Council 
SSRC Social Science Research Council 
TBVC Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei 
TEC Translation Executive Council 
TEFSA Tertiary Education Fund of South Africa 
TUT Tshwane University of Technology 
UB University of Buea 
UCM United Christian Movement 
UCT University of Cape Town 
UDF United Democratic Front 
UDW University of Durban-Westville 
UJ University of Johannesburg 
UKZN University of KwaZulu-Natal 
UNIN University of the North 
UP University of Pretoria 
USF United Student Front 
UWC University of the Western Cape 
Wits University of the Witwatersrand 
WP White Paper 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
KEYWORDS .................................................................................................................... II 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... III 
DECLARATION ............................................................................................................. VI 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................... VII 
LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................... VIII 
CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ........................................................................................... 1 
RESEARCH PURPOSE AND QUESTION .................................................................................. 5 
RATIONALE ......................................................................................................................... 7 
METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................. 9 
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS .................................................................................................... 11 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................. 15 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 15 
PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCING AND STUDENT FUNDING .................................. 16 
Cost-sharing and higher education ..................................................................................................... 16 
Student loans – an important aspect of cost-sharing ........................................................................ 19 
Cost-sharing in Africa - from imposition to resistance .................................................................... 21 
Cost-sharing in South Africa: historical context, implementation and student resistance .................. 27 
Apartheid higher education funding system - for white and black ................................................... 27 
Declining state subsidy and tuition fee increase .............................................................................. 30 
Student responses to cost-sharing in South Africa ........................................................................... 31 
ACCESS .............................................................................................................................. 34 
STUDENT ACTIONS ............................................................................................................ 35 
Student activism ................................................................................................................................... 35 
Student participation in higher education governance ........................................................................ 41 
IMPLICATIONS AND RELEVANCE OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................... 46 
Gaps ..................................................................................................................................................... 49 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 50 
CHAPTER THREE: TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ................... 52 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 52 
CONCEPTUALISATION OF STUDENT ACTIONS .................................................................. 53 
Collective normative student action (Type 1) ...................................................................................... 57 
Collective non-normative student action (Type 2) ............................................................................... 59 
Student activism ................................................................................................................................... 59 
State-focused student activism ......................................................................................................... 61 
Institution-focused student activism ................................................................................................ 62 
Student leadership-focused student activism ................................................................................... 63 
INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS ........................................................................................................ 64 
Individual normative action (Type 3) .................................................................................................. 64 
Individual non-normative student actions (Type 4) ............................................................................. 65 
NON-ACTION ..................................................................................................................... 66 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 66 
  
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................ 68 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 68 
SELECTION OF THE UWC AS A CASE STUDY .................................................................... 68 
DATA COLLECTION ........................................................................................................... 70 
Interviews ............................................................................................................................................ 71 
Gaining access ................................................................................................................................. 71 
Selection criteria .............................................................................................................................. 72 
Process of interviewing .................................................................................................................... 74 
Data security: recording, transcription and storage .......................................................................... 77 
Participant observation .................................................................................................................... 78 
Documentation ................................................................................................................................. 80 
Data analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 81 
ADDRESSING ISSUES OF RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY ...................................................... 83 
Ensuring trustworthiness of the study .................................................................................................. 86 
METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY ........................................................... 87 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 88 
CHAPTER FIVE: STUDENT ACCESS AND FUNDING DEMANDS .................... 89 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 89 
POLITICAL CONTEXT ........................................................................................................ 90 
THE HISTORY AND ROLE OF UWC BEFORE THE 1994 DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS .......... 94 
STUDENT DEMAND FOR INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC SRCS .................................. 102 
STUDENT DEMAND FOR EXPANSION OF ACCESS ............................................................. 109 
STUDENT DEMAND FOR EXPANDED FINANCIAL AID AT UWC ....................................... 112 
The post-apartheid higher education policy: rejection of fee-free higher education and 
implementation of cost-sharing and NSFAS ...................................................................................... 116 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 118 
CHAPTER SIX: STUDENT ACTION TO ADDRESS ‘UNMET 
FINANCIAL NEED’ ..................................................................................................... 121 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 121 
STUDENT USE OF COLLECTIVE STUDENT ACTION BETWEEN 1995 AND 2000 ................ 121 
The case of the 1998 UWC conflict ................................................................................................... 122 
Origin of the dispute and the use of Type 1: collective normative student action .......................... 122 
Lobbying for external student support ........................................................................................... 124 
The use of collective non-normative student action ....................................................................... 126 
Resolution of campus conflict and reaching of a financial agreement ........................................... 129 
STUDENTS’ USE OF COLLECTIVE STUDENT ACTION BETWEEN 2000 AND 2005 ............. 133 
Student negotiations with Student Credit Management ..................................................................... 140 
The weaknesses of SCM ................................................................................................................ 145 
INDIVIDUAL STUDENT ACTIONS ...................................................................................... 147 
Individual normative student actions (Type 3) .................................................................................. 147 
Focus on the university registration process .................................................................................. 147 
Student negotiations with the UWC Financial Aid Office ............................................................. 153 
Self-initiated support ...................................................................................................................... 154 
Student-family networks ................................................................................................................ 158 
Individual student actions (Type 4) ................................................................................................... 161 
Student solidarity ........................................................................................................................... 161 
INTERPRETATIVE REFLECTION ON THE RESULTS .......................................................... 162 
Collective student actions before 2000 .............................................................................................. 162 
Collective student action after 2000 .................................................................................................. 165 
Individual student actions .................................................................................................................. 166 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 167 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 170 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 170 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS ................................................................................................ 171 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS .................................................................................................. 177 
Government’s paradoxical policy ...................................................................................................... 177 
Cost-sharing ...................................................................................................................................... 178 
Balancing financial sustainability and student affordability ............................................................. 179 
Collective student actions .................................................................................................................. 180 
The 1998 UWC conflict ..................................................................................................................... 181 
Individual student actions .................................................................................................................. 184 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 186 
APPENDIX A: INTERVIEWS .................................................................................... 226 
APPENDIX B: GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS ...................................................... 229 
APPENDIX C: DAILY NEWSPAPERS AND WEBSITES ...................................... 230 
APPENDIX D: REPORTS AND MINUTES .............................................................. 231 
Students .............................................................................................................................................. 231 
Institutional ........................................................................................................................................ 231 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 1: TYPOLOGY OF STUDENT ACTIVISM AIMED AT FUNDING POLICY .......................... 60 
TABLE 2: INSTITUTION-FOCUSED STUDENT ACTIVISM AIMED AT FUNDING POLICY ............. 62 
TABLE 3: NUMBER OF STUDENTS INTERVIEWED BY RACE .................................................. 76 
TABLE 4: PERCENTAGE OF INTERVIEWED STUDENTS BY PROVINCE .................................... 77 
TABLE 5. FUNDING GRANTS PARAMETERS BETWEEN 1999 AND 2006 .............................. 135 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE 1 MATRIX OF STUDENT ACTIONS ........................................................................... 55 
FIGURE 2 RECOVERABLE STUDENT FEE DEBT BETWEEN 1995 AND 2005 .......................... 101 
FIGURE 3: UWC BANK OVERDRAFT BETWEEN 1995 AND 2005 ........................................ 101 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
 
Introduction 
This purpose of this chapter is to identify the research problem, provide the 
rationale and propose the purpose of the research and research question. It also 
describes the research methodology and outlines the structure of the thesis.  
 
Statement of the problem 
In 1994, the South African democratic government inherited a higher education 
system that was “characterised by a high degree of fragmentation and 
incoherence, high levels of institutional inequality, an inequitable financing 
system, inequalities of access and undemocratic systems of governance” (Wolpe, 
1995a: 287). It was therefore believed that the transformation process should 
result in a higher education system that is “more socially equitable internally and 
promotes social equity more generally by providing opportunity for social 
advancement through equity of access and opportunity” (Badat, 2004: 3).  
 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the issues of equity, access and redress continued to 
dominate the post-apartheid national higher education policy and student agenda 
(see Barnes, 2006: 153; Cloete et al., 2006). In particular, all higher education 
stakeholders generally supported the call for the expansion of access to higher 
education, targeting especially poor and black students. The White Paper on 
Higher Education (1997) formally adopted and committed government to 
"expanded access [with a focus on equity and redress] through the planned 
expansion of the system over the next decade” (Cloete, 2004; 52; Cloete, 2011: 2). 
This was perhaps not in the same way or form as the National Council on Higher 
Education (NCHE) had envisaged: a specific form of expansion of access known 
as massification. Definitionally, as Jansen argued, massification in South Africa 
"assumed an absolute growth in student enrolments as well as more egalitarian 
distribution of students in higher education, one that reflected the race and gender 
profile of the nation" (2003:292). Altbach refers to massification as tremendous 
expansion of enrolments that has taken place worldwide in the past 30 years 
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(2011:302). The NCHE’s recommendation was informed in part by stark racial 
inequalities in the higher education participation rate: African students 
represented only one-sixth of the number of whites in 1992. Specifically, the 
participation rate of the age group of 18 to 21 year old Africans increased from 
5% in 1986 to 11% in 1992, while the rate of coloureds increased from 9% to 
12%, that of Indians increased from 32% to 37% and that of whites from 61% to 
65% in the same period. In the age group of 20 to 24 year old South Africans, the 
respective increases during the period 1986 to 1992 were 4% to 9% for Africans, 
7% to 10% for coloureds, 27% to 33% for Indians and 48% to 54% for whites 
(NCHE, 1996:33; see also Bunting, 1994).  
 
There are many implications of expanding access, including its impact on the 
public budget. The South African government committed itself to changing the 
composition of the student body by ensuring that the “relative proportion of public 
funding used to support academically able but disadvantaged students must be 
increased” (White Paper on Higher Education, 1997: 22). However, government 
argued that “fee-free higher education for students is not an affordable or 
sustainable option for South Africa” (White Paper on Higher Education, 1997: 
46). The reasons for this included: first, the knowledge and skills acquired in the 
course of achieving higher education qualifications generate significant lifetime 
private benefits for successful students, as well as long-range social benefits for 
the public at large. Second, although higher education institutions admit an 
increasingly large proportion of students from poor families, students from 
middle-class and wealthy families still tend to be disproportionately well-
represented (White Paper on Higher Education, 1997:46). Based on these two 
reasons, government supported “an approach to higher education funding based 
on a sharing of costs between private beneficiaries (students) and the state, 
representing the public interest” (White Paper on Higher Education, 1997: 57; see 
also NCHE 1996 and Green Paper on Higher Education 1996). The sharing of the 
burden of the costs of study is known as cost-sharing (Johnstone, 2006: 16). 
Government further stated that it was aware of “severe limits to the capacity of 
many students and their families to pay, particularly first generation students from 
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poor families” (White Paper on Higher Education, 1997:57). Accordingly, 
government established the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) in 
1999, which is an income-contingent loan scheme and typically part of a policy of 
cost-sharing (Johnstone 2003a: 8-9; see NSFAS 1999 Act).  
 
The post-apartheid higher education policy needs to be understood as having 
evolved in the context of an unsupportive macro-economic policy, fiscal austerity 
and belt-tightening driven through the state’s overall economic plan, called the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), adopted in 1996. As 
some writers argued, the policy put “limits on public spending and imposed fiscal 
constraints on higher education institutions” (Gibbon and Kabaki, 2006: 128). For 
Badat this limited (or even inadequate) funding “hindered the government in its 
progressive commitments to increasing student enrolment, participation, access 
and equity” (2004: 46). With hindsight, the post-apartheid higher education policy 
thus represents a paradox of simultaneous pursuit of (1) massive expansion of 
higher education for black students (,which in effect means creating opportunities 
of access to higher education for working class and poor students,) involving a 
policy of higher education massification in South Africa; and (2) a self-imposed 
commitment to fiscal 'austerity' reflected in the rejection of free higher education 
provision and provision of limited financial assistance and the adoption of cost-
sharing, which requires that students, including the working class and poor, pay a 
significant share of the costs of study. It is an interesting puzzle to investigate in 
the context of a university committed to providing access to the poor; in terms of 
the political processes and student behaviours it gave rise to and students’ lived 
experience of the ‘unmet financial needs’ that this paradoxical policy gave effect 
to at the case of the University of the Western Cape (UWC), which is a 
historically black university (HBU) with a history of deep institutional 
commitment to opening access to black working-class and poor students.   
 
The specific moment UWC found itself in during the immediate post-apartheid 
years was certainly complicated, if not worsened, by the effect of the democratic 
government’s paradoxical higher education policy of expansion of access and 
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limited funding (with cost-sharing promoted as policy solution). Historically, 
UWC experienced a high demand for the expansion of student access, particularly 
from historically disadvantaged and poor students. Student culture at that 
institution is historically characterised by high-level student activism to advance 
their demands and struggles for democratisation (Maseko, 1994). They linked 
their demands and struggles for access and equitable funding to the broader 
liberation struggle which they had participated in originally as a struggle against 
the illegitimate and repressive apartheid state and for equality, freedom and social 
justice prior to 1990, but which changed and came to be focused inwardly on their 
campus during the transition to and after the attainment of democracy.  
 
In the 1980s, UWC acceded to student demands for the expansion of access and 
opened its ‘doors of learning’ in a political context that was “savagely opposed to 
it” (Muller, 2009: 4). While UWC won a “special place in the history of higher 
education in South Africa, and deserved reputation for its role in the creation of 
democratic order, it came at a cost” (UWC, 2002: 19-21). The ‘cost’ came from 
two fronts. First, the apartheid regime reduced its budget subsidy to UWC and 
other HBUs that had defied it. The apartheid regime revised its funding policy 
following the decision of UWC (and other HBUs) to open access to all students 
irrespective of colour, ethnicity or origin. The revised funding policy combined 
student enrolment growth (which was the most important factor in the old subsidy 
formula) with student success as two major factors for consideration in the 
allocation of resources to institutions. This disadvantaged institutions that were 
committed to the enrolment of poor students who were often academically 
underprepared; thus the institutions’ funding levels were reduced.  
 
Second, given the fact most students who benefited from UWC’s democratisation 
of access were poor and unable to pay their fees, the university was “unable to 
collect from all its students their full contribution to their education, and a student 
debt developed over time” (UWC, 2002: 21). In consequence, UWC faced an 
increasing challenge of financial sustainability and student affordability. Given 
the persistent gross inequalities and imbalances in the higher education sector, the 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
'advent of democracy' in 1994 had "justifiably raised the hopes and expectations 
of many for fundamental and sweeping change" (Barnes, 2006:153). This was 
particularly true for students who, based on their historical role during the national 
liberation struggle and alignment with the liberation movement, could legitimately 
hope and expect that the post-apartheid government would be understanding and 
sympathetic to their concerns and thus develop higher education policies that 
would expand access, create more equal opportunities and provide equitable 
financial aid to historically disadvantaged black and poor students.  
 
According to a UWC self-evaluation report, UWC accepted a call by the post-
apartheid government to “allow indigent’ students to enrol without paying” 
(UWC, 2007: 6). This occurred against the background of rising student debt and 
thus placed the university in a precarious financial position (UWC, 2007: 6). 
Financially distressed, UWC continued to draw students from the “less wealthy 
sectors of society who have access to fewer resources and have had poorer 
schooling” (CHE, 2010: 8). In doing so, UWC had to continuously confront the 
challenge of ensuring both institutional sustainability and student affordability, 
which at times resulted in serious confrontations with students.  
 
Research purpose and question 
The way that UWC dealt with its own financial challenges simultaneously with 
the implementation of the post-apartheid higher education policy provides a point 
of interest into this study. Any decision or action that the university was going to 
take was bound to have an impact on students’ experiences and their ability to 
access and complete higher education. Given the historical role of student 
activism at UWC, I was specifically interested in understanding the type of 
behaviours that students would employ in order to address their funding problems.  
 
The purpose of the study is therefore to understand what I call the paradoxical 
government policy of an expansion of student access to historically disadvantaged 
and poor students and in a context of commitments to limiting public funding of 
higher education (with cost-sharing being promoted as policy solution) in terms of 
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its effects on UWC and particularly student actions between 1995 and 2005. In the 
study, I am neither intending to offer a critique nor make policy 
recommendations. Rather, my study is about the 'human cost' or 'effects on the 
ground' of what amounts to a paradoxical government policy in the context of the 
case of UWC. 
 
The key research questions driving the study are: 
a) How did UWC confront the paradoxical post-apartheid higher education 
policy of expansion of access and limited funding?  
b)  How did students address the resulting problem of ‘unmet financial need’ 
at UWC? 
 
According to Spencer, ‘unmet financial need’ “is a gap between total educational 
costs and available funding” (Spencer, 2002: 153). I argue that the problem of 
unmet financial need emerges at the individual level as historically disadvantaged, 
poor students are required to share the burden of the costs of study. The literature 
on the concept of cost-sharing provides an understanding of, and a rationale for, 
the notion of sharing the burden of the cost of the study. Since its emergence, 
cost-sharing has been promoted as policy solution to persistently escalating 
student demand for access and enrolment and inadequate public funding or 
financial austerity problems experienced by higher education institutions in both, 
developing and developed countries (Altbach, 2011: 308; see also Woodhall, 
2002).  
 
Cost-sharing is conceptualised as “the introduction of, or especially sharp 
increases in, tuition fees to cover part of the costs of instruction or of user charges 
to cover more of the costs of lodging, food, and other expenses of student living 
that may have hitherto been borne substantially by governments (taxpayers) or 
institutions” (Johnstone, 2006: 16). It has been suggested that students and their 
parents should increasingly shoulder “a greater share of higher education costs, 
usually through higher education tuition fees and paid for more often with loans 
and student jobs instead of grants” (Johnstone, 2006: 16; see also Merisotis and 
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Wolanin, 2002; Van Harte, 2004; Vossensteyn, 2005). Potentially, students who 
can afford to pay their contribution would not have a problem in this regard. 
However, for poor students, the demand to pay their contribution to the costs of 
study becomes a problem, which may be conceptualised as an unmet financial 
need.  
 
Rationale 
There are academic, political and moral reasons for conducting this study. From 
an academic perspective, the survey of international literature shows that a lot has 
been done to understand the phenomenon of student activism, its role and impact 
(Luescher, 2005: 1; Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 262). However, some writers 
have raised concerns about the focus of the literature, which has “mainly been on 
industrialised nations and less on developing nations” (Byaruhanga, 2006: xviii; 
Munene, 2009: 117) and a lack of serious research on the role of students in 
democratic transitions (Zeilig and Dawson, 2008: 9). While the study of student 
activism in South Africa is relatively developed (e.g. Alence, 1999; Badat, 1999, 
1997, 1995; Cele, 2009; Maseko, 1994; Murray, 1993, 1990; Naidoo, 2006; 
Pithouse, 2006; Odhav, 1997; Sikwebu, 2008), it generally focuses on national 
political issues and rarely links student activism with the issues of student 
funding. 
 
Prior to 1994, student struggles typically revolved around racist political 
institutions, campaigns of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), political 
repression and similar issues (Badat, 1995: 145). However, the post-1994 era 
brought changes in the student struggles. Wolpe argues that the previous 
concentration on issues of political rights and state power gave way to "relatively 
un-coordinated and fragmented engagements around education, which have 
become virtually uncoupled from the struggle for political liberation and 
economic emancipation" (Wolpe, 1994: 7; see also Badat, 1995, Luescher-
Mamashela and Mugume, 2014). Thus, this study seeks to contribute to 
understanding changes in student struggles and particularly changes in the form of 
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student action, which largely targeted educational concerns, especially the 
problem of unmet financial need. 
  
Secondly, the literature provides some account of student activism in Africa 
against tuition fees, the abolishment of student allowances, poor living and 
accommodation conditions (whether as part of fighting against cost-sharing or 
structural adjustment programmes [SAPs] and their effects), which resulted in 
some instances in student arrests, killings, or expulsion from campuses (see 
Alidou, Caffentzis and Federici, 2008; Byaruhanga, 2006; Fukwang, 2009; 
Konings, 2009). References to student funding, however, appear largely 
coincidental at times. This is in part because the interest tends to be more in the 
role of students in dealing with larger social and political concerns (such as 
repressive regimes, SAPs) than in matters related to higher education policy.  
 
Thirdly, the literature rarely provides accounts of individual student experiences 
or detailed accounts of the role of Student Representative Councils (SRCs), 
student guilds or student unions, in addressing the problem of sharing the burden 
of the cost of study. In fact, students in general are frequently treated at student 
body level, as if this was a homogenous body, thus putting individual student 
actions and intra-student dynamics such as the relationship between the student 
leadership and the rank and file beyond the scope of many studies.  
 
My study seeks to address some of the above-mentioned gaps. It will seek to 
provide evidence emerging from the ‘ground’ on students’ lived experience of the 
post-1994 government policy implementation. This study is therefore partly about 
what Jansen referred to as “unseen pains of transitions” (2004: 118). Thus, it 
prominently includes interviewing and documenting student experiences across 
different races, ages, faculties and political orientations at UWC.  
 
Moreover, the study seeks to contribute to the understanding of post-apartheid 
higher education transformation and student funding policy by providing the 
perspective of students shaped by their experiences, challenges and roles, as well 
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as changing political conditions. UWC is an important case where students 
frequently set the pace of transformation. The study provides an account of the 
shifts in student politics from a politics of resistance to one of co-operative 
governance, and the implications of this shift on how students addressed their 
problem of unmet financial need.  
 
From the political and moral perspective, my study emanates from a deep concern 
for the high levels of inequality across all spheres of life in South Africa. As the 
son of a domestic worker and Transnet labourer, I personally experienced the 
brutality and loss of human dignity in not having enough money to access higher 
education, remain at university, and complete higher education studies.  
 
Yet, as a student activist and leader, I realised that my situation was better than 
that of others that I served. I refused to be a victim. I saw other students who, like 
me, refused the status of victimhood. The power and collective struggles of 
students helped me to register for my second, third and final years without having 
to pay the full required registration fees. I therefore wanted to study the process 
and dynamics of inclusion and exclusion that enabled me to gain an education 
while it excluded so many others. 
 
Methodology  
I shall use a single case study method in conducting this study. A case study is a 
“process of inquiry about the case and the product of that inquiry” (Stake, 2005: 
444). There are several reasons for choosing a qualitative single case study 
approach to conduct an investigation. First, a case study is a “common way to do 
qualitative inquiry” (Stake, 2005: 443). Second, UWC as a case offers an 
“opportunity to learn” (Stake, 2005: 451). Third, choosing a case study approach 
generally helps to “understand complex social phenomena” in their context (Yin, 
1994: 3). The case study method allows for the investigation of specific issues in 
their real-life context where the issues to be investigated are integrally linked to 
the context. Thus, as Babbie and Mouton put it, “the interaction of the unit of 
analysis with its context is a significant part of investigation in case studies” 
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(2001: 283). I provide specific reasons for selecting UWC as my case study in 
Chapter Four. They include UWC’s principled but risky commitment to expand 
access to poor and African students in the 1980s, which was an antithesis to the 
apartheid agenda of white supremacy and racial bigotry.  
 
Second, the post-apartheid era presented UWC with different challenges, 
including redefining its role and relationship with the state. In particular, I was 
interested in determining how UWC would respond to the paradoxical 
government higher education policy, given its historical commitment to 
expanding access to poor students.  
 
Third, students were facing unfamiliar challenges as they defined themselves as 
allies of the African National Congress (ANC)-led MDM while the challenges 
they confronted mostly emerged when the ANC-led government policy and 
students’ ‘bread and butter’ issues did not complement each other. For me, the 
historic 1998 UWC conflict presents an interesting particular case within a much 
larger question which remains to be investigated.  
 
Furthermore, I chose UWC because of its establishment of a Student Credit 
Management (SCM) office, which was a brainchild of students. SCM came to be 
responsible for debt management (including debt collection and payments) and 
financial risk management at the institution (including forecasting the 
implications of re-admitting debt-ridden students). SCM was also responsible for 
student billing and played a leading and central role in negotiations between the 
university management and students towards financial agreements. 
  
Finally, I chose UWC for practical reasons, because I had ease of access and 
already an experiential ‘knowledge’ of the institution and its stakeholders. Blatter 
argues that having access is another important criterion for selecting cases (2008: 
69). I was employed as a researcher at one of the university’s research institutes 
from 2000 to 2005. As a UWC employee, a researcher in student politics and an 
active participant in campus politics for five years, I was able to conduct research 
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as an ‘insider’ thus giving me the emic perspective sought in in-depth case study 
research.  
 
As noted, the study uses multiple sources of data, including interviews, official 
documents and observation notes. Using multiple sources of data is “important in 
case studies of all kinds” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 282) and the main advantage 
of using multiple sources of data is the ability “to triangulate” (Yin, 2009: 261). 
Triangulation has generally involves “a process of using multiple perceptions to 
clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation” 
(Stake, 2005: 454). It is used to avoid the “common problems of bias, poor recall 
and poor or inaccurate articulation” (Yin, 1994: 85). Triangulation is also an 
important tool of ensuring the trustworthiness of the study’s findings and 
conclusions, which is a critical aspect of qualitative research study. I then 
highlight the limitations of my study. 
 
The case study report is presented in Chapters Five and Six. They deal 
respectively with the nature of student demands (that is, demands for the 
establishment of a democratic and independent SRC; access and equitable student 
funding) and the related post-apartheid government policy response as well as an 
analysis of the various ways in which students address their problem of unmet 
financial need at UWC by applying the conceptual framework. 
 
Outline of chapters 
Chapter Two reviews the accessible scholarly literature that I consider relevant to 
the research problem and question. First, I review literature on international and 
national financing of higher education. The focus of the analysis is on cost-
sharing and South African public financing of higher education policy. I shall 
show that cost-sharing is a highly contested concept and presented as a funding 
policy solution to a higher education funding crisis, which arises as a function of 
escalating student demand for access and enrolment on the one hand, and 
declining state subsidy and related pressure for diversification of funding sources 
on the other hand. In Africa, cost-sharing has frequently been ‘imposed’ as a 
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conditionality conjoined with SAPs in several countries; there are only few 
countries such as South Africa, which have a pre-1990s history of some form of 
cost-sharing and/or ‘voluntarily’ embraced cost-sharing. The introduction of cost-
sharing has resulted in different kinds of student actions in countries that 
‘voluntarily’ accepted it and those that somewhat ‘involuntarily’ accepted it.  
 
Second, I review the literature on access to higher education. I argue that access 
and funding are closely intertwined. Funding can facilitate or inhibit the 
achievement of access in higher education. In particular, the problem of students' 
limited ability to pay for the cost of study, i.e. students’ unmet financial need, can 
inhibit access, which in turn may provoke various kinds of student action. I shall 
show that there are different types of access and I will review literature on 
different kinds of student actions, especially student activism as ‘informal 
governance’ (Luescher, 2005: 2) involving student participation in ‘extraordinary 
governance processes’ (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 262) and student 
representation in higher education governance as ‘formal governance’ (Luescher, 
2005: 2) or participation in ‘ordinary governance processes’ (Pabian and 
Minksová, 2011: 262). I then identify gaps and implications of the literature 
review in relation to my study.  
 
Chapter Three uses the results of the literature review to develop a conceptual 
framework for the case study. This conceptual framework serves a heuristic 
function. It is a guide to data collection, analysis and interpretation. I am inspired 
by Wright et al.’s framework (1990) to conceptualise student actions as the 
possible behaviours of disadvantaged group members in terms of different ideal 
types. This enables me to construct a matrix of two continuums, i.e. a horizontal 
continuum ranging from collective to individual actions at the end of each 
extreme; and a vertical continuum consisting of normative and non-normative 
elements at the end of each extreme. The examination of the relationships between 
the continuums lead to an emergent typology of four diffeent kinds of student 
actions, which I then categorise as collective normative and collective non-
normative, and individual normative and individual non-normative types. In 
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addition, I clarify concepts such as student activism, student body, student 
organisations and student to clarify their use in this study.  
 
Chapter Four provides the overall research design and methodology of the study. I 
provide reasons for selecting UWC as a case study and the use of the single case 
study methodology. I discuss the construction of the case study database in terms 
of data collection (interviews, observation and documentation) and data analysis, 
and matters related to the trustworthiness of the study’s findings. I also identify 
the methodological limitations of the study. 
 
Chapter Five provides the broader ideological and policy context of post-apartheid 
South African higher education, which sets up the analysis of UWC student 
actions against the problem of unmet financial need in Chapter Six. Specifically, I 
examine historical student demands (that is, demands for the establishment of a 
democratic and independent SRC, demands for access, and for equitable student 
funding) and the related post-apartheid government’s policy response. I shall 
show in Chapter Five that (a) there was dissonance between student expectations 
and the post-apartheid higher education policy; that (b) there was a historical 
context to both student policy expectations and government’s policy responses; 
and (c) that the policy response regarding access and funding seen together 
amount to a problematic, indeed a paradoxical, combination of policies, which, as 
I shall show in Chapter Six, leads to unmet financial need and various and 
changing ways of students addressing the problem of unmet financial need.  
 
Chapter Six thus describes and analyses the various actions that UWC students 
undertook both as a collective and as individuals to address the problem of unmet 
financial need. It finds that students used collective normative and collective non-
normative actions in a complementary manner prior to 2000. The period between 
2000 and 2005 in turn was characterised by an absence of collective non-
normative action, especially student activism. Instead, students relied on 
collective normative action to address the problem of unmet financial need. In 
addition, I shall explore various individual student actions aimed at addressing the 
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student problem of ‘unmet financial need’. Chapter Six thus applies the 
framework developed in Chapter Three. The thesis concludes with Chapter Seven 
highlighting the main findings and conclusions and offering recommendations for 
future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
This study examines various ways in which UWC confronted the paradoxical 
post-apartheid higher education policy of expansion of access and limited funding 
and how UWC students addressed the resulting problem of unmet financial need 
between 1995 and 2005. The previous chapter provided a general introduction to 
the thesis, including a statement of the problem statement and identifying the 
research purpose and research questions. This chapter presents a literature review 
based on accessible scholarly literature. First, I review literature on international 
and national financing of higher education. The particular focus is on cost-
sharing, which the literature finds to be a highly contested concept. Cost-sharing 
is considered a policy solution to a higher education funding crisis attributed to an 
escalating student demand for access and enrolment, declining state subsidy and 
related pressure for diversification of funding sources. The World Bank played an 
important role in conceptualising and promoting cost-sharing, especially in 
developing countries. In particular in Africa, cost-sharing was imposed and 
conjoined with SAPs in several countries, while other countries ‘voluntarily’ 
embraced cost-sharing. South Africa is among the few African countries which 
have a pre-liberation history of cost-sharing; given the first post-apartheid 
government’s commitment to the transformation of higher education (and, indeed, 
society), the cost-sharing and its continuation in South African policy warrants, 
however, a closer inspection. Moreover, as the literature shows, cost-sharing has 
resulted in various kinds of student actions in both, countries that ‘voluntarily’ 
accepted or ‘involuntarily’ accepted it.  
 
Second, I review the literature on access to higher education, as access and 
funding are closely intertwined. Funding can facilitate or inhibit the achievement 
of access to higher education. In particular, the problem of unmet financial need 
can inhibit access, which is the reason for student actions. I shall show that there 
are different types of access. Thirdly, I review literature on various kinds of 
student political actions. The analysis of student actions in general and student 
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activism and student participation in higher education in particular is directly 
relevant to the research questions. I shall show in the discussion that students 
undertake different actions in addressing their funding problems. Student actions 
depend on context and prevailing conditions. Student actions affect the 
relationship between students and society. The role and meaning of the concept 
‘students’ continuously change.  
 
This chapter is structured according to three themes, namely public higher 
education financing and student funding; access and student actions (student 
activism and student participation in higher education governance). It concludes 
by identifying implications, relevance and gaps of the literature for the study. 
 
Public higher education financing and student funding 
 
Cost-sharing and higher education  
Cost-sharing is a relatively new concept despite the fact that some of its 
associated elements (such as tuition fees) predate it. Cost-sharing has been 
conceptualised as “the introduction of, or especially sharp increases in, tuition 
fees to cover part of the costs of instruction or of user charges to cover more of 
the costs of lodging, food, and other expenses of student living that may have 
hitherto been borne substantially by governments (taxpayers) or institutions” 
(Johnstone, 2006: 16). The origin of cost-sharing can be traced back to World 
Bank studies and its associated experts (including Johnstone, 1991, 1993; 
Woodhall, 1992; World Bank, 1994; Ziderman & Albrecht, 1995; Johnstone, 
Arora & Experton, 1998) who recommended the supplementation of higher 
educational revenue by non-governmental sources - primarily students and family 
as an important policy solution to increasingly underfunded and overcrowded 
universities in the developing world (Johnstone and Shroff-Mehta, 2000: 8).  
 
According to Mamdani, World Bank studies claimed to show that the rate of 
return on investment in higher education was much lower than that in secondary 
or primary education, and that the benefit was mainly private. The World Bank 
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drew two conclusions from this, namely that the “beneficiaries should share a 
significant part of the cost of higher education; and, two, that the state should 
reduce funding to higher education” (Mamdani, 2008: 8). Thus, the ideological 
basis of cost-sharing is such that higher education has both public and private 
benefits and that any funding policy must entail state subsidy and tuition fees that 
must be paid by students and their parents and "paid for more often with loans and 
student jobs instead of grants” (Johnstone, 2006: 16; see also Merisotis and 
Wolanin, 2002; Van Harte, 2004; Vossensteyn, 2005).  
 
Since its emergence, cost-sharing has also been promoted as policy solution to the 
persisting escalating student demand for access and enrolment and inadequate 
funding or financial austerity problems experienced by higher education 
institutions in developing and developed countries (Altbach, 2011: 308).  
 
The degree of acceptance of cost-sharing has varied from one form of cost-sharing 
to another and from one country to another. According to Johnstone (2004: 5), 
some forms of cost-sharing are “relatively acceptable”. These include small 
earmarked fees such as registration, examination, or caution fees - but not yet 
tuition (for example in Nigeria, Egypt and India); the ‘freezing’ of the value of 
student grants (in most African countries, the United States and Russia); the 
introduction of tuition fees only for students not admitted to ‘free’ slots, thus 
resulting in dual or parallel track student bodies (for example in Uganda, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Russia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary); the 
encouragement of, and even provision of revenue support to, a tuition-dependent 
private sector (in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, the Philippines, Japan, Korea, 
Brazil, Russia); enhancing the recovery of student loans (e.g. in South Africa, 
Kenya, Ghana, and the United States);l and the introduction of tuition fees in the 
form of deferred contributions (in Australia, New Zealand, Scotland).  
 
Johnstone has also identified some forms of cost-sharing that could be described 
as “unpopular and unacceptable”. For instance, the payment of ‘upfront tuition 
fees’ in public institutions remains ‘unpopular’ in South Africa and Mozambique 
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as well as in Britain, the Netherlands, Austria, China, Mongolia and Vietnam 
(2004: 5). The cutting or elimination of some student support grants is another 
form of cost-sharing that is ‘unpopular’ in most African countries as well as the 
United Kingdom (UK).  
 
Moreover, the literature differentiates between contributions (or shares) of parents 
and students. Johnstone argues that a parent’s contribution is based on the 
principle that parents are obliged to pay for the educational costs of their 
“financially dependent” children “at least to the limit of their financial ability” 
(2006: 26-28). Beyond the dependency principle, Merisotis and Wolanin argue 
that parents should pay for the education of their children “not only because of the 
personal benefits the parents can expect to enjoy but also because it is their 
responsibility and their obligation as parents” (2002: 1). While this can be 
described as a “common cultural value”, it is not universal as cultures “clearly 
vary considerably in the degree to which parents are expected to pay for the 
education of their children, particularly education beyond secondary school” 
(Merisotis and Wolanin, 2002: 1). 
 
On the student side, Johnstone argues that the theory behind the suitability of a 
student contribution is based “almost entirely on the assumption of substantial 
personal and private benefits from the higher education” (2006: 29). These 
presumed benefits may be manifested in having higher incomes, pleasant jobs, 
higher social status, improved living conditions and having a secured economic 
future for their children compared to those without higher education (Merisotis & 
Wolanin, 2002: 1).  
 
Financial assistance plays an important role in relation to student contributions. 
As Woodhall argues, financial assistance enables students to pay direct and 
indirect costs of higher education (tuition fees, books and living expenses) and the 
fact that it ensures “equality of opportunity, equity, and social justice is rarely 
questioned” (Woodhall, 2004: 38). However, the form that such financial 
assistance should take (in particular, whether it should be in the form of universal 
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or means-tested grants or bursaries, competitive scholarships, sponsorships, 
sponsorship by employers, subsidised job opportunities, or student loans) remains 
“a matter of fierce dispute” (Woodhall, 2004: 38).  
 
The issue of financial assistance has been a critical part of student demands or a 
focus of student struggles on various campuses, including UWC during the 
apartheid era and beyond. In the next section, I am going to explore student loans 
as a form of financial assistance. This is in part because the NSFAS became the 
primary means of post-apartheid higher education student loan funding in South 
Africa.  
 
Student loans – an important aspect of cost-sharing 
Johnstone argues that student loans, or any other sort of what are sometimes 
called deferred payment plans (including all forms of income-contingent and so-
called graduate tax schemes, as well as more conventional, or mortgage type, 
forms of lending) “are integral to any policy that features as a share of higher 
educational costs to be borne by students” (2003a: 8).  
 
Johnstone argues that student loans purport to achieve two distinct aims. Firstly, 
such schemes “are usually part of a policy of cost sharing” (2003a: 8-9). 
Secondly, loan schemes are ways to enhance student participation or accessibility 
to higher education (Johnstone, 2003a: 8-9). Consequently, equity would be 
achieved in "either (or both) by increasing the total revenue stream and thus 
expanding higher education’s capacity (and thus its accessibility), and also by 
making it possible for would-be students without parental or other sources of 
support nonetheless to invest in their own higher education" (Johnstone, 2003: 8-
9).  
 
The literature has identified problems associated with the implementation of 
student loans in developing countries. According to Woodhall there has not been 
an agreement on the feasibility or whether student loan schemes “can ever work 
successfully, particularly in developing countries - and if so, how best to design 
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and manage student loan programmes effectively” (2004: 38). Repayment of 
student loans has been identified as another problem being experienced more 
acutely in developing countries than in developed countries. This is in part 
because developed countries have “extensive reporting and monitoring of 
virtually all income and with a culture of voluntary income tax compliance may 
be able to overcome these problems, as Sweden and Australia seem to have done” 
(Johnstone and Marcucci, 2009: 19). In contrast, in developing countries, sources 
of income are “frequently multiple, highly variable, and often unreported, the 
problem of establishing the repayment obligation may be enormous and virtually 
invites misrepresentation of income and almost certain repayment shortfalls” 
(Johnstone and Marcucci, 2009: 19). It has been noted that “most loan 
programmes in Africa (as much as in Latin America and elsewhere in the 
developing world) simply do not recover payments” (Johnstone, 2006: 24; see 
also Johnstone, 2000; Ziderman, 2002; Ziderman & Albrecht, 1995).  
 
Students’ aversion to debt and willingness to borrow has been identified as one of 
the problems related to student loans (Vossensteyn, 2005: 22). Students from 
lower-social economic status groups were “more likely to be deterred by higher 
education costs and the prospects of debt” (Vossensteyn, 2005: 42). As a result, 
some prospective students “who are not certain about going to higher education 
are strongly attracted to the financial independence of getting a job instead of 
studying” (Vossensteyn, 2005: 42-43).  
 
Others who are uncertain but eventually end up going to higher education 
institutions are “more likely to reduce their study costs and debt by enrolling in 
shorter, lower level, less advanced and more vocational courses” (Vossensteyn, 
2005: 42-43). Students seem to “believe that debt deters entry into higher 
education, and often regard it as one of the drawbacks of student life” 
(Vossensteyn, 2005: 43). The research results of Leslie and Brinkman (1988); 
Heller (1997) and Dynarski (2003) all found that grants increased the likelihood 
of enrolment of students and had stronger effects on students from low-income 
families than on students from middle- and high-income families (Vossensteyn, 
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2005: 37). In the Netherlands, one of the reasons for the decline in willingness to 
borrow was “the 1992 introduction of interest on student loans during college 
time” (Vossensteyn, 2005: 45).  
 
Some of the challenges of student loans were confirmed by delegates attending a 
student loan workshop that took place in Tanzania in 2008. Delegates identified 
two challenging realities confronting cost-sharing in developing countries. The 
first reality was the ‘political opposition’ to cost-sharing. The delegates argued 
that political parties tended to use their opposition to cost-sharing as “focal point 
to galvanise support and foment campus unrest” (ICHEFAP, 2008: 3). The second 
reality related to the fact that any meaningful contribution to the costs of their 
higher education (including both tuition fees and the cost of student living) would 
require students to ‘defer’ in one way or the other study costs “until after 
completion of higher education and entry into the adult workforce - presumably at 
a salary that reflects the expected greater productivity of college or university 
graduates: in other words, a student loan scheme” (ICHEFAP, 2008: 3).  
 
Cost-sharing in Africa - from imposition to resistance 
As noted above, the policy of cost-sharing in Africa is both voluntary and 
involuntary. Cost-sharing was imposed in most African countries as part of World 
Bank higher education sector or structural adjustment credit in the 1990s, which 
was an aspect of SAPs (Wangenge-Ouma, 2008: 219, see also Fokwang, 2009 
[Cameroon]; Kiamba, 2003, Ouma, 2007). In this sense cost-sharing can be seen 
as involuntary.  
 
South Africa is one of the few countries that voluntarily accepted and embraced 
cost-sharing as a critical component of post-funding policy. In the case of South 
Africa, there are two possible reasons for the voluntary acceptance of cost-
sharing. South Africa has a long history of tuition fees, upfront payments and fee 
increases, which predates the advent or emergence of cost-sharing both as concept 
and preferred funding policy solution internationally. Secondly, cost-sharing 
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seems to resonate with post-apartheid macro-economic policy. I shall examine 
cost-sharing in South Africa and student responses separately.  
 
There has been resistance to various forms of cost-sharing in different countries 
and campuses. Student resistance took different forms. In Cameroon, during the 
1994/95 academic year of the University of Buea (UB), the university 
administration tried to co-opt parents through the establishment of a Parent 
Faculty Association in a bid to stave off its financial crisis. The idea was to 
“create awareness of the need to diversify the university’s sources of income 
instead of depending exclusively on the government” (Fukwang, 2009: 15).  
 
Students interpreted this action as the administration’s strategy to increase fees 
(Fukwang, 2009: 15; see also Konings, 2009). Student leadership mobilised the 
“student population against the idea, again pitting students against the 
administration in defiance of the ban on student strikes” (Fukwang, 2009: 15). 
The ‘ban on student strikes’ had been introduced following the initial student 
strike in 1993, when students “vehemently opposed some of the 1993 university 
reform measures, in particular the abolition of scholarships and the introduction of 
tuition fees” (Konings, 2009: 217). Perhaps feeling aggrieved and undermined, Dr 
Njeuma, the head of the university, ordered students and parents to “sign an 
undertaking never to indulge in strike actions” (Konings, 2009: 217). Nonetheless, 
students managed to achieve their objectives in 1994/95 despite the fact that some 
of them were “suspended indefinitely for inciting students to strike” (Fukwang, 
2009: 15; see also Konings, 2009).  
 
In Kenya, in 1989, political opposition and student unrest successfully resisted the 
government’s efforts to implement tuition fees in universities. The resistance 
occurred despite “the fact that expansion of student numbers from 8, 000 in 1984 
to 40, 000 in 1990 imposed an unsustainable financial burden on government 
funds” (Woodhall, 2003: 47). At Kenyatta University and Egerton University 
students rioted in the mid-1990s over mismanaged loan payments and the 
exorbitant cost of university room and board. The police arrived at the scene and 
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crushed the student uprising. At the University of Nairobi, students demonstrated 
too and then rioted in 1997 over increases in tuition and government efforts to 
collect student loans. Armed riot police arrived on the campus and attacked the 
students with clubs, whips and guns, while the protesters fought back with stones. 
The police rampage left several students dead (Boren, 2001: 242).  
 
In the late 1990s, the dual track tuition policy was introduced in Kenya and 
resulted in two types of students: government-funded students who are admitted 
for ‘free or nearly free’ and self-funded students who are admitted and expected to 
pay in order to supplement revenue (Marcucci, Johnstone & Ngolovoi, 2008: 3). 
In 1998, the University of Nairobi introduced the dual-track tuition policy called 
Model II or Parallel Programmes in the Faculties of Commerce, Law, Education, 
Medicine, Pharmacy, Dental Sciences and Engineering, as well as the Institute of 
Computer Science. The dual-track tuition policy served to supplement 
government revenue.  
 
Johnstone (2006: 22) argues that dual-track tuition policies have been successful 
with respect to wages, faculty retention, infrastructure and technology. However, 
dual-track tuition policies or programmes also had several negative consequences. 
Zeleza argues that as fees rise or become more differentiated across programmes, 
learning increasingly becomes a “market transaction and consumer mentality 
takes hold among the high fee paying students, thereby weakening their collective 
capacity to protect their rights and the quality of their education” (2003: 165). 
 
The Makerere University Council and administration imposed cost-sharing in 
1990/91 (Mamdani, 2007: 15). Mamdani argued that the Makerere University 
faced “the drying up of financial resources as if it were a natural fact, something 
beyond its control” (2007: 9). The government was “in a position to set priorities, 
but within constraints of diminishing resources and with the full knowledge that it 
would have to shoulder responsibility for policy outcomes” (Mamdani, 2007: 9). 
Conversely, the World Bank was a “powerful creditor that was in the enviable 
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position of setting ‘conditionalities’ without being held responsible for failed 
policies and adverse consequences” (Mamdani, 2007: 9).  
 
Mamdani then argued that “not surprisingly, the Makerere University Council’s 
first option was to look for ways to cut cost rather than to change policy 
priorities” (Mamdani, 2007: 9). The Makerere University Council made its 
decision “long before government commissions raised the issue; Makerere 
University Council began to explore cost-sharing as an option” (Mamdani, 2007: 
9-10) in a “context … increasingly being defined by the World Bank” (Mamdani, 
2007: 10; see also Wangenge-Ouma, 2008). So the cost-sharing was a “top-down 
strategy pushed by the Makerere University Council and the administration and 
opposed by staff and students” (Mamdani, 2007: 17; see also Byaruhanga, 2006).  
 
Students led strong resistance and opposition to reforms at Makerere University 
between 1989 and 1994. The resistance took various forms. Firstly, student 
leadership engaged the student body partly to receive a mandate on the 
appropriate direction and actions to be taken. On Saturday 01 December 1990, the 
student guild leadership “convened a general assembly to solicit students’ 
response to a letter from the permanent secretary, Ministry of Education Fr. Pius 
Tibanyendera, restating the government’s decision to abolish student allowances 
(book, transport allowances and pocket money [‘boom’])” (Byaruhanga, 2006: 
97). The contents of the letter “enraged the students, who quickly decided to call a 
Student Emergency General Assembly on 1 December 1990. The second student 
action involved negotiations with the university management. Students invited the 
Vice-chancellor to attend the assembly and listen to students’ concerns, but “he 
declined the invitation, charging that he had not been informed ahead of time” 
(Byaruhanga, 2006: 97). Students then passed a vote of no confidence in the Vice-
chancellor, “accusing him of dereliction of duty by prevaricating on student 
matters” (Byaruhanga, 2006: 97). Students also accused the Vice-chancellor of 
previously having served on the Visitation Committee (appointed by President 
Yoweri Museveni) in 1987 and as chairman of the Education Policy Review 
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Commission, which proposed the introduction of cost-sharing in education 
(Mamdani, 2007: 17).  
 
Thirdly, student actions involved defiance, class boycotts and peaceful 
demonstrations against the government decision to eliminate student allowances 
(2006: 99). Despite a stern warning letter from the vice-chancellor against the 
planned boycott, students “staged a peaceful demonstration on Wednesday 
December 5, during which a group of about 3000 students marched around 
campus sounding their displeasure toward the vice-chancellor, while renewing 
their demands for allowances” ( Byaruhanga, 2006: 99).  
 
Again, on Monday morning, 10 December 1990, students began to “converge at 
the main building for the planned assembly, but suddenly the situation turned 
sour. Before the guild president arrived, police, who were earlier deployed to 
intercept the assemblage began to open fire, killing two students” (Byaruhanga, 
2006: 99). Government “ordered closure of the university on 10 December 1990, 
sending all students home” (Mamdani, 2007: 17). Government continued “with a 
coercive and administrative response, compelling students individually to sign 
statements that combined a total renunciation of the strike with a blanket 
acceptance of all future decisions of the authorities” (Mamdani, 2007: 17). Part of 
the statement required that the student “sign a statement of abject surrender in 
schoolboy fashion” (Mamdani: 2007: 18). The last student action against cost-
sharing was “the march to Parliament on 10 May 1994, and the agitation at 
Freedom Square the day after” (Mamdani, 2007: 18-19).  
 
Thereafter Makerere University students embarked on a series of so-called ‘needy 
students demonstrations’, which demanded that government should find an 
alternative solution to the abolishment of allowances. Government conceded, and 
the 1992 White Paper on Education was promulgated and sanctioned the “creation 
of the ‘Needy Students’ Work Scheme” (Byaruhanga, 2006: 105). The university 
was encouraged to “provide work opportunities to the needy students in such 
janitorial areas as cleaning after meals and the like” (Byaruhanga, 2006: 106).   
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This section of the literature review has provided insights into the concept and 
policy of cost-sharing, which is a cornerstone of the problem of unmet financial 
need. The policy of cost-sharing requires that students share the burden of the 
costs of study irrespective of whether they can afford it or whether they have 
funding sources from which their contributions will come. Potentially, students 
who can afford the fees would have no problem to pay their contribution. 
However, for poor students who cannot afford to pay their contribution, the gap 
between educational costs and available funding can create a problem of unmet 
financial need. Therefore the issue of financial assistance could become critical.  
 
The literature review showed that the issue of financial assistance has been 
accepted as a necessity but the form it should take, whether it should be in the 
form of subsidised job opportunities or student loans, remains in dispute. Student 
loans have been promoted as a form of financial assistance as part of the policy of 
cost-sharing. However, the implementation of student loans experienced 
challenges, especially in developing countries. Debt aversion and the 
unwillingness of poor students to borrow and repay student loans were some of 
the student challenges identified.  
 
Other forms of cost-sharing have also experienced implementation and 
acceptability challenges in developing countries. Students embarked on different 
actions to resist or challenge the implementation of cost-sharing, which was 
imposed as part of SAPs in some African countries or World Bank-driven higher 
education reforms. Specifically, the analysis of Cameroon, Uganda and Kenya has 
shown that students’ actions against cost-sharing included defiance, student 
mobilisation, protests, peaceful demonstrations and marches, as well as class 
boycotts. These forms of student actions perhaps highlight a gap in the literature 
that I reviewed, namely that there was no focus on formal student participation in 
higher education governance, especially negotiations between students and 
university management. Potentially, the case study of UWC can contribute to 
closing this gap.  
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The literature review also indicated that some African countries, including South 
Africa, voluntarily embraced and implemented cost-sharing as part of student 
funding policy. In the next section, I shall examine cost-sharing in South Africa 
and student responses.  
 
Cost-sharing in South Africa: historical context, implementation and student 
resistance  
As indicated above, South Africa has a long history of some forms of cost-sharing 
(such as tuition fees). Therefore it is important to go beyond cost-sharing as it 
now appears in a post-apartheid public higher education funding policy. In the 
analysis, I am going to examine both the apartheid public higher education 
funding policy and the post-apartheid public higher education funding policy and 
their impact on students and resultant student responses.  
 
Apartheid higher education funding system - for white and black 
Higher education funding policies during the apartheid period (1948-1994) 
mirrored the apartheid regime’s divisions and the different governance models 
that it imposed on the higher education system (Bunting, 2006: 73). Funding and 
governance policies were integrally linked. Funding policy was designed in such a 
manner that it reflected perpetuated and maintained racial bigotry. The apartheid 
higher education funding policy was differentiated according to the old Republic 
of South Africa (RSA) and the former Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and 
Ciskei (TBVC) states. It was also differentiated along the racial divide, that is, 
HBUs and historically white universities (HWUs). The HWUs were funded 
through the South African Post-Secondary Education (SAPSE) funding formula 
(Bunting, 2006: 73). The SAPSE framework “explicitly rejected the principles of 
equity and redress, holding that it was not the business of the higher education 
system to deal with social inequalities which affected either individuals or 
institutions” (Bunting, 2006: 84). The HBUs and technikons were funded through 
the so-called ‘negotiated budgets’ system.  
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The highly differential apartheid funding policy accorded institutions different 
powers. HWUs had considerable administrative and financial powers relative to 
HBUs, which had limited or no institutional autonomy. HBUs could not 
determine tuition fees, employ new staff or buy equipment and building material 
without the approval of the ‘controlling government department’ (Bunting, 2006: 
74).  
 
HBUs aspired to have a similar level of autonomy as HWUs during the 1980s. 
They envisaged that the achievement of autonomy would happen through the 
“adoption by their departments of the funding framework of the historically white 
universities. By 1988, the 18 HBUs (including UWC) had achieved their ambition 
to be placed on the same funding basis as the historically white universities” 
(Bunting, 2006: 74). 
 
The SAPSE formula was applied to the six HBUs’ state allocations by the end of 
the 1980s. These institutions also accepted the assumptions and principles that 
underpinned SAPSE on the basis that they would gain more administrative and 
financial powers, as well as financial benefits to be accrued as a result of growth 
in student enrolments (Bunting, 2006: 76).  
 
The government was of the view that its apartheid ideological basis remained 
intact; “all universities and technikons should be given high levels of 
administrative and financial autonomy” (Bunting, 2006: 76-77). It was also of the 
view that the so-called ‘higher education market’ should determine the size and 
shape of the higher education system in line with its apartheid agenda (Bunting, 
2006: 77). Notwithstanding achieving some relative autonomy, between 1986 and 
1994 HBUs experienced “severe financial strains” (Bunting, 2006: 81). 
 
According to Bunting (2006: 81), three aspects of its financial performance in the 
years between 1986 and 1994 had generated severe financial strains on the RSA’s 
historically black university sector. First, because government appropriation totals 
in real terms remained flat over this period, even though student enrolments had 
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grown rapidly, the real government income per student at the HBUs had fallen 
sharply by 1994 compared with 1988. This happened because of the rapid student 
growth between 1986 and 1994.  
 
Second, the RSA’s HBUs had been forced to rely to an increasing extent on 
student tuition fee collections to build up their required income. This had placed a 
heavy burden on students who came from economically disadvantaged sectors of 
South African society and were unable to meet large increases in their tuition fees 
and cost of living expenses. In consequence the HBUs were forced to “project 
their expenditure budgets on the assumption that they would be able to collect 
100% of their student fee billings, even when there was evidence that they knew 
that at least 33% of all fees charged would remain uncollected” (Bunting, 2006: 
81).   
 
Third, the problems that this funding framework generated for historically black 
institutions emerged even more clearly when the universities and technikons of 
the TBVC countries were incorporated into the South African higher education 
system after the 1994 elections. These seven universities and technikons had not 
been placed on the SAPSE formula in 1988. 
 
After the 1994 elections, all higher education institutions fell under the control of 
a new national Department of Education. Subsequently, the differential funding 
policy was abolished and instead all institutions (including those in the former 
TBVC states) received their allocations through the same funding formula. 
Government gave TBVC institutions about five years to ‘adapt’ to lower levels of 
government funding because they had received generous funding through the 
TBVC regimes in comparison with that of black as well as white institutions in 
the old RSA (Bunting, 2006: 81). 
 
These developments had several implications for students. For instance, the fact 
that the apartheid regime had different funding formulae for HWUs and HBUs 
meant that the HBUs had to rely on student tuition fee collections to build up their 
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required income. The effect of this was a heavy burden on poor students who 
could not manage to deal with increases in their tuition fees and the cost of living 
expenses. This led to increasing student debt. In the next section, I examine issues 
of state subsidy and tuition increases. 
 
Declining state subsidy and tuition fee increase  
The state subsidy to South African higher education declined while tuition-fee 
income increased from 1986 to 2003. Steyn and de Villiers pointed out that the 
tuition fees as a percentage of total income for the HWUs increased from 13% in 
1986 to 23% in 2003. The state appropriations as a percentage of the total income 
of HWUs declined from 51% in 1986 to 40% in 2003 (2006: 92).  
 
Steyn and De Villiers found that tuition fees as a percentage of total income 
increased for HBUs from 11% in 1986 to 25% in 2003 (2006: 92; see also Pillay, 
2003). The state appropriation as a percentage of the total income of the group 
was 66% in 1986 and decreased to 51% in 2003 (Steyn and De Villiers, 2006: 93). 
The Department of Education noted that student fees constituted 29% of the 
income of all public higher education institutions in 2005 from 24% in 2000 
(HESA report, 2008: 10; see also Wangenge-Ouma and Cloete, 2008).  
 
Steyn and De Villiers (2006: 94) indicated that the tuition fees as a percentage of 
total income increased for HWUs from 15% in 1986 to 31% in 2003. The 
contribution of the state’s appropriation for this group was initially high at 60%, 
but since 1990 it has been lower and relatively constant around 50%.  
 
The post-apartheid ANC-led government was confronted with the challenge of 
having two broad sets of higher education institutions. The first set, the HWUs, 
had “enjoyed a period of relative institutional stability during 1983-1993 and were 
poised to engage in a greater level of entrepreneurial activity to increase their 
sources of own income” (Stumpf, 2001a: 2-3).  
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The second set was the HBUs, institutions that had “experienced a decade (1983-
1993) of great institutional instability and seemed to place an inordinate amount 
of trust and hope in government to secure their financial futures through redress 
measures including student financial aid and the undoing of past injustices” 
(Stumpf, 2001a: 2-3). UWC was in this cohort. 
 
Student responses to cost-sharing in South Africa 
Student activism has been a common student response in dealing with multiple 
effects and implications of cost-sharing for higher education access. According to 
Wangenge-Ouma, tuition fees per full-time equivalent enrolled student in nominal 
rands rose at an average annual rate of 12.2 % between 2000 and 2004, and in real 
terms at an annual average rate of 4.8 % (2012: 5). In essence, the students’ view 
has been that tuition fee increases “make higher education unaffordable for poor 
students” (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 5). According to Koen, Cele and Libhaber 
(2006: 408), about 51 incidents of student activism against cost-sharing (financial 
aid, financial exclusions and fee increases) took place in South African higher 
education institutions between 2002 and 2004. Student activism became “violent 
at times” (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 5; see also Pithouse 2006: xxiv). The most 
notable incidents occurred at the UWC in October 1998; at the University of 
Witwatersrand (Wits) early in 2001 and again in 2004; at the former University of 
the North in early 2004; and at the former University of Durban-Westville (UDW) 
in 1998 and again in 2000 (Pithouse 2006: xxiv).    
 
Koen et al. (2006: 407) found that all 51 recorded incidents of student activism 
were focused on institutions instead of the state. Koen et al. (2006) argue that the 
absence of state-focused student activism suggests that the post-apartheid state 
“has reasonably successfully resolved the key student-linked higher education 
challenges that it faced” (407-408). For example, state intervention in 2000 at the 
former UDW “contributed significantly to the appointment of a commission to 
investigate student and management actions and the appointment of a mediator to 
moderate engagement between students and management using a style appropriate 
to trade union negotiations” (Koen et al., 2006: 408).  
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Similar state intervention took place in 2004 at Wits following a deadlock and 
week-long student activism against cost-sharing. About 3 000 Wits students 
received letters informing them that their financial aid would be cut by up to 50%. 
The financial aid problems emanated from a R33 million cut in Wits’s aid budget 
in 2004. The cut was supposed to enable Wits to balance its books after it 
overspent by about R30 million on financial aid during the 2003 academic year 
(Edusource Data News no 46, 24 December 2004). From the perspective of 
students, the action taken by the Wits management was nothing but part of a 
continuous trend by certain administrators of higher education to commodify 
education rather than treating it as a basic need of the South African people (IOL, 
08 October 2007). Wits senior staff and students slammed management’s apparent 
inability to foresee that increasing numbers of disadvantaged students would 
apply for financial aid and that its budget would not be able to meet the increased 
need (Mail & Guardian, 30 April 2004).  
 
Students called for state intervention, which resulted in several meetings between 
senior officials of the former national Department of Education, university 
management and students. Consequently students suspended their collective 
action. A compromise was reached between university management and the SRC 
at the end of April. They agreed that the university would not exclude students 
who could not afford to continue their studies on the reduced aid, and the SRC 
and university management would raise funds to meet the estimated R40 million 
shortfall (Edusource Data News no 46, 24 December 2004). Another contested 
issue related to 12 students who were arrested and charged with public violence 
and participating in an illegal gathering during student activism. Students 
threatened to resume activism if the university did not drop the charges or 
refrained from charging interest on the accounts of students on financial aid 
(Edusource Data News no 46, 24 December 2004).  
 
The Wits case highlights important issues related to understanding student actions 
in response to cost-sharing. The role of the state is an ambiguous one. As a 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
custodian of cost-sharing policy, it does not become an object of student anger, 
frustration and student activism. Instead, higher education institutions become the 
object of student activism. However, the same institutions would call for state 
‘coercive and administrative’ intervention, which tends to come in the form of 
police, thus resulting in ‘campus invasions’. The police presence on campuses 
tends to exacerbate student anger and confrontation, which leads to arrests and 
imprisonment. Nevertheless, the state intervenes as ‘mediator’ between students 
and management. The literature suggests that the locus of struggle against cost-
sharing seems to have shifted to higher education institutions; the university 
management and students thus have to face each other. Moreover, as 
demonstrated by the Wits case, student activism has remained a dominant student 
collective response. However, students also use negotiations and state intervention 
and forge alliances with staff in a complementary manner.  
 
The literature review has shown that students embarked on various collective 
actions to address their funding problems, in relation to, for example, tuition fee 
increases, financial exclusions and financial aid. Various campuses have 
experienced different kinds of student actions, with student activism and 
negotiations dominating. Students have tended to use a combination of actions in 
order to address their problems. The literature also highlighted the ambivalent role 
of the state as enforcer of ‘stability’ by deploying the police and acting as 
mediator when there is a deadlock between students and the university 
management. Students directed their anger and frustrations at their institutions 
rather than the state as the source of their funding problems.  
 
Provided that student struggles concerning funding concerns were primarily about 
ensuring students’ access to higher education, especially for those coming from a 
historically disadvantaged background and the poor, I shall therefore examine the 
issue of access more closely in the next section.  
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Access 
Access to university education is an “important means to individual and collective 
social mobility” (Sichone, 2006: 35). The issue of access has been and remains a 
critical part of the national higher education policy and top of the student agenda. 
In his seminal writing, Morrow distinguishes between two types of access, that is, 
formal and epistemological access. Formal access is achieved once a student 
becomes “legally registered at the university” (Morrow, 1993: 3). Epistemological 
access is achieved when a student is able to access an ‘essential good’ or 
knowledge that is distributed by a university (Morrow, 1993: 3). 
 
Reflecting on the pre-1994 era, Morrow argues that as part of its project of 
democratising access to knowledge, UWC developed an admissions policy that 
enabled many students who would not otherwise have had this opportunity to gain 
formal access to university education. There was a mismatch between the 
increased number of admitted students and available teaching staff. In 
consequence, Morrow argues, the university could not “in real terms provide 
adequate access to university education”, which is sometimes expressed as an 
issue of “quality or standards” (1993: 3). Morrow further argues that “unless there 
is a corresponding increase in teaching staff more formal access leads to less 
epistemological access” (1993: 3). It is therefore important to recognise access as 
a “complex domain and its expansion transcends enrolment management and 
admissions practices” (Subotzky, Koen and Howell, 2004: 1). Put differently, 
“opening doors of higher education is only a small part of [the] process” (Bird, 
1996: 9). Emphasis must be put on both access and success in order to achieve 
equity.  
 
People hold different views on access. Drawing on the American experience of 
racial segregation, Bird argues that “whereas white people emphasise issues of 
access, black people are far more concerned with what happens when black 
students enter higher education” (Bird, 1996: 10). Bird argues further that the 
experience of black students in higher education was not characterised by “quality 
treatment or by quality of treatment” (Bird, 1996: 10).  
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The achievement of greater and more equitable access would have been viewed as 
a crucial step in transforming higher education inequalities in order to create 
conditions and make “opportunities available to [historically disadvantaged] 
students who qualify to pursue different academic programmes” (Ngome, 2006: 
845).  
 
Access is relevant to the research question. Funding can facilitate or inhibit 
students’ formal access to higher education. In particular the problem of unmet 
financial need is a hindrance to formal access. Addressing the problem of unmet 
financial need is a means to the end of formal access. Students embark on any 
action to address the problem of unmet financial need primarily in order to access 
higher education (whether that means entering for the first time or resisting 
financial exclusion from higher education). My argument is that students act 
against the problem of unmet financial need not for its own sake but for the 
purpose of accessing higher education. In the next section, I examine literature on 
student action, especially student activism and formal student participation in 
higher education governance, as student actions are at the core of the research 
question.   
 
Student actions 
 
Student activism 
In the preceeding discussion of existing literature I have shown that students have 
tended to embark on student activism as part of their resistance to cost-sharing in 
various countries. Therefore I would like to explore student activism further as a 
concept, a form of student action and in terms of its impact on society. The survey 
of international literature on student activism shows that a lot has been done to 
understand the phenomenon, its role and impact (Luescher, 2005: 1; Pabian and 
Minksová, 2011: 262). However, some writers have raised concerns about the 
focus of the literature, which has “mainly been on industrialised nations and less 
on developing nations” (Byaruhanga, 2006: xviii; Munene, 2009: 117), with a 
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lack of serious research on the role of students in democratic transitions (Zeilig 
and Dawson, 2008: 9). The study of student activism in South Africa is relatively 
developed (Alence, 1999; Badat, 1999, 1997, 1995; Cele, 2009; Hyslop, 1993; 
Maseko, 1994; Murray, 1993, 1990; Naidoo, 2006; Pithouse, 2006; Odhav, 1997; 
Sikwebu, 2008). 
 
Student activism can influence and can be influenced by different social and 
political conditions (Badat, 1999: 21; see also Altbach, 1997). Student activism 
played a catalytic role in the national liberation struggles against colonialism, 
imperialism and apartheid, in Africa and continues to do so even in the post-
independence era SAPs in African economies (see Altbach, 2004; Badat, 1999; 
Burawoy, 1976; Chikwanha 2009; Diouf, 1996, 2003; Munene, 2003 and Wolpe, 
1994). It is through student activism that student latent and yet potent power is 
unleashed and students regain self-belief and courage to take on authority and 
power without fear.  
 
Some writers have argued that student activism has had a greater impact in Africa 
than in the economically developed nations (Munene, 2009: 118, see also Altbach, 
1997: 211). Some of the notable impacts of student activism include creating 
‘government instability’, ‘power political shifts’ and overthrowing governments 
in some African states (Altbach, 2004: 47, see also Munene, 2003: 117). Some of 
the oppressive regimes that were overthrown with the element of student 
militancy and activism include the Bokassa regime of the Central African 
Republic in 1979 (Byaruhanga, 2006: xvii) and the Banda regime in Malawi in 
1994 (Zeilig and Dawson, 2008: 22). In South Africa, students were “major 
catalysts of popular struggles against apartheid and often characterised as the 
shock-troops of the South African revolution” (Wolpe, 1994: 7).  
 
The ‘nationalist project’ pursued by post-independence African nation states 
sought to “maintain the frontier between elders and juniors that characterised 
traditional African values, and to put young people at the centre of plans for 
economic development and national liberation” (Diouf, 2003: 3-4). At the same 
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time, students and youth were “conceived not only as the hope of African nations 
under construction, the chief actor in African societies’ struggle against 
underdevelopment, poverty, misery, and illiteracy but also as the hope of the 
world” (Diouf, 2003: 4, see also Burawoy, 1976). These various constructions of 
students implicitly suggest that students should see themselves as part of and 
responsible for the reconstruction and development process rather than take a 
distant, disinterested and critical stance against power. I may be giving a 
simplistic interpretation to a very complicated problem of redefining the 
relationship between democratic and developmental states and liberation 
movements and erstwhile allies such as students on the one hand, and liberation 
movements and social movements, including student organisations, on the other. 
While this problem remains unresolved in some countries, it is a well-known fact 
that student activism has not stopped. Its frequency, scale and degree of impact 
may change, but as a phenomenon student activism continues.  
 
Chikwanha argues that after independence Zimbabwean students functioned as 
“an episodic oppositional force and periodically demonstrated against the 
government’s policies, which they view as violating their freedom and dignity” 
(2009: 80). For Diouf the failures of nationalist economic, cultural, and political 
models across the African continent had “particularly dreadful effects on young 
people. As national models of economic development proved to be inadequate or 
irrelevant, so did customary rites of socialisation through work or education” 
(2003: 4). Young people thus became the “first group in society to have 
manifested, in practical and often violent ways, hostility toward the reconstituted 
nationalist movement” (Diouf, 1996: 42). They also began to identify 
“authoritarian drift of postcolonial powers whose neo-colonial economic and 
political orientations they denounce” (Diouf, 1996: 42-43). This awareness seems 
to have been the “basis for youth’s resistance to the repression, encadrement, and 
co-optation through which the state handles social movements” (Diouf, 1996: 42-
43). In confronting the effects of the collapsing nationalist project, youth "moved 
into the cracks opened up by the crisis of the state and society. African youth has 
provoked an unprecedented moral and civic panic” (Diouf, 2003: 9). This was 
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accompanied by violent activities, which as Diouf argues reflected the "enterprise 
of the postcolonial legitimacies" (2003: 7). Both the challenge to postcolonial 
powers (especially in Africa) and the violent nature of student activism have 
resulted in students being “seen and constructed as menace” (Diouf, 2003: 9). At 
the same time, the notion of youth as the "hope of the world’ has been replaced by 
representations of youth as dangerous, criminal, decadent, and given to a sexuality 
that is unrestrained and threatening for the whole society" (Diouf, 2003: 4). It 
seems students do not only serve, as Altbach puts it, as "spokespersons for [the] 
broader population" (1998: 162) and the "conscience of their societies" (1998: 
162-163).  
 
Some writers have tried to provide reasons for student violence. Konings suggests 
two reasons for student violent actions after observing the 2005 and 2006 UB 
student strikes that were marked by a high degree of violence. The first relates to 
the “regular failure of university and government officials to take students 
seriously and create effective channels of communication and negotiation” (2009: 
214). Students use violence to give voice to their grievances mainly because of the 
intransigence of university officials who tend to be “suspicious of student unions 
and are hesitant about allowing students to unionise” (Konings, 2009: 214). The 
second reason is that university and government officials are “more inclined to 
solve student problems through repression than dialogue and peaceful 
negotiation” (Konings, 2009: 214). Conversely, for authorities, violence serves as 
a “deterrent to the students from engaging in any ‘irresponsible’ behaviour, but 
the provocative and brutal actions of the security forces have also tended to fuel 
student violence” (Konings, 2009: 214). I think it is fair to assume that 
universities and governments differ from one country or continent to another and 
therefore accept that some will resort to repression out of choice while others may 
detest violence but resort to repression because of their failure to find an 
alternative response. It cannot be assumed that all universities and governments 
are inherently repressive and that their relationship with students is necessarily 
and permanently antagonistic. There are many examples of students and 
universities standing side by side against autocratic regimes. My view is that the 
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reasons for students using violence are very complicated and can actually form 
part of a future research agenda on student activism - not from psychological but 
from sociological and political or even historical perspectives.  
 
There is a considerable body of literature focusing on student activism against 
SAPs in African economies. I indicated earlier that cost-sharing was imposed in 
some African countries as part of SAPs. SAPs were essential elements of the 
neoliberal globalisation phenomenon underlined by the Washington Consensus, 
which refers to the 1980s-1990s ideology of the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), US Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board and 
assorted Washington think tanks funded by large corporations and banks, as well 
as institutions outside Washington, such as the World Trade Organisation (Bond, 
2000: 156). The universities were at the centre of this process and the resistance to 
it, both because of the “heated debates and anti-IMF mobilisations these policies 
generated within them, and because, from the start, they were one of the main 
targets of the cuts in public funds introduced in the name of paying the debt” 
(Alidou et al., 2008: 62). 
 
Towards the end of the 1980s, prescriptions of SAPs had “begun to affect the 
education sector and suspicions of the government’s intentions towards the 
student body began to surface” (Chikwanha, 2009: 77; see also Zeilig and 
Dawson, 2008: 22). The universities were forced to cut budgets and rationalise 
resources as part of implementation of SAPs (Teferra and Altbach, 2004: 46).  
 
Public investment in education was gutted, user fees were introduced, and 
programmes were restructured so as to boost a technocratic knowledge 
appropriate for the tasks of economic liberalisation. The whole project was 
promoted by the World Bank under what Alidou, Caffentzis and Federici called 
“the racist title of ‘Africa Capacity Building’” (Alidou et al., 2008: 63). The 
budget cuts became a hotbed for student anger and struggles against “deteriorating 
living and academic conditions, poor student services, delay of stipends, and/or 
removal of perquisites and benefits” (Teferra and Altbach, 2004: 46). There was 
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open confrontation between students and government and student activism was 
increasingly repressed by force (Alidou et al., 2008: 62). Demonstrations, strikes, 
blockades, confrontations with police and armed forces invading the campuses 
quickly became part of the campus experience in many African countries (Alidou 
et al., 2008: 63).  
 
The recent changes in higher education (including managerialism) have had an 
impact on student activism. In a case study of the University of Cape Town, 
Luescher-Mamashela found that managerialism changed student governance into 
a collegial-managerial regime and was reflecting an “individualistic, consumerist 
discourse, which appears to challenge the classic, emancipatory type of student 
activism” (2010a: 279). He then characterised the emergent new form of student 
activism as “entrepreneurial student activism” (2010a: 279). Some of the features 
of ‘entrepreneurial student activism’ include that it is “consumerist, individualist, 
and actively seeking the inclusion of student leaders in established authority rather 
than being revolutionary” (Luescher-Mamashela, 2010a: 279). In a 
reconceptualised role of students as clients, student leaders “only retained a 
degree of formal involvement in institutional decision-making in as much as this 
would lead to better information being available to decision-makers and improved 
organisational performance” (Luescher-Mamashela, 2010a: 280).  
 
Student activism has contributed to university transformation in various countries, 
changes of which “include curricula reforms, structural changes that resulted in 
the inclusion of students in the echelons of university governance” (Byaruhanga, 
2006: xvii, see also Altbach, 1998: 153). I explore the issue of student inclusion in 
the university governance in the next section. It is important to note that student 
activism had an impact on the decisions of higher education institutions to accept 
the need and importance of involving students in formal governance processes 
(Byaruhanga, 2006: xvii; see also Altbach, 1997, 2006; Pabian and Minksová, 
2011). Accordingly research studies have been conducted and literature has 
emerged focusing on a range of aspects related to student participation in higher 
education governance.  
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Student participation in higher education governance 
According to Minksová and Pabian, despite a considerable number of studies on 
student involvement in governance, “unfortunately this topic remains ‘under-
researched’” (2011: 262; see also Luescher, 2005). Some recent South African 
academic writings on the subject include those of Johnson (2000), Luescher-
Mamashela (2010a), Luescher (2009, 2008, 2005) and Koen et al. (2006). 
Historically, students’ demand for participation in South African higher education 
governance was linked to the broader call for the transformation of higher 
education and democratisation of the political and social system (Maseko, 1994). 
This demand was finally realised with the promulgation of the Higher Education 
Act 1997, which formally recognised students as one of the key stakeholders in 
higher education.  
 
The South African experience followed an international trend where students 
demanded institutional reform, especially ‘university democratisation’. According 
to Luescher-Mamashela, university democratisation can be defined as a 
“reconstitution of internal decision-making in universities with reference to 
democratic principles, inter alia, by making decision-making processes in 
universities more representative of internal constituencies such as students” 
(2010a: 260).  
 
Consequently, higher education stakeholders reached general consensus that 
students should participate in higher education governance largely owing to what 
Pabian and Minksová describe as the “universal acceptance of (at least some of) 
the principles of representative democracy in higher education” (2011: 271). What 
remains in dispute among stakeholders relates to how and to what extent students 
should participate (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 271). Partly, the stakeholder 
differences can be attributed to their different and “competing visions of higher 
education” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 271).   
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Luescher (2005: 7) states that the formal inclusion of students in African higher 
education governance has taken three principal forms, namely (a) establishment of 
student governments on university campuses, (b) representation of the 
institutional student body in certain structures of university governance, and (c) 
involvement of national (or institutional) student organisations in higher education 
policymaking. However, there is a “paucity of publications on student 
involvement in national higher education governance” (Pabian and Minksová, 
2011: 263).  
 
In the literature, it has been suggested that one way of understanding student 
participation is by situating it within different types of higher education 
governance. In particular, the literature has identified four ideal types of higher 
education governance, which, as Pabian and Minksová have cautioned, however, 
were “formulated without students in mind” (2011: 269). A first ideal-type higher 
education governance model is called the representative democracy. This model 
rejects the idea that a single actor, such as the state or the academic estate, can 
represent the ‘general will’; instead, it opens the gates to the principle that every 
interest group should be democratically represented in the governance process 
(Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 270). Within the logic of a representative 
democracy model students are defined as “legitimate or even as principal 
stakeholders in higher education” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 270). Students 
thus have the “fundamental right to participate in higher education processes at all 
levels and in all areas of decision-making on equal terms with other academic 
citizens and external stakeholders” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 270). When the 
students’ position is defined in this way, they play the role of “collaborators in 
achieving goals negotiated with other actors represented in the governance 
processes” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 270).  
 
In addition, students will have a “strong sense of ownership of the university and 
conceive of themselves as a distinct group within a university community that 
ought to be governed democratically” (Luescher-Mamashela, 2010a: 262). The 
representative democracy model seems to have inspired some of the governance 
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proposals for a post-apartheid higher education policy (e.g. the 1996 NCHE and 
1997 White Paper on Higher Education).  
 
Secondly, the model of the academic oligarchy conceptualises the university as a 
“meritocratic community of scholars” (Oslen, 2005: 8). Pabian and Minksová thus 
argue that an academic oligarchy model is based on the “meritocratic principle” 
(2011: 269) that the “only legitimate authority is based on neutral competence” 
(Oslen, 2005: 10). The university is a “collegial organisation, [of] or [with] 
elected leaders and disciplinary organization” (Oslen, 2005: 10). The model of 
academic oligarchy only bestows on the academics (by virtue of their teaching 
and research responsibilities) the right to “participate in the governance of higher 
education because nobody else is qualified to make decisions about these tasks” 
(Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 269). Inherently, within this logic of academic 
oligarchy, students are not expected to play any role in governance in part because 
they are “learners, they enjoy the freedom to learn (Lernfreiheit) but obviously 
lack the academic qualifications to participate in the decision-making process” 
(Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 269).  
 
Thirdly, the state bureaucracy model is based on the logic that the “most 
important authority in higher education is that of the state” (Pabian and Minksová, 
2011: 269). Essentially, in the state bureaucracy model the university is an 
“instrument for national political agendas” (Oslen, 2005: 10). Therefore, it is 
expected that university decisions should be geared towards meeting national 
agendas whether “they are nation building or economic development” (Pabian and 
Minksová, 2011: 269). Following this logic, students have “no say in the 
formulation of policy agendas and are hardly in a position to participate in their 
implementation” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 269). 
 
Student exclusion would be justified on the basis that students are “immature and 
incapable and impartial (they will promote the particular corporate interests of the 
student body, in contrast to the state, which promotes general societal interests)” 
(Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 270).  
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Fourthly, there is the market enterprise model in which higher education 
institutions are given the responsibility of ensuring “student satisfaction, in 
particular with regard to the provision of education and support services, thus 
leading to the development of satisfaction feedback mechanisms as the primary 
venue of student involvement in the governance processes” (Pabian and 
Minksová, 2011: 270). The market enterprise model defines students as 
‘consumers’ or ‘clients’ or ‘beneficiaries’, in keeping with the hallmark of the 
neoliberal thinking and related institutions such as the World Bank (Pabian and 
Minksová, 2011: 270; see also Luescher-Mamashela, 2010a: 264; McCulloch, 
2009: 171). McCulloch writes that in the model of ‘student as consumer’, the 
university acts as the “provider of products and services, in the form of 
programmes of study and support for the pursuit of those programmes, and the 
student acts as a consumer of those products and that support” (2009: 171). As 
identified by McCulloch, some of the criticism against the ‘student as consumer’ 
concept stems from the fact it (a) “inappropriately compartmentalises the 
educational experience as a product as opposed to a process” and (b) “does little 
to clarify or to harmonise organisational relationships” (2009: 173).  
 
In the market enterprise model, the participation of students in university 
governance “may amount to little more than the representation of service-users on 
user committees” (Luescher-Mamashela, 2010a: 262). Thus, in that study, student 
leaders “only retained a degree [of] formal involvement in institutional decision-
making in as much as this would lead to better information being available to 
decision-makers and improved organisational performance” (Luescher-
Mamashela, 2010a: 280).   
 
Student participation has been assessed in some countries, such as Italy, Norway 
and Portugal. According to Pabian and Minksová, while students were allowed to 
participate and were democratically represented in Italy’s higher education 
governance structures, they “occupied a minority position in all the elected bodies 
while the decisive majority remained in the hands of the academics” (2011: 266). 
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This is, in part, because academics “refuse to accept students as fully legitimate 
actors in higher education governance” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 269). 
Students have therefore tended to distance themselves from the ordinary 
governance processes; instead they engage more in extraordinary student activism 
(Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 269). Furthermore, Pabian and Minksová argue that 
in Norway, the “role of representative bodies was weakened and the students’ 
position partly refined as customers whose satisfaction is very important but who 
perhaps lack expertise to participate in managerial decision-making” (2011: 266). 
Conversely, in the case of Portugal, students are seen as ‘members of the 
academic community’ and therefore treated as such in governance processes. 
Pabian and Minksová note several factors that served as constraints to student 
participation. For instance, student participation was affected by institutional 
culture, which “is dominated by the values of academics and academic managers, 
thus symbolically relegating students to secondary positions and perhaps even 
leading them to withdraw their commitment” (Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 267).  
 
Luescher argues that formal student participation in university decision-making 
would provide, on the one hand, an alternative to tactics of coercion and 
disruption by students; on the other hand, it might also moderate the partisan 
views of other members of the university and thus create less adversarial 
relationships on campus (2008: 24). Co-optation of students onto university 
committees is therefore a double-edged sword with a moderating effect on student 
activists as well as on the other role-players in decision-making, with benefits to 
all involved (Luescher, 2008: 24). The impact or effect of student participation in 
higher education governance on student activists and other stakeholders still 
requires systematic analysis, especially since South African higher education 
institutions continue to experience student activism. It is therefore necessary to be 
a little cautious.  
 
The literature review has identified various ways in which student participation 
occurs, depending on the nature or model of the university. It also indicated that 
the meaning and role of students are defined differently under the different 
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models. Therefore, it is possible to locate UWC within the different models and 
think of the type of role that students play as they participate in formal 
governance. At an organisational level, UWC governance may be described as a 
hybrid model involving elements of a representative democracy model and, as far 
as the senate is concerned, it may also reflect aspects of academic oligarchy 
model.   
 
The case study of UWC will enhance our understanding of students’ role in 
formal higher education governance, including the role of negotiations between 
UWC students and the university management and designated officials 
concerning funding problems.  
 
Implications and relevance of the literature review 
The literature review has shed light on issues to consider when developing a 
conceptual framework as well as on the analysis and interpretation of data. 
However, affordability (by state and students) has been raised as a serious 
challenge and the “main militating factor against maintaining wide scale 
enrolments” (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 5). In both developed and developing 
nations, financial austerity has been crippling higher education institutions, which 
are battling with pressures of expanding access and increasing costs (Altbach, 
2011: 307).  
 
Cost-sharing has been proposed, adopted and contested as a funding policy 
solution. Cost-sharing is predicated on the view that higher education has both 
private and public benefits and therefore suggests financing of higher education 
must consist of a state subsidy and tuition fees. At the heart of cost-sharing is the 
notion that parents, students and the state should share the burden of the costs of 
study. Cost-sharing takes different forms, such as tuition fee increment, upfront 
payments, rationalisation of budgets and abolishment of student allowances, all of 
which affect access and have in the past “triggered student activism, which was at 
times violent” (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
A synthesis of the views of Morrow, Subotzky, Koen and Howell emphasises the 
importance of thinking about access in relation to success, the effect of which will 
be equity. However, little or nothing has been said in the existing literature about 
the role that funding can play as an enabler or inhibitor to access. Funding is 
therefore a key determinant of access to higher education in South Africa. The 
existing funding context (declining government funding, regular tuition fee 
increases and inadequate NSFAS funding) is one that is arguably “inimical to 
wider access and participation, and therefore, the achievement of equity of access 
in South Africa’s higher education” (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 5). I therefore 
propose that financial access needs to be recognised as critical in providing 
financial means for equitable outcomes. It must be considered alongside with 
formal and epistemological access.  
 
The literature has identified different actions that students take in order to address 
their problems. Drawing on Byaruhanga and Badat’s conceptualisation of student 
activism, there are numerous points that are relevant for the present study. These 
include the fact that student activism influences and is influenced by educational 
and political conditions. In an attempt to understand students’ strategies and 
activities, it is important to analyse both internal factors (such as student origin, 
organisation, and leadership) and external factors. Another issue that has to be 
taken into account is the relationship between students and the ruling party, e.g. 
the ANC in post-apartheid South Africa, which they helped to bring to power, and 
the relationship between students and government. Finally, the relationship 
between students and other stakeholders in the higher education sphere is vitally 
important.  
 
The literature reviewed also showed the dynamic and changing meaning of 
‘student’. This is evident in the writings of Diouf, Muhula, Burawoy and Altbach 
and Luescher-Mamashela. On the one hand, the changing meaning and 
construction of students reflect both the temporary and yet dynamic and fluid 
nature of the relationship between students and society in general, and with those 
in power. The meaning of students has been transformed from the ‘hope’ or 
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‘future’ of a nation to being a ‘menace’ to ‘consumers’ or ‘clients’. On the other 
hand, the changing meanings of students may imply that students are in a 
permanent state, searching for the ‘better and different’ in their social and political 
lives. Therefore it would not be surprising to find students at the forefront of 
struggles aimed at bringing about fundamental social and political change. 
Nevertheless, students also depend on forging alliances with other sectors of 
society in order to achieve their objectives.  
 
The literature review has further shown the relationship between student 
participation in higher education governance and different visions and governance 
models as necessary to consider. The literature review has identified factors 
affecting the effectiveness of student participation in higher education 
governance. These include institutional culture, the nature of the institutional 
governance model, attitude of staff, especially academics, to students, the 
implication of the reconstruction of students as ‘customers’ owing to 
managerialism, and the size of student representation in governance structures.  
 
The literature reviewed has further highlighted several issues that have guided the 
study. These include (a) the interaction between the larger social and political 
environment and higher education institutions (e.g., political dynamics, priorities 
and interference, expected role of higher education, governance [e.g., the power of 
higher education institutions versus government, appointments of vice-
chancellors, and role of international bodies in determining national policy]); (b) 
the government educational policies and their impact on higher education 
institutions, student activism and participation in governance (especially regarding 
the financing of higher education, access, student funding-financial aid); (c) 
higher education transformation and role of students; and (d) dynamics between 
the student body and student leadership, student organisations, social composition 
and origin of students, and finally the relationship between student leadership and 
the political elite.  
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Gaps 
I have identified several gaps in the above literature review. Firstly, the literature 
on student activism in Africa is very limited. It also tends to collapse student 
activism into youth activism. Inherently, there is nothing wrong with this, given 
the fact that students constitute a critical aspect of the youth and in some instances 
boundaries become blurred in the ‘actual course of struggle’, as happened during 
the national liberation struggle against apartheid. However, the weakness of this 
approach manifests itself in many ways. There is generally a lack of conceptual 
clarity on the notion of students. The role of students as an autonomous force is 
not considered critically. The relationships between students and other 
components of youth, students and their surrounding social and political 
environment and between students and higher education are inadequately 
explored. Students’ internal dynamics, especially the relationship between the 
student leadership and student body, tend to be left unexplored.  
 
Secondly, the literature tends to use concepts of student activism, student strikes, 
student politics, student boycotts and student riots interchangeably and without 
sufficient definitions.  
 
Thirdly, the literature does provide some account of student activism in Africa 
against tuition fees, abolition of student allowances, poor living and 
accommodation conditions (whether as part of fighting against cost-sharing or 
SAPs and their effects), which resulted in some instances in student arrests, 
killings and expulsions from campuses. However, sometimes a reference to 
student funding is coincidental, in part because the interest tends to concentrate 
more on the role of students in dealing with larger social and political concerns 
(such as repressive regimes, SAPs).  
 
Finally, the existing literature rarely provides accounts of students’ individual 
experiences or detailed accounts of the role of the SRCs, student guilds or student 
unions, in addressing the problem of sharing the burden of the cost of study. In 
fact, students generally remain treated at student body level, thus limiting access 
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to intra-student dynamics such as the relationship between the leadership and the 
rank and file. This study will contribute to addressing some of these gaps. It 
provides evidence emerging from the ‘grounds’ on the post-1994 government 
policy implementation. It is, in some sense, about what Jansen referred to as 
“unseen pains of transitions” (2004: 118). Thus, I document the experiences of a 
selected number of UWC students across different races, ages, faculties and 
political orientations. However, I provide more detail on this in the research 
methodology chapter.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed wide-ranging literature on students and higher 
education. I reviewed the literature focusing on cost-sharing, student activism, 
student participation in higher education governance and access. The literature 
review of cost-sharing has provided the basis for understanding the issue of 
students’ sharing the burden of the costs of study and related types of financial 
assistance, such as loans. These are two components of the problem of unmet 
financial need.  
 
The literature review highlighted that cost-sharing is premised on the notion that 
higher education has both public and private benefits, thus any public funding 
policy must entail both a state subsidy and tuition fees. Cost-sharing takes 
different forms whose acceptability varies from one country to another. Some 
African countries voluntarily accepted and promoted cost-sharing as a funding 
policy. In other African countries, cost-sharing was imposed as part of the SAPs, 
driven largely by the World Bank. South Africa is one of the few African 
countries with a long history of cost-sharing, which predates the advent of the 
concept itself.  
 
Cost-sharing continues to experience implementation challenges, especially in 
developing countries. Some of these challenges relate to student loan schemes. 
Students undertook various collective actions against different forms of cost-
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sharing. The dominant form of student action against cost-sharing has tended to 
be student activism in various African countries.      
 
The literature review on student activism has noted differences in terms of the 
impact of student activism in developing countries compared to developed 
countries. It highlighted the catalytic role that student activism played in the social 
and political transformations of various countries, including the overthrow of the 
oppressive regimes and resistance to them before and after independence. In 
consequence the meaning of ‘students’ was transformed from the ‘hope’ or 
‘future’ of a nation or 'shock-troops of revolution' to being a ‘menace’ to 
‘consumers’ or ‘clients’. The literature also highlighted the impact of student 
activism in the higher education transformation, including the acceptance that 
students should participate in formal governance structures. The literature 
differentiated between four models of a university (representative democracy 
model, academic oligarchy model, state bureaucracy model, market enterprise 
model), which were conceived without ‘students in mind’. The nature of student 
participation and the role and meaning of students vary within these different 
university models.   
 
I have also reviewed literature pertaining to access, which is interlinked with the 
problem of unmet financial need. The literature review identified different types 
of access, namely formal and epistemological, and emphasised the importance of 
linking access to success in order to achieve equity. Funding inhibits student 
access (formal) in higher education.   
 
The next chapter will develop a conceptual framework that will illuminate the 
research question and will guide data collection and analysis. In particular, the 
conceptual framework will enable me to be “selective and have some way of 
deciding what data are pertinent and essential to one’s enquiry” (Badat, 1999:5). 
Specifically, I shall conceptualise student actions, including student activism and 
formal student participation in higher education governance, the notion of 
students and cost-sharing.  
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CHAPTER THREE: TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I conducted a literature review whose results will now be 
used to develop a conceptual framework for the study. I depart from the premise 
that funding is probably the most important tool that “was utilised by the 
apartheid state, and is being utilised by the post-apartheid state, to achieve the 
desired access policy goals” (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 2). Funding played and 
continues to play a central role in the processes of inclusion and exclusion in 
higher education during and after apartheid. In the previous chapter I indicated 
that apartheid public higher education funding was structured to mirror apartheid 
racial divisions and promoted inequalities. An apartheid public higher education 
funding policy deliberately excluded the principles of equity and redress.  
  
The post-apartheid higher education policy embraces principles of equity and 
redress and seeks to ensure that the financial need is not “an insuperable barrier to 
access and success in higher education” (Department of Education, 1997: 40). It 
advocates that the financing of higher education “must increase equity in access 
and outcomes, improve quality and efficiency, and link higher education activities 
and national and regional development needs more purposefully” (Department of 
Education, 1997: 40). Cost-sharing is one of the key principles underlying the 
post-apartheid public higher education policy. Cost-sharing is predicated on the 
fact that higher education has both public and private benefits (Department of 
Higher Education and Training, 2013: 14). This thesis seeks to show that 
government’s policy commitment to the expansion of access and reduced funding 
(with cost-sharing advanced as solution) is paradoxical. This paradox is most 
severely experienced by poor students at historically disadvantaged institutions 
(such as UWC), whose constrained ability to pay a portion of their cost of study 
cannot be mitigated by institutional resources alone. Generally, in post-apartheid 
South Africa, affordability both for the state and individual students (and their 
families) has been the main militating factor against maintaining wide-scale 
enrolments (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 5).  
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Therefore the main purpose of this chapter is to develop a conceptual framework 
that can illuminate the research question. In conceptualising student actions, I am 
inspired by the Wright et al. framework (1990) for categorising the numerous 
possible behaviours exhibited by disadvantaged-group members. Relationships 
between various forms of student action are explored and mapped in terms of a 
conceptual framework that can be applied in the analysis of student actions to 
address their unmet financial need. 
 
Conceptualisation of student actions 
Given the main concern of my study, student actions provide a first point of 
clarification. In particular, my investigation focuses on the how as opposed to the 
why and when students choose a particular action/s to address their problem of 
unmet financial need. Wright et al. (1990: 995; see also van Stekelenburg, 2013) 
have proposed a framework for categorising the numerous possible behaviours 
exhibited by disadvantaged-group members based on three distinctions. First, a 
distinction is made between action and inaction. Second, a distinction is made 
between collective action and individual action. Collective action refers to action 
or behaviour that “is “directed at improving the condition of the entire group” 
(1990: 995; see also Stekelenburg, 2013). It comprises “any form of concerted 
group effort to achieve a shared goal” (Ratner, Meinzen-Dick, May and Haglund, 
2013: 200-201).  
 
Individual action, on the other hand, is “behaviour that is directed at improving 
one's personal condition” (Wright et al., 1990: 995; see also Stekelenburg, 2013). 
Therefore the intended outcome of the action (whether it benefits the collective or 
individual) is the main distinguishing criterion. I must add that the mere belief in 
the shared goal and acceptance of being part of and acting as part of the group 
would not necessarily bar an individual from taking action at individual level. The 
‘possibility’ is always there. A third distinction is between actions that conform to 
the norms of the existing social system (normative) and those that contravene the 
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existing social rules and structure (non-normative) (Wright et al., 1990: 995; see 
also Stekelenburg, 2013).  
 
From these three distinctions, Wright et al. (1990: 995) then propose five broad 
categories that can be used to describe various actions in response to a particular 
inequality: (a) apparent acceptance of one's disadvantaged position; (b) attempts at 
individual upward mobility through normative channels made available by the 
system; (c) individual action outside the norms of the system; (d) instigation of 
collective action within the prescribed norms of the existing system; and (e) 
instigation of collective action outside the norms of the system. Furthermore, 
Wright et al. argue that collective non-normative action “directly threatens the 
existing social order, whereas acceptance and individual normative actions serve 
to protect the status quo” (1990: 995). These categories will play an important role 
in the process of conceptualising and locating student actions in this study. In the 
following discussion, I shall focus on two forms of collective action: student 
activism and student participation in higher education governance.  
 
Moreover, the conceptualisation of student action needs to include the 
clarification of concepts such as students, student body and student organisation, 
as well as certain relationships among them. To begin with, all higher education 
institutions have a student body, which may be defined as the “collective of 
individuals who are engaged in academic study and vocational education and 
training at a particular higher education institution” (Badat, 1999: 23; see also 
Luescher, 2005). A student body is made up of student organisations and is the 
"source of potential members, supporters and sympathisers as well as antagonists" 
(Badat, 1999: 24). The size and social composition of the student body has an 
impact on the character, role and actions of a student organisation (Badat, 1999: 
24). Accordingly, a student organisation can be understood as a collective of 
students with different reasons (political, cultural, religious, academic and/or 
social) for affiliation (Badat, 1999: 21). A student organisation can take different 
forms (such as ‘council’, ‘club’, ‘society’, ‘association’, ‘union’ and even 
‘organisation’ itself, which may be used to designate such a formation) (Badat, 
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1999: 21-22). Most student organisations are characterised by voluntary 
membership, although some student organisations, for example the SRCs at 
historically black higher education institutions, have automatically incorporated 
all registered students (Badat, 1999: 22). Student organisations have constitutions 
or base documents that outline governance arrangements and guiding principles, 
objectives and the vision and conduct of members, including dispute resolution 
measures.  
 
Badat argues that the concerns of students and student organisations “may extend 
beyond the educational arena and social relations in education to social relations 
in the political sphere” (1999: 21). This implies that the “form and content of 
student struggles may be mediated not only by educational apparatuses but also by 
the apparatuses of the political sphere” (Badat, 1999: 21; see also Altbach, 1997).  
 
Thus, in keeping with Badat (1999: 21), the form and content of student actions 
may vary. Inspired by Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam (1990), I propose that 
various kinds of student actions can be conceptualised along two continuums, as 
shown in Fig. 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Matrix of student actions 
 
The horizontal continuum (in Fig. 1) relates to the range of forms that student 
actions take within higher education institutions. I describe the extremes of this 
Nonnormative  
 
Normative 
 
Type 4 
Individual  
Type 3 Type 1 
Type 2 
Collective 
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continuum as collective student action and individual student action, with the 
former depending on the cohesive power of the student body as an organised 
force, the relationship between the student body and the student leadership and 
common concerns or objectives, while the latter is about individual students 
pursuing their self-interest individually rather than collectively with other 
students. 
 
The vertical continuum in Fig. 1 involves an interpretation of the content of 
student actions in terms of whether or not such actions follow the prescribed 
norms of the system. The extremes of this continuum are normative and non-
normative student actions. Normative student actions occur within prescribed 
norms. Non-normative student actions occur outside the prescribed norms of the 
higher education system.  
 
The relationships within and between the two continuums are complex and 
characterised by interrelatedness and interdependency, on the one hand, and 
diversity of purpose and outcomes, on the other hand. This, however, presents a 
possibility to construct four ideal types of student actions with both analytical and 
practical applicability to this study. These ideal types are (1) collective normative 
student action, (2) collective non-normative student action, (3) individual 
normative student action and (4) individual non-normative student action. By 
proposing these ideal types, I am not necessarily suggesting that this is how 
students act in reality. Rather it is an attempt to find a way of thinking about 
student actions both in abstract and concrete terms.  
 
The proposed ideal types require further elaboration in order to establish some 
basic characteristics and possible analytical interests. The results of the literature 
provide the necessary basis for analysing collective student actions. In particular it 
has been shown that students tend to use student activism or ‘informal 
governance’ (Luescher, 1995: 2) or ‘extraordinary governance process’ (Pabian 
and Minksová, 2011: 262) or student participation in higher education governance 
or ‘formal governance’ (Luescher, 1995: 2) or ‘ordinary governance process’ 
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(Pabian and Minksová, 2011: 262) to address their problems, including funding. I 
therefore propose to analyse student activism and student participation in higher 
education governance as a way of seeking to elucidate basic characteristics and 
identify possible indicators of collective student action. For the purpose of this 
study, I consider various kinds of student activism as representing collective non-
normative student action and formal student participation in higher education 
governance as representing instances of collective normative student action. These 
two are, of course, historically intimately related, because student participation in 
higher education governance is a consequence of student activism in higher 
education.  
 
Collective normative student action (Type 1) 
In the previous chapter I highlighted that formal student participation in higher 
education governance is receiving increasing attention in academic research and 
writing. The relationship between this form of collective student action and the 
conceptions of universities has been explored. Luescher (2008: 68) recommends 
that any empirical study of student governance could investigate the extent of 
student influence and oversight in university governance by considering the 
following indicators  
 
(1) Formal means by which students can participate in the political 
processes and thereby express their preference about higher education 
policy;  
(2) Formal methods by which students can hold university leadership 
accountable; and  
(3) The extent of political participation of the student body at large in 
matters of university governance (Luescher, 2008: 68).  
 
These indicators can to some extent complement the ones proposed for various 
types of student activism. If one compares the first indicator with the ones that I 
propose for state-focused and institution-focused student action (see below), there 
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is a common objective of seeking to influence policy; the difference is the route to 
be used.  
 
Formal student representation in higher education governance presumes the 
existence of a relationship between the student body (as the represented) and 
student leadership (as representatives), characterised by a degree of common and 
shared vision or interests and governed by an agreed set of rules, which may be 
codified formally, for example, in a SRC constitution. This compels the student 
leadership to operate on some kind of mandate, which may be sought or provided 
in different ways, depending on the nature of student governance in a particular 
institution. The mandate may be interpreted as providing a framework within 
which negotiations between the student leadership (on behalf of the student body) 
and university management may happen.  
 
However, the approach to the mandate that student leaders may take will differ, 
depending on their interpretation and understanding of the issues proposed as part 
of the mandate. The attitude and approach of university management could play a 
huge role in influencing and shaping the approach of student leaders. For instance, 
if management is seen as ‘intransigent’, students are likely to take a hawkish 
approach, whereas if management is seen as ‘progressive’ and understanding, 
student leaders may take a more ‘measured’ or consensus-building approach. In 
the final analysis the relationship between student leaders and the student body is 
vitally important to formal student participation in higher education in the form of 
collective student action. Student alliances (strategic-based on principles or 
tactical-based on convenience) with other stakeholders (such as workers) can also 
play an important role in ensuring the effectiveness of formal student participation 
in higher education governance. 
 
The aspect of formal student participation in higher education governance that is 
most relevant to this study is negotiations. This is a process in which students try 
to influence higher education institutional leaders to understand and address their 
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‘bread and butter’ problems (such as access, financial exclusions, financial aid) 
(Cele, 2008: 88).  
 
Collective non-normative student action (Type 2) 
There are several analytic interests in studying collective non-normative student 
action. In this regard, this study focuses on collective non-normative student 
action with the following analytic factors:  
 
a) Monitor and describe incidents of collective non-normative student action 
aimed at addressing students’ problem of unmet financial need. 
b) Determine student perceptions on the use and relevance of collective non-
normative student action in addressing students’ problem of unmet 
financial need. 
c) Determine the effectiveness and impact of collective non-normative 
student action on national and institutional funding policy development 
and change.  
 
The second and third analytic interests are also relevant to an empirical study of 
collective normative student action.  
 
Student activism  
I previously indicated that students tend to use student activism as one of their 
favourite forms of collective non-normative action. Student activism has 
consistently been a “feature of student life in higher education institutions in both 
the developed and developing countries for decades” (Munene, 2003: 117). 
Student activism can be understood as the manifestation of student struggles 
“within a specific arena aimed at specific sets of relations” (Badat, 1999: 21; see 
also Byaruhanga, 2006). These struggles can range from “militant protest 
demonstrations to petitioning legislators, from paramilitary political action to 
educational efforts as well as student publications focusing on politics” (Altbach, 
1997: 2-3). In the previous chapter, I discussed the catalytic role and impact of 
student activism in bringing about social change, political and higher education 
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transformation. Student activism is largely influenced by the context and 
conditions under which it happens. In this study I emphasise the importance of 
understanding context and conditions as both enablers and inhibitors to students’ 
advancement of their struggles, including those directed at funding problems.  
 
I propose to expand the conceptualisation of student activism in order to enhance 
its relevance and utility in this study. I intend to use Koen et al.’s (2006) typology 
of student activism in higher education in a revised form. The typology has been 
constructed based on the focus of student activism. Three ideal sub-types of 
student activism have consequently been proposed: state-focused student 
activism, student leadership-focused student activism and institution-focused 
student activism. I propose a refined version of typology, as summarised in Table 
1. I follow this up with a detailed discussion. The main idea is that empirical 
studies can be conducted based on one of more of the three ideal types.  
 
Table 1: Typology of student activism aimed at funding policy  
 State-focused Student leadership- 
focused  
Institution-focused 
Size Small-large, nationally 
or provincially and 
institutionally 
coordinated 
Combination of small 
and large 
Large 
Nature  Planned, mass 
meetings, handing 
over memorandum, 
class boycott, 
marches, peaceful and 
violent placard 
demonstrations 
Spontaneous and 
planned, mass 
meetings, handing 
over memorandum, 
marches, peaceful and 
violent 
demonstrations 
Spontaneous and 
planned, mass 
meetings, handing over 
memorandum, class 
boycott, sit-ins, 
marches, peaceful and 
violent demonstrations 
Focus National policy  Accountability and 
responsiveness 
Institutional policy and 
change 
Recognition Official  Unofficial  Unofficial 
Source: Adapted from Koen et al. (2006) 
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State-focused student activism 
State-focused student activism tends to focus on national funding policy as its 
primary object. Here I think of policy in its broadest sense as contested terrain and 
site of struggle. State-focused student activism may be used as strategy to 
mobilise support in order to influence and shape the policy. State-focused student 
activism can be coordinated at various levels, that is, nationally, provincially or 
even institutionally. Permission is generally sought from the police beforehand. 
State-focused student activism can assume different forms. These include planned 
action, mass meetings, handing over of a memorandum, class boycotts, marches 
and peaceful and violent placard demonstrations. Parliament and the Ministries of 
Education and Finance tend to be targeted, given their different roles in the 
funding policy. The intended recipients of student demands are Ministers or 
Directors General of government departments or the Speaker of Parliament. The 
size of state-focused student activism can attract small to large numbers of 
students as participants.  
 
State-focused student activism can be seen as a way in which students attempt to 
exert influence on national funding policy as the site of struggle and contested 
terrain. In consequence the role and influence of students on policy development 
and change can be considered an important dimension of state-focused student 
activism. I propose five indicators that can be considered as part of any 
investigation related to student influence on national funding policy. The 
proposed indicators are the following:  
 
• The impact of social and political conditions on student activism; 
• Mass-based action;  
• Change-driven action; 
• Political and ideological disposition; and 
• Performance of catalytic function.    
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It is also possible to think of qualitative indicators related to, for instance, the 
ability of students to change the content of a policy from an ideological or 
political basis to underlying principles. Therefore different studies can be 
conducted using all or some of the proposed indicators.  
 
Institution-focused student activism 
Institution-focused student activism tends to be driven by students’ concerns 
related to a particular funding policy or management attitude to student funding 
concerns and demand for change. All these issues are interrelated. Funding plays 
an important part in the processes of inclusion and exclusion of students, hence it 
tends to be a key focus. Students generally do not seek permission from the 
university management to embark on student activism. Therefore, institution-
focused student activism can be considered ‘unofficial’. Institution-focused 
student activism can be large or small, depending on the nature of the institution, 
scale of the problem and number of students affected. It takes different forms, 
including spontaneous and planned mass meetings, handing over of memoranda, 
class boycotts, sit-ins, marches, peaceful and violent demonstrations.  
 
I propose student financial access and financial exclusion as the two dimensions 
of institution-focused student activism against funding policy. I also propose a set 
of indicators for each dimension, as captured in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Institution-focused student activism aimed at funding policy  
Dimension Indicator 
Financial exclusion Percentage fee increase per annum (the extent to which students 
can prevent or reduce fee increment) 
Number of financially excluded students 
Amount of outstanding fees and upfront payment 
Fees and upfront payment, minimum payment 
Financial access Number of financial aid awards 
Amount of allocations 
Values of scholarship, bursaries or loans 
Total student enrolment 
Percentage of poor students as proportion of total student 
enrolment 
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I also propose that qualitative indicators can be formulated concerning the impact 
of fee increases, inadequate financial aid, inability of students to pay the minimum 
or the entire required amount and related experiences of seeking alternative 
funding in order to make the required financial contribution. These indicators are 
appropriate for both qualitative and quantitative research studies. 
 
Student leadership-focused student activism 
Responsiveness and accountability tend to constitute the focus of student 
leadership-focused student activism. It can be spontaneous and planned. Student 
leadership-focused student activism assumes different forms, including mass 
meetings, the student general council, handing over of memoranda, marches, class 
boycotts, peaceful and violent protest demonstrations and barricading of gates. 
Depending on the institutional context and nature of concern, student-leadership-
focused student activism can attract large or small numbers of students.  
 
The oversight and active participation of the student body seems to be the main 
dimension of student-leadership-focused student activism. I propose the following 
indicators: 
 
• Regular holding of student mass meetings; 
• The implementation of the student body’s mandate; 
• Frequent reporting; 
• Effective management and efficient use of the student budget by the 
student leadership; and 
• Attitudes to and perceptions of students of the role and contribution of 
student leadership and student organisations, such as the SRC. 
 
These quantitative indicators can be complemented by qualitative indicators 
related to experiences and views of the student body about the role, effectiveness 
and efficiency of their student leadership and student organisation, involvement of 
the student body in student governance in general and student organisations’ 
activities in particular and finally views of the student body on the existence or 
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nonexistence of accountability measures. Empirical studies that combine both sets 
of indicators should therefore be encouraged.  
 
Having discussed the different types of collective non-normative student activism 
or ‘informal student participation in higher education governance’, the next 
discussion will shift the focus to ‘formal student participation in higher education 
governance’. I have made a point before about the interconnectedness between 
student activism or informal student participation in higher education governance 
and formal student participation in higher education governance, notwithstanding 
possible differences that may exist between these two forms of collective student 
action. The differences may be about ideological and political preferences or 
linked to the historical effectiveness of the two forms. To an extent some of the 
differences may be described as irreconcilable. One may think of situations where 
decisions about using any of the collective student actions would have been made 
along rigid ideological and political lines.  
 
As indicated earlier, students may choose individual actions to address their 
problem of unmet financial need. I shall focus on the individual actions in the next 
section, differentiating between individual normative actions and individual non-
normative actions.  
 
Individual actions 
 
Individual normative action (Type 3) 
Individual student actions constitute an important aspect of the proposed 
conceptual framework of this study. They can be divided into individual 
normative student actions and individual non-normative student actions. 
Individual normative student actions occur within existing channels or prescribed 
norms of a system. Individual normative student actions in relation to a student’s 
unmet financial needs can assume different forms, such as negotiations with 
university officials, job-seeking on and off campus, part-time or temporary jobs 
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and sharing study materials and food, writing a letter to a newspaper or other 
public or social media platform.  
 
 Individual normative student actions can take place at different institutional 
levels between the student concerned and university representatives or designated 
officials. Potentially, the academic performance and socio-economic situation of 
students will become the main basis of negotiations. Ability and willingness of 
students to pay may be considered key dimensions of individual normative 
student action. Some of the indicators related to this type of student action 
include: 
 
• The amount of individual student financial contribution; 
• Finalisation of the registration process; and 
• Reduction or cancellation of student debt. 
 
Individual non-normative student actions (Type 4) 
Individual non-normative student actions can be described as those actions that 
fall outside prescribed norms or existing channels. Such actions range from 
individual student protest, ‘squatting’ or 'illegal' sharing of a university residence 
room, submission of financial aid eligibility-related documents with incorrect 
information, hunger strikes, placard demonstrations, sit-ins and forming human 
chains. 
 
The ability and willingness of students to protest may be considered key 
dimensions of individual non-normative student action. Some of the indicators 
related to this type of student action will include the following:  
 
• Non-payment of fees; 
• Amount of individual student financial contribution; and 
• Finalisation of the registration process. 
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Non-action 
I have so far discussed various types of actions that students may undertake to 
deal with their problem of unmet financial need. I earlier indicated that Wright et 
al. (1990) distinguished between action and non-action. They proposed five 
categories to explain behaviours that could be displayed by individuals as they 
confront their disadvantaged situation. I have already discussed and mapped four 
categories related to action as well as certain sub-categories. I now want to focus 
on the fifth one related to non-action which is beyond the typology involved in the 
above framework. In Wright et al.’s terms inaction involves “apparent acceptance 
of one’s disadvantaged position” (1990: 995).  
 
With respect to my study, I propose that a student who quickly gives up hope and 
‘voluntarily’ accepts exclusion may indeed be accepting his or her disadvantaged 
situation. Here I am specifically referring to a student whose only basis of 
exclusion is finance, not academic performance. I also qualify my statement by a 
careful use of ‘voluntarily’ to distinguish between someone who is informed of 
outstanding fees, realises that he or she cannot do anything about it and chooses 
not to return to campus, versus someone who acts, returns to campus, approaches 
the SRC, participates in collective action and even tries to negotiate with the 
university officials individually, but in the end is still excluded. Both these types 
of students are victims of the system, but the difference is that the one apparently 
more readily accepts her or his disadvantaged position, almost voluntarily so, 
while the other one refuses to do so and fights against the disadvantaged position, 
even if eventually he or she loses the battle.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to develop a conceptual framework to analyse and interpret 
data for the study. The framework was inspired by Wright et al.’s framework 
(1990) for categorising the numerous possible behaviours exhibited by 
disadvantaged-group members. These could be (a) apparent acceptance of one's 
disadvantaged position; (b) attempts to gain individual upward mobility through 
normative channels made available by the system; (c) individual action outside 
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the norms of the system; (d) instigation of collective action within the prescribed 
norms of the existing system; and (e) instigation of collective action outside the 
norms of the system. Therefore the framework sought to conceptualise student 
action as the possible behaviour of disadvantaged-group members in terms of 
different ideal types. On the basis of this, I developed a matrix consisting of 
horizontal and vertical continuums. The horizontal continuum indicates collective 
and individual elements at the end of each extreme. The vertical continuum 
indicates normative and non-normative elements at the end of each extreme.  
 
Furthermore, I magnified the typology by developing sub-types of student 
activism, which represent collective non-normative student action. I refined Koen 
et al.’s (2006) typology of student activism and constructed three ideal sub-types, 
namely, (a) state-focused student activism; (b) institution-focused student 
activism; and (c) student leadership-focused student activism. 
 
In subsequent chapters, I shall show how the framework and related typology can 
be applied to the UWC situation from 1995-2005.  
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology framework for the study. I 
adopted a case study approach and used multiple sources of data collection, 
namely interviews, observation and documentation. This was important to ensure 
methodological triangulation. My previous research experience at UWC enabled 
me to access a variety of data. I established the necessary rapport with students 
and university management, which played an important role in dealing with issues 
of subjectivity.   
 
This chapter consists of four sections. The first section provides the rationale for 
the selection of UWC as the case. The second section deals with data collection 
and data analysis. The third section deals with issues of validity and reliability. 
The fourth section identifies the limitations of the study.  
 
Selection of the UWC as a case study 
Stake argues that perhaps the “most unusual aspect of case study in the social 
sciences and human services is the selection of cases to study” (2005: 450). The 
cases are of prominent interest before formal study begins (Stake, 2005: 450). A 
case study is a “process of inquiry about the case and the product of that inquiry” 
(Stake, 2005: 444). I adopted a qualitative single case study approach for several 
reasons. First, a case study is a “common way to do qualitative inquiry” (Stake, 
2005: 443). Second, I chose UWC because it offered an “opportunity to learn” 
(Stake, 2005: 451). Third, choosing a case study approach generally helps to 
“understand complex social phenomena” (Yin, 1994: 3). In this respect, the case 
study approach allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events such as individual life cycles, organisational and 
managerial processes and environmental change. The case study method allows 
for the investigation of specific issues in their real-life context where the issues to 
be investigated are integrally linked to the context. In other words, as Babbie and 
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Mouton put it, “the interaction of the unit of analysis with its context is a 
significant part of investigation in case studies” (2001: 283).  
 
Other reasons also influenced my choice of UWC as a case study. I chose UWC 
because of its historical role in the national liberation struggle against the 
apartheid system and its commitment to bringing about thorough-going 
transformation.  
 
UWC’s commitment to expanding access to students despite lack of adequate 
funding on the one hand, and the role of students in this situation offered 
interesting data to analyse. Given the fact that UWC had built a special 
relationship with the ANC alliance before 1994 and had been an academic home 
to the National Education Policy Initiative and a number of intellectuals 
associated with it, I was initially interested to understand how this relationship 
would affect the subsequent relationship between UWC and the post-1994 
government. I was also interested in understanding the impact of the relationship 
on the resolution of the paradox of expansion of access and limited funding.  
 
Furthermore, I chose UWC because of its unique SCM office, which was the 
brainchild of students and born out of the 1998 UWC non-normative student 
action. SCM was responsible for debt management (including debt collection and 
payments) and risk management (including forecasting possibilities and the 
implications of admitting debt-ridden students). SCM was also responsible for 
student billing and played a leading and central role in negotiations between the 
university and students about financial agreements. 
  
Finally, I chose UWC for practical reasons, because I had accumulated 
experiential ‘knowledge’ of the institution and its stakeholders. Blatter argues that 
having access is an important criterion for selecting cases (2008: 69). I was 
employed as a researcher at one of the UWC research institutes from 2000 to 
2005. As a UWC employee, a researcher in student politics and an active 
participant in campus politics for five years, I was able to conduct research as an 
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‘insider’. For this reason, I gained access and permission to do research without 
experiencing any problems. I had access to all campus stakeholders (senior 
management, academic and non-academic staff and students) and maintained 
good working relationships with them. Admittedly the mere fact that I was a 
researcher (a research instrument) could potentially raise concerns about 
subjectivity and objectivity. Partly, I managed to deal with this concern through 
the existing ‘trust’ that I shared with stakeholders. This trust contributed to the 
generous support that I received throughout the duration of my study.  
 
Another crucial factor was that I managed to persuade especially students and 
management to ‘buy in’ and see the importance of conducting my investigation, 
which despite its primary academic interest, could provide some insights or 
lessons for higher education institutions and stakeholders. I would use my 
observation in writing up my study in a limited and measured way with a view to 
supplement limited or missing data, to add context or provide clarity. My 
observations have been referenced.   
 
Data collection 
The access I enjoyed to students and university management for this study gave 
me the opportunity to assemble a unique and diverse case study database. I used 
multiple sources of data, which is “important in case studies of all kinds” (Babbie 
and Mouton, 2001: 282). The goal of using different types of evidence is “to 
triangulate” (Yin, 2009: 261). Triangulation has been generally “considered a 
process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the 
repeatability of an observation or interpretation” (Stake, 2005: 454). It is used to 
avoid the “common problems of bias, poor recall and poor or inaccurate 
articulation” (Yin, 1994: 85). I collected data through interviews, participant 
observation and documentation. Each one of these three methods is discussed 
below.  
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Interviews 
I conducted individual research interviews, which are commonly used in 
qualitative research. According to Babbie and Mouton (2001: 289), the individual 
research interview differs from most other types of interviews in that it is “an 
open interview which allows the object of study to speak for him/her/itself rather 
than to provide our respondent with a battery of our own predetermined 
hypothesis-based questions” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 289). Accordingly I did 
not have predetermined questions that had to be answered in any particular order. 
Rather I created an environment in which I had open-ended conversations with 
interviewees around a number of topics in relation to my research question. 
Correspondingly, Babbie and Mouton (2001: 289) argue that a qualitative 
interview is an “interaction between an interviewer and a respondent in which the 
interviewer has [a] general plan of inquiry but not a specific set of questions that 
must be asked in particular words and in a particular order”(Babbie and Mouton, 
2001: 289). I discuss how I gained access, selected interviewees and conducted 
the interviewing process in the next sections.  
 
Gaining access 
By their very nature most case studies are "reported and interpreted through the 
eyes of specific interviewees" (Yin, 1994: 85). It is argued that well-informed 
respondents can provide useful information and easy access to the case and can 
help a researcher to "identify other relevant sources of evidence" (Yin, 1994: 85). 
In the case of this study, the criteria of choosing 'well-informed respondents' who 
could provide a different perspective on the same situation prompted me to choose 
students and staff of the university who were directly involved in the key concerns 
of the study as respondents in interviews. 
 
Gaining access to do research with students and staff of the university was an 
important step that I had to undertake before the commencement of my study. 
Access can be defined as the “appropriate ethical and academic practices used to 
gain entry to a given community for the purposes of conducting formal research” 
(Jensen, 2008: 2). 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
 
Thus, I approached the Registrar, explained my research in detail and sought 
broad university permission to conduct the study. In turn, the university granted 
me its full permission, which allowed me to have unfettered access to UWC staff 
and students, as well as documentary records and archives. 
 
Selection criteria 
For the selection of students as interview respondents, I used mainly snowball 
sampling, a technique of non-probability, purposive sampling. Snowball sampling 
refers to “the process of accumulation as each located subject suggests other 
subjects” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 167). Given the difficulty of locating 
students with ‘unmet financial need’, I identified a few interviewees (especially 
ordinary students) initially. These interviewees then assisted me in identifying 
others facing similar problems. These interviewees became informants or 
‘gatekeepers’, which is “another means of access in qualitative research” (Jensen, 
2008: 2). Gatekeepers will have “inside information that can help the researcher in 
determining who the best participants to access in the community or organisation 
are” (Jensen, 2008: 2).  
 
Based on my insights into the university as locally based researcher, I carefully 
identified senior managers and SRC members whom I was going to interview, 
based on the nature and role of their portfolios in relation to my study. I 
mentioned earlier that I chose UWC because it offered “an opportunity to learn” 
(Stake, 2005: 451). Stake argues that the “potential for learning is a different and 
sometimes superior criterion to representativeness” (Stake, 2005: 451). I then 
considered this criterion applicable in the selection of interview respondents who 
were easily accessible.  
 
Once interviewees had been identified, I then explained the purpose of and details 
about my study and requested them to grant me their informed consent to 
participate in the study. Since I did not prepare a research information sheet, I 
indicated to the potential interviewees that I was interested in finding out how 
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students addressed their problem of unmet financial need at UWC between 1995 
and 2005.  
 
Generally, the university management officials and student leaders consented to 
the research verbally, while some of the interviewees (mainly ordinary students) 
consented in writing by signing my notebook. Having gained the informed 
consent of the subjects meant that my study was in line with a general research 
code of ethics, which insists that “subjects must agree voluntarily to participate 
without physical and psychological coercion and their agreement must be based 
on full and open information” (Christians, 2005: 144). 
 
Altogether, I interviewed two government officials, 30 UWC students (student 
leaders and ordinary students), four UWC staff members (academic and non-
academic) and six UWC management officials. Interviews dealt with a variety of 
issues: contextual issues related to the changing role of UWC in society and the 
university’s understanding, interpretation and response to evolving national higher 
education policies as they apply to the issues under investigation in this study.  
 
From the collective student action perspective, I interviewed student leaders who 
were in the different SRCs from the late 1980s till 2005. This enabled me to 
understand student demands, challenges and decisions across different generations 
of student leadership and to use the historical insights to make sense of students’ 
decisions, particularly on access, financial agreements, student debts and 
payment.  
 
The interviews with student leaders provided insights into the role of students in 
transforming UWC from its origins as an apartheid institution for the so-called 
‘coloured’ population to an open and democratic institution for all students across 
the erstwhile racial divide. The insights also provided understanding of the role of 
students and UWC in the national liberation struggle against the apartheid regime. 
The interviews with student leaders further highlighted internal student cleavages, 
some of which were politically and ideologically based. These cleavages 
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manifested themselves in the manner in which students approached student 
funding problems, the relationship with government, university management and 
the role of the SRC.  
 
I interviewed student leaders representing different political organisations, namely 
the South African Student Congress (SASCO), the Azanian Student Congress 
(AZASCO) and Pan-Africanist Movement (PASMA). Interviewing these student 
leaders was important, given the highly politicised nature of the SRC and the fact 
that their organisations had been present in UWC student politics and contested 
SRC elections for the entire duration of the case study period. While SASCO was 
the dominant student political organisation to win SRC elections between 1995 
and 2005, an analysis of UWC student activism would be incomplete without 
including all three student political organisations, which reflected national 
political differences between the ANC, Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and 
Azanian Political Organisation (AZAPO).  
 
From the individual (or atomised) student action perspective, I interviewed 
‘ordinary’ students (i.e. individuals registered as university students and not 
involved in any institutional leadership) who came from historically 
disadvantaged backgrounds and who had experienced financial difficulties. Some 
of these students had received inadequate financial assistance, which made them 
vulnerable to exclusion or drop-out. Others did not have funds for the required 
upfront payment and/or registration fees.  
 
Process of interviewing 
I conducted face-face interviews using ad hoc open-ended questions, which were 
related to the purpose and research question of the study and prompted by the 
interview encounter. The questions (or topics) used to stimulate respondent 
narratives were related to broad themes: student access, student funding 
(especially tuition and accommodation fees, fee increases, financial exclusions, 
financial assistance, upfront payments and registration), university funding policy 
(e.g. drivers, approach, structures, challenges) and agency role of students in 
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addressing their ‘unmet financial need’. The interviewees and I were able to 
discuss issues in detail. In instances where the interviewees did not respond 
adequately or misunderstood my questions, I gave clarifications, posed follow-up 
questions and probed further. My experience coincides with the insight of Babbie 
and Mouton that probes are “more frequently required in eliciting responses to 
open-ended questions” (2001: 253).  
 
I conducted most interviews in the offices of the interviewees, especially the 
offices of university management and officials, union members and SRC 
members. In the case of ordinary students, I conducted some interviews in my 
UWC office or in places where students felt comfortable. The duration of the 
interviews ranged from 30 minutes to three hours. I always asked students if they 
were comfortable with the recording of the interviews, which would only be used 
for the purpose of my study. All interviewees gave me permission to audio-record 
the interviews and none ever requested to withdraw or that some parts of the 
interview should be deleted.  
 
The interviews were necessary to understand students’ reasons for individual 
action while the SRC continued to exist. The interviews provided insights into the 
impact that lack of adequate funding and inability to pay had on students, 
especially their academic performance.  
 
Most importantly, the interviews provided insights into the nature of the process 
that students and their parents had to undergo in mobilising the required funding 
and the engagement of students with university funding structures, especially the 
SCM. The interviews were critical in uncovering the stories or “unseen pains of 
transition” (Jansen, 2004: 118) and ‘solidarity networks’ that students leveraged 
in order to address ‘unmet financial need’.   
 
I interviewed undergraduate students from five different faculties (Law, Natural 
Sciences, Community and Health, Arts and Economics and Management), at 
different levels of study. There were students who were first-years but had been at 
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the institution for more than six months, second-year students and also final-year 
students who were doing either the third year of a three-year degree or fourth year 
of a four-year degree. The reason for interviewing the different students was to 
gain diverse and yet rich data on their experiences, challenges and expectations, 
which would presumably also be different. For instance, two students (with the 
same amount of available funds) who were doing Bachelor of Pharmacy and 
Bachelor of Arts degrees might deal with the financial requirements of their 
studies differently.  
 
I interviewed African and coloured students at UWC, as shown in Table 3. At 
UWC at the time there were very few white and Indian students. About 80% of 
the interviews were with African students, and 57% of interviewees were female.  
 
Table 3: Number of students interviewed by race 
Race Number of students interviewed at UWC 
African 24 
Coloured 6 
Total 30 
 
The students I interviewed at UWC came from different geographical 
backgrounds (mainly Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Gauteng and 
Western Cape), as shown in Table 4. More than half (about 53%) came from the 
Eastern Cape.  
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Table 4: Percentage of interviewed students by province  
Geographical origin Students interviewed 
KwaZulu-Natal 7%  
Eastern Cape 53%  
Gauteng 13% 
Western Cape 17% 
Northern Cape 0% 
Mpumalanga 3% 
Limpopo 7%  
Free State 0% 
 
To gain an institutional perspective from management and academics, I 
interviewed UWC senior management (including the Rector, Vice-Rectors, 
Registrar, Executive Director of Finance and Institutional Planner), a student 
development officer, union representatives, academic staff members, and the 
heads of SCM and the Financial Aid Office. 
 
Data security: recording, transcription and storage 
Most of the interviews were recorded and transcribed. Yin argues that “tapes 
certainly provide a more accurate rendition of any interview than any other 
method” (1994: 86). I stored the tapes in a safety box at home. I did not write 
down the original names of interviewees to maintain confidentiality and shall 
negotiate with the university about what to do with the tapes once I have finished 
the study.  
 
Over and above recordings, I listened attentively and took meticulous field notes, 
which were later analysed and in some instances followed up with the respective 
interviewees for further clarity. This was in line with what Bryman and Burgess 
suggest, namely that “the quality, or even adequacy of a research project is not 
only the result of the questions asked or concepts used, it is also the result of 
keeping rigorous field notes” (1994: 36).  
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Participant observation 
Yin (1994: 87) emphasises the significance of observation as an important aspect 
of data collection. As a UWC employee, I was able to conduct both direct and 
participant observation. According to Stake, researchers involved in a qualitative 
case study spend “extended time on site, personally in contact with activities and 
operations of the case, reflecting and revising descriptions and meanings of what 
is going on” (2008: 450). I therefore attended the SRC public activities held on 
campus between 2000 and 2005. These activities ranged from SRC elections, 
annual general meetings (AGMs), transformation summits and strategic planning 
sessions, cultural and social events, to SRC members assisting students during 
registration. I took notes, collected pamphlets, discussion documents and reports 
and interacted with students.  
 
I also participated in institutional structures (such as the Senate, Institutional 
Forum (IF) and Employment Equity Forum as the National Education Health and 
Allied Workers Union representative and consultant respectively), where students 
were represented and contributed to issues that concerned them. The interaction 
enhanced my relationship with the student leaders and improved their confidence 
and trust in me, which facilitated access to information.  
 
In addition, the different student political parties discussed their perspectives and 
differences with me. At times, the focus of the discussions emanated from the 
specific issues that I raised. Each party would articulate its position and indicate 
where it differed from others. Some of the UWC leaders were also members of 
the national executive committees of various organisations or participated in both 
provincial and national executive meetings of their respective political 
organisations.  
 
Other UWC leaders were members of the national SRC structures, such as former 
South African universities’ SRCs and the South African Technikons’ Student 
Union (SATSU). In these cases, students shared and exchanged with me 
information and documents that they had received at these meetings. Students 
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shared their national positions on various issues. I also learned a lot about what 
was happening on other campuses.  
 
Students also invited me to make presentations to their workshops, strategic 
planning sessions and national forums. I made presentations at the Western Cape 
Provincial General Council of PASMA in 2003 at the former Cape Technikon, 
SATSU National Executive Committee Meeting in 2004 at the former Pentech 
and SASCO National General Council in 2004 at the former Vaal Technikon. 
These engagements were useful to me. I received feedback on the presentations. 
Students critically engaged me on the issues that were raised with respect to their 
accuracy, relevance and bias. At times, I had to sharpen and refine or 
fundamentally change my thinking. Students can be brutally frank and robust in 
their engagements when they are confident about their issues and stories.  
 
Being involved in institutional structures allowed me access to the arguments 
advanced by other stakeholders, particularly the university management. I was 
able to access the documents and data, which might have been impossible without 
maintaining such good relationships. I always informed and assured the university 
management that I would use their data only for the purpose of the study and 
consult them if there was a possibility of the analysis and writing 'harming' the 
university. However, the idea was not for the university to change or influence my 
data but be satisfied that there were no deliberate misrepresentations or 
inaccurances. In this respect, the relationship methodologically was akin to 
member-checks.  
 
I had an ongoing positive relationship with various student leaders across the 
political spectrum based on mutual respect and trust and commitment to social 
justice. This relationship was a consequence of my research work, which dealt 
with issues that were relevant to students. In other words, student engagement 
with my research work played an important role in establishing my relationship 
with students. From this base other aspects of the relationship emerged, including 
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broad discussion related to the internal and external challenges they were facing, 
their struggles with management and ideological and political differences.  
 
The relationship posed ethical challenges, which I managed as follows. Whenever 
I observed something of interest or was given a document that could be useful to 
my research at the meeting or workshop that I attended, though not in my capacity 
as doctoral researcher, my apporach was to make the students aware of my 
interest and request permission to use such data for my research. I enjoyed a 
relationship of mutual trust and respect with students. Students and I discussed 
issues freely. Students shared their personal views, which at times differed from 
the ‘official’ views. They shared sensitive discussions that they had in their 
organisations, or things that they were planning to do. Students even shared with 
me papers and presentations that they were going to make on various issues. 
Sometimes student leaders asked me to comment on these papers. In all my 
interactions with students as ‘research subjects’ in my study, I was guided by the 
ethics of social research (e.g. Babbie et al, 2001). 
 
Documentation  
Official and unofficial documents constitute another important source of evidence. 
Yin argues that the importance of using documents is to “corroborate and augment 
evidence from other data sources” (Yin, 1994: 81). Specifically, documents are 
“helpful in verifying the correct spellings and titles or names of organisations that 
might have been mentioned in an interview” (Yin, 1994: 81). Documents can be 
used to "corroborate information from other sources and if the documentary 
evidence is contradictory rather than corroboratory" (Yin, 1994: 81). Inferences 
can be made from documents. However, these inferences should be “treated only 
as clues worthy of further investigation rather than as definitive findings, because 
the inferences could later turn out to be false leads” (Yin, 1994: 81).  
 
As Yin further argues, the “usefulness of various documents must not be based on 
their necessary accuracy or lack of bias. In fact, documents should be carefully 
used and should not be accepted as literal recordings of events that have taken 
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place” (1994: 81). Therefore in my analysis I was careful and conscious of the 
potential problem of over-reliance on documents. This was because, as Yin 
argues, the casual investigator may mistake certain kinds of documents, such as 
proposals for projects or programmes, "for those containing the unmitigated truth" 
(1994: 82). In fact, it is important in reviewing any document to understand that 
"it was written for some specific purpose and some specific audience other than 
those of the case study being done" (Yin, 1994: 82). A case study investigator is 
"a vicarious observer, and the documentary evidence reflects a communication 
among other parties attempting to achieve some other objectives" (Yin, 1994: 82).  
 
I collected and examined several kinds of documents from UWC. From the 
student side, I collected AGM reports, financial agreements, organisational, 
political, and financial conference documents, resolutions, programmes of action, 
memoranda, communiqués, pamphlets, correspondence, minutes of meetings, 
letters, submissions to government, conference papers, student submission papers, 
strategic plans, student leadership election results reports, court judgments, 
election manifestos, pamphlets and posters.  
 
From the institutional side, I collected annual reports, financial statements, review 
reports, strategic documents, policies (strategic plans, three-year rolling plans, 
financial plans, institutional plans, residence information and information on 
financial aid, student affairs, scholarships and bursaries) and submissions, relevant 
academic and non-academic published and unpublished writings - including 
public debates, press reports, and institutional research reports.   
 
Data analysis 
Analysis of data can be "conducted based on raw data such as interviews 
transcripts, fieldnotes, archival materials, reports, newspaper articles, and art" 
(Benaquisto, 2008: 86). Conceptualisation and breaking down of data constitute 
“the first step in data analysis” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 63). This process is 
called open coding. During open coding the data are “taken apart an observation, a 
sentence, a paragraph [at the time], and giving each discreet incident, idea, or 
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event, a name [or code], something that stands for or represents a phenomenon” 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 63). Data are also compared for “similarities and 
differences, and questions are asked about the phenomena as reflected in the data” 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 62; see also Benaquisto 2008). It has been suggested 
that it is necessary to group concepts around particular phenomena that have been 
identified in the data. The process of “grouping concepts that seem to pertain to 
the same phenomenon is called ‘categorising’” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 65). 
Essentially, the concepts are grouped together under “a higher order, more 
abstract concept called a category” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 61). The 
development of categories can be done in terms of their “properties (attributes or 
characteristics pertaining to a category), which can be dimensionalised (a process 
of breaking a property down into its properties)” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 63).  
 
Strauss and Corbin (1990: 72; see also van den Hoonaard and van den Hoonaard 
2008) suggest several ways of approaching open coding, which I have used during 
data analysis. First, I analysed interview and observation data ‘line by line’, which 
at times involved a closer look ‘phrase by phrase’ or at ‘single words’. I used 
preliminary results (especially of earlier interviews and initial observations) to ask 
specific questions arising from my research question and conceptual framework 
and focus on certain behaviours during later interviews and observations.  
 
Second, I sometimes analysed a ‘sentence or paragraph’ with a view to find out 
the key message or idea. Once I had identified the key idea, I then tried to a give it 
a name and conducted detailed analysis to refine the concepts further. This 
entailed questioning assumptions and meanings (both ‘intended and assumed’) of 
what the interviewees were saying.  
 
Finally, I continuously reflected on each and every interview that I conducted and 
asked if there was anything emerging that could be similar or different from the 
previous interviews. I did the same thing with documents (such as financial 
agreements, annual reports, discussion documents and so forth) that I collected. 
Throughout the analysis process I was reminded of what Strauss and Corbin said: 
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“never take anything for granted ... because the minute you do, you foreclose on 
many possibilities that may be the key to uncovering the answer to one of your 
research problems” (1999: 93).  
 
One of key challenges that I had to deal with related to interpretation of data. 
According to Badat one approach to the task of interpretation could be to concede 
that knowledge about one’s research is “intrinsic to the actors themselves, and to 
accept the definitions and conceptions contained in their documents, reports and 
statements as well as speeches of the officials” (1999: 6). Consequently, the 
meanings and voices of participants “are not only unduly privileged but also 
treated as unproblematic. There is no critical interrogation of meanings and self-
definitions or dialogue with other empirical evidence, which could, indeed, be 
deemed irrelevant” (Badat, 1999: 6). Such an approach is more accurately 
described as “‘propaganda’ and characteristic of the ‘official histories’ of some 
organisations, rather than serious scholarly work” (1999: 8). In order to avoid 
falling into error, I examined each and every piece of data (whether from 
interviews, documents and observation). In the case of interviews, I did ask 
interviewees for their views on certain issues or statements that might have been 
expressed by others. For instance, if a student leader had made a certain statement 
I could ask another one and in some instances, I would even go back to the same 
interviewee to clarify the matter further. Moreover, the adoption of a conceptual 
framework (as presented in Chapter Three) eventually provided a useful lense for 
re-categorising and interpreting the data and emerging findings from the first 
rounds of analysis. In this respect, the post-hoc ‘imposition’ of a conceptual 
framework - after having attempted a more ‘grounded approach’ to 
conceptualisation - represents a departure from Strauss and Corbin (1990) but 
furthered the purpose of the investigation towards answering the research 
question.  
 
Addressing issues of reliability and validity 
The issues of validity and reliability were important to deal with in the study. 
Simon argues that validity and reliability “must be addressed in all studies” (2011: 
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1). This is important to ensure that there are accuracy, dependability and 
credibility of information. There are differences in the manner in which validity 
and reliability are considered in quantitative studies and qualitative studies.  
 
In quantitative research, reliability refers to the “ability to replicate the results of a 
study” (Simon, 2011: 1). In qualitative research studies there “is no expectation of 
replication” (Simon, 2011: 1). Similarly, some qualitative researchers have argued 
that the term validity “is not applicable to qualitative research, but at the same 
time, they have realised the need for some kind of qualifying check or measure for 
their research” (Golafshani, 2003: 602). 
 
Many researchers (such as Davies and Odd, 2002; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Mishler, 2000; Seale, 1999; Stenbacka, 2001) have “developed their own concepts 
of validity and have often generated or adopted what they consider to be more 
appropriate terms, such as, quality, rigor and trustworthiness” (Golafshani, 2003: 
602, see also Simon, 2011). They have also adopted ‘dependability’ instead of 
reliability (Simon, 2011: 1). Dependability necessitates that "an enquiry must also 
provide its audience with evidence that if it were to be repeated with the same or 
similar respondents (subjects) in the same (or similar) context, its findings would 
be similar” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 278).  
 
The concept of ‘trustworthiness’ as introduced in the influential work of Lincoln 
and Guba (1985) is the key criterion or principle of good qualitative research. As 
Babbie and Mouton argue, the basic issue of ‘trustworthiness’ is, “how can an 
inquirer persuade his or her audiences (including him or herself) that the findings 
of an inquiry are worth paying attention to or worth taking account of”? (2001: 
276). The concept of ‘trustworthiness’ contains four aspects, namely credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability (Morse et al., 2002: 2).   
 
Regarding credibility, Babbie and Mouton ask: “is there compatibility between 
the construed realities that exist in the minds of the respondents and those that are 
attributed to them?” (2001: 277). They then suggest that credibility can be 
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achieved “through prolonged engagement, persistent observation, triangulation, 
referential adequacy, peer debriefing, and member checks” (Babbie and Mouton, 
2001: 277).  
 
Transferability refers to the “extent to which the findings can be applied in other 
contexts or with other respondents” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 277). In a 
qualitative study, a researcher is “not primarily interested in (statistical) 
generalisations. All observations are defined by the specific contexts in which 
they occur” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 277). Therefore, a researcher “does not 
maintain or claim that knowledge gained from one context will necessarily have 
relevance for other contexts or for the same context in another time frame” 
(Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 277). Within the quantitative tradition, it is "the 
obligation of the researcher to ensure that findings can be generalised from a 
sample to its target population; in a qualitative study the obligation for 
demonstrating transferability rests on those who wish to apply it to the receiving 
context (the reader of the study)" (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 277).  
 
Thick description and purposive sampling are the strategies for transferability. A 
thick description is “usually a lengthy description that captures the sense of 
actions as they occur. It places events in contexts that are understandable to the 
actors themselves” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 272).  
 
Confirmability refers to “the degree to which the findings are the product of the 
focus of the inquiry and not of the biases of the researcher” (Babbie and Mouton, 
2001: 278). It can be established through an audit trail involving the review of at 
least six classes of data. That is, the raw data (e.g. recorded videotapes, written 
field notes, documents, and survey results); the data reduction and analysis 
products (e.g. write-ups of field notes, summaries and condensed notes, 
theoretical notes such as working hypotheses, concepts and hunches); the data 
reconstruction and synthesis products; findings, conclusions and a final report; 
process notes (e.g. methodological notes, trustworthiness notes, and audit trail 
notes); material relating to intentions and dispositions (e.g. inquiry proposal, 
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personal notes and expectations); and instrument development information (e.g. 
pilots, forms and preliminary schedules, observation formats and surveys) (Babbie 
and Mouton, 2001: 278).  
 
Several methodological strategies for demonstrating ‘trustworthiness or 
‘qualitative rigour’ have been developed. These include triangulation, writing 
extensive notes, audit trails, peer review or debriefing, member checks when 
coding, confirming results with participants, structural corroboration and 
referential material adequacy (Morse et al., 2002: 2; Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 
275, Jensen, 2008: 10). Luescher-Mamashela argues that application of these 
methods can take place at “one or several stages during the research process” 
(2010b: 5). He argues that the methods for ensuring trustworthiness “cannot - and 
should not - be purposed primarily for verification” (2010b: 5). He suggests that 
some methods “more appropriately aim at the falsification of the research findings 
(such as member checks); while most other methods, including those of 
triangulation (whether theoretical or methodological), prolonged engagement, 
persistent observation, and so forth, are strategies aiming dynamically at both 
verification and falsification” (2010b: 5). Thus, Simon argues that ‘member 
checking’ allows the participant a chance to “correct errors of fact or errors of 
interpretation (2011: 1). ‘Member checking’ also “adds to the validity of the 
observer’s interpretation of qualitative observations” (Simon, 2011: 1).  
 
Moreover, according to Bryman and Burgess, the process of note taking should be 
considered “not only as a means of data collection, but also as an important 
location for formal and informal analysis through commentary and coding” (1994: 
11).  
Ensuring trustworthiness of the study 
Having briefly discussed different methods for ensuring trustworthiness above, I 
now want to focus on how I have dealt with the issue of trustworthiness during 
my investigation. First, as indicated earlier, I used methodological triangulation 
by combining interviews, participation observation and documentation. This also 
involved source triangulation. Second, I wrote ‘extensive notes’ during 
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observations and interviews. This required me to listen very attentively to the 
interviewees. Third, I had good rapport with students. I enjoyed a unique position 
with student leadership structures at UWC. I participated in workshops and 
summits where students deliberated on issues and strategies that they were going 
to use to address institutional issues, problems and challenges. I also participated 
in informal discussions with student leaders on issues affecting students and the 
transformation of the UWC. I asked questions related to some of the issues that 
emerged during these sessions during interviews with some students. I also read 
various documents to see if and how they dealt with similar issues.  
 
Methodological limitations of the study 
The principal methodological limitation related to the availability of historical 
data on student funding and governance issues. UWC lacks detailed and 
consistent data runs related to fee increases, student debt and financial exclusions 
prior to 2000. During interviews with UWC senior management, it was mentioned 
that records related to the student affairs portfolio (including interactions between 
the SRC and management, governance and, financial exclusions) were either 
missing or unavailable in archived records. I was told that the university had not 
yet developed a student financial management system that could capture data such 
as student exclusions. 
 
Student organisations did not have a proper records management system either. I 
could consequently not find SRC AGM reports and minutes. It was difficult to 
fully comprehend some decisions that the SRC took on the problem of unmet 
financial need because of a dearth of historical records. I was informed during my 
research that student political organisations tended to use the SRC records as part 
of their broader student power struggles. Outgoing SRCs used to destroy all their 
reports, correspondence, financial statements and similar documents. The 
intention was to disadvantage the incoming SRCs, especially if they belonged to a 
different political group. On the one hand, this implied that there would be no 
‘proper’ handover reports between the outgoing and incoming SRCs. On the other 
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hand, it implied that future generations of student leaders would not have access 
to historical documentation and insights.  
 
In future, UWC should consider developing a comprehensive knowledge and 
records management system to build and keep institutional memory and support 
work of different stakeholders, including SRCs.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter presents the methodological framework for the study. I adopted a 
qualitative case study approach and used a variety of data collection methods 
(such as interviews, documentation and observation). I had to choose 'well-
informed respondents' to provide insights and shortcuts to the prior history of the 
situation, and to identify other relevant sources of evidence (Yin, 1994: 85). In my 
case the criteria of choosing 'well-informed respondents' who could provide a 
different perspective on the same situation prompted me to choose students and 
staff of the university who were directly involved in the key concerns of the study 
as respondents in interviews.  
 
Observation and documentation also played an important role as sources of data 
collection. In the former case, I managed to observe various student activities on 
campus, including student meetings and workshops where they discussed student 
funding concerns. In the case of documentation, I collected different types of 
official documents, including SRC annual reports, minutes, discussion documents, 
the university annual reports, financial statements and so forth. Using multiple 
data collection methods enabled me to conduct methodological data source 
triangulation, an important element of ‘trustworthiness’ or ‘qualitative rigour’. I 
took extensive notes during observations and interviews as part of ensuring the 
trustworthiness of my study. I also had good rapport with students and university 
management, given my role as a researcher and an activist on campus during my 
tenure between 2000 and 2005. This rapport facilitated access to the variety of 
data that I needed.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: STUDENT ACCESS AND FUNDING DEMANDS 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, it was mentioned that prior to 1990, South African 
students were “major catalysts of popular struggles against apartheid and often 
characterised as the shock-troops of the South African revolution” (Wolpe, 1994: 
7). Students demanded transformation of the apartheid higher education system, 
especially its governance and funding policies, which mirrored apartheid’s 
divisions (Bunting, 2006: 73). However, student focus and priorities, especially in 
HBUs, changed following the unbanning of the liberation movement and release 
of political prisoners (including former President Nelson Mandela) in 1990 and 
the commencement of political negotiations. Students shifted "from protests 
against an illegitimate government to demands for unrestricted access to higher 
education, expanded financial aid to needy students, and relief from personal debt 
to the institutions" (Jansen, 2004: 303-304; see also Naidoo, 2006). This shift was 
confirmed by the former UWC SRC president, who indicated that access and 
financial issues became dominant concerns for UWC students from the late 1980s 
onwards (Interview with the UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004). 
 
The shift was related to broader social and political change, which happened after 
1990. Wolpe argues that the “previous concentration on issues of political rights 
and state power has given way to relatively un-coordinated and fragmented 
engagements around education, which have become virtually uncoupled from the 
struggle for political liberation and economic emancipation” (1994: 7; see Badat, 
1995; Luescher-Mamashela and Mugume, 2014). At the same time, students had 
become “even further marginalised” (Wolpe, 1994: 7, see also Badat, Barends and 
Wolpe, 1995; SASCO Political Report 1996) and actually rendered “spectators” 
(Wolpe, 1994: 7).  
 
Conceivably, HBUs and students might legitimately have expected the ANC-led 
government and especially its post-apartheid higher education policy to respond 
favourably to their demands for expanding access and financial aid for African 
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and poor students. However, I shall show in this chapter that (a) there was a 
dissonance between student expectations and the post-apartheid higher education 
policy; (b) there is a historical context to both, student policy expectations and 
policy responses; and (c) the policy response regarding access and funding seen 
together amounts to a problematic, indeed a paradoxical combination of policies, 
which as I shall show in Chapter Six, led to unmet financial need and various and 
changing student actions.  
 
This chapter consists of five sections. The first section situates the study within 
the broader political and higher education context. The second section provides a 
brief historical account of UWC in terms of its origin, role during the liberation 
struggle and post-apartheid era, as well as leadership challenges. The third section 
deals with the student demand for an independent and democratic SRC. I have 
included this demand because of the historical role that the UWC SRC has played 
in the collective student normative and non-normative actions aimed at opening 
access to higher education institutions and the provision of financial aid to poor 
and African students between 1995 and 2005. Therefore, tracing the genesis and 
conditions that shaped and influenced the SRC is necessary to enhance one's 
understanding of its role as a leader and institutional representative of students' 
collective concerns, including unmet financial need. The SRC is a contested 
terrain of struggle for student power and influence. It is an embodiment of the 
dominant student ideological and political view, which in turn shapes and 
influences the nature and form of collective student actions against the problem of 
unmet financial need. The fourth section deals with students’ demand for the 
expansion of access. The fifth section deals with students’ demand for expanded 
and equitable financial aid.  
 
Political context 
Wolpe and Unterhalter argue that “education may be a necessary condition for 
certain social processes, but it is not a sufficient condition, and hence cannot be 
analysed as an autonomous social force” (1991: 3). I propose that post-apartheid 
higher education needs to be seen in the broader national socio-economic and 
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political context. In general, higher education has an important role to play in 
socio-economic development and the eradication of inequalities. However, it is 
not a ‘panacea’ to all social ills. The higher education policy tends to be modelled 
within the broader socioeconomic development policy. I have already established 
in Chapter Three, that student actions can influence and be influenced by socio-
economic and political conditions. Therefore I feel it is important to conduct a 
brief analysis of the post-apartheid socio-economic and political policy trajectory, 
which has a bearing on the research question.  
 
The post-apartheid democratic state was established through a negotiated 
settlement and involved significant compromises and trade-offs between the 
ANC-led liberation movement and the apartheid government. The negotiated 
settlement was the outcome of a stalemate - “a relatively static, unstable 
equilibrium of power in South Africa” (Wolpe, 1992: 15). This stalemate was 
characterised by the dominant social classes not being “powerful enough to 
reproduce the apartheid and capitalist social order without massive and endemic 
social conflict and international isolation, and the liberation forces being unable to 
achieve the revolutionary overthrow of the regime and the winning of state 
power” (Wolpe, 1992: 15).  
 
The main outcome of the negotiated settlement was the attainment of democracy 
with political power, but without economic power. This created a number of 
opposing and contradictory dynamics within South African society. The post-
1994 democratisation project has created a peaceful and stable political climate in 
which many significant freedoms are enjoyed. It marked a beginning and 
established a “necessary condition, but not the sufficient conditions, for the 
transition from the apartheid system to a new social order” (Wolpe, 1995a: 286).  
 
The attainment of political power by the ANC and the establishment of the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) has, beyond the arena of representative 
government, and despite some erosion, left more or less intact the mode of 
operation of much of the existing institutional order, that is, the inequalities 
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between institutions (e.g. HBUs and HWUs, universities and technikons, etc.) as 
well as the social structural conditions of the society (Wolpe, 1995a: 286). 
 
The country has witnessed four successive elections being held and widely 
accepted by both local and international stakeholders. The democratic state’s 
social policy has resulted in the significant expansion of social grants, millions of 
low-cost houses and water, electricity and telephone connections, and similar 
services. However, many people have had their water supplies disconnected, 
according to national government surveys, and ten million were victims of 
electricity disconnections (see Bond, 2004; Desai and Pithouse, 2004 for details). 
 
The macro-economic policy has hampered social progress in other ways, as social 
spending has increased but critical social needs remain unmet (see Terreblanche, 
2005 for further details). South African macro-economic policy has kept inflation 
and public debt low despite harsh criticism from mainly the left and civil society 
formations. It also opened the South African market to “international trade and 
capital flows” (Rodrik, 2006: 1; see also Hirsh, 2005). The economic policy 
adopted in 1995, GEAR, promised to achieve 6% economic growth and the 
creation of 400 000 new jobs by 2000. It was expected that GEAR would 
contribute to a “booming South African economy operating at or near full 
employment. Unfortunately, it has not turned out that way” (Rodrik 2006: 2).  
 
Prior to the global financial crisis in 2008, South African economic growth 
exceeded 3% per annum. However, this did not lead to the creation of new 
employment. Rodrik argued that the South African unemployment rate was one of 
the highest in the world and in fact it appeared to have increased rapidly since the 
democratic transition (from a “low of 13 percent in 1993”) (Rodrik, 2006: 2). 
Specifically, unemployment had risen substantially, from 17.6% in 1995 to a peak 
of 30.4% in 2002, although it seems to have stabilised around 27% since 2004 
(Bhorat & Oosthuizen, 2007: 391). 
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The unskilled and black population constitutes the majority of the unemployed. 
According to Bhorat and Oosthuizen (2007: 393), in 2004 unemployment rates 
among Africans and women were above the 38.8% national mean, at 44.8% and 
46.6% respectively. The situation for African women was severe, with 52.9% 
being unable to find employment. The situation of rural women was even more 
severe (Bhorat and Oosthuizen, 2007: 393). Unemployment rate among persons 
aged 15-24 years was substantially higher than those in the 25-34 year age group 
in 2005 (Statistics South Africa: 2005:xvi).  
 
Bhorat and Oosthuizen (2007: 398) furthermore state that overall, 9.7% of 
individuals with tertiary qualifications were unemployed in 2005, according to the 
expanded definition. However, among those with diplomas and certificates, the 
unemployment rate was 13.2%, compared to a rate of 4.4% among those with 
degrees. Thus, individuals with degrees appeared to be able to find work more 
readily than those with diplomas and certificates, and much more readily than 
those without any higher qualification.  
 
Some of the complementary economic policy interventions spearheaded by the 
private sector worsened the situation. One of the consequences of these 
interventions was the restructuring of the economy, which involved mass 
retrenchments in the labour market, casualisation, informalisation, privatisation 
and fragmentation of the public and private sector (see Cronin, 2004; Desai and 
Pithouse 2004; Nzimande, 2004). 
 
The restructuring of state policy from the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) to GEAR in 1996 sought to reduce the role of the state in order 
to create favourable macro-economic conditions for investors (especially foreign 
direct investors) and capitalist-driven growth. South African women of colour 
bore the brunt of retrenchments and casualisation as direct victims and as the ones 
who normally had to face the reality of poverty in the household and deal with it 
(see Daniel and Habib, 2003; Desai, 2004; SACP, 2005; Terreblanche, 2004).  
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Following strong opposition, a massive anti-privatisation campaign, and a general 
strike led by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) around 
2001, dominant policy in government began to shift towards much greater 
emphasis on building state capacity, and towards supporting the idea of a 
developmental state playing an active role in the economy, particularly in driving 
infrastructural development and an industrial policy. However, these shifts did not 
necessarily mark a decisive break with a paradigm that envisaged a dichotomy 
between capitalist-driven growth on the one hand, and a more or less separate and 
technocratic development programme, dependent on capitalist growth, on the 
other.  
 
The macro-economic policy set “limits on public spending and imposed fiscal 
constraints on higher education institutions” (Gibbon and Kabaki, 2006: 128). 
Badat argues that this limited or inadequate funding hindered the government in 
its progressive commitments to increasing student enrolment, participation, access 
and equity (2004: 46). 
 
The history and role of UWC before the 1994 democratic elections 
The apartheid regime’s 1959 Extension of University Education Act formally 
segregated the provision of higher education in South Africa and gave birth to five 
racial and ethnic universities established in 1960 and 1961. These were UWC for 
coloured students, UDW for Indian students, the University of the North (UNIN) 
for Tsonga/Venda/Sotho-speaking students, the University of Zululand for 
Zulu/Swazi students and, as an ethnicisation of an existing university, the 
University of Fort Hare for Xhosa students. These institutions were called HBUs 
or, more derogatively, ‘bush colleges’.  
 
Wolpe stressed that UWC, together with the UNIN, Zululand and UDW, 
“emerged under the historical conditions of suppression of black political 
opposition, the introduction of repressive measures, the establishment of elaborate 
structures of administrative control of blacks, the initiation of and development of 
the Bantustan policy and so forth, all of which narrowed the scope for legal 
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political opposition and were aimed at the entrenchment of the apartheid system” 
(1995a, 278). According to Wolpe and Sehoole, there were gross material and 
functional inequalities (in terms of financing, material resources, staffing, 
undergraduate teaching loads, quality of students and availability of courses) 
between HWUs and HBUs (1995: 3). They argued that this functional 
differentiation of HBUs and HWUs had its origins in the different conceptions of 
the roles of these institutions which aimed at serving the broader political 
objectives of an apartheid society (Wolpe and Sehoole, 1995: 3).  
 
HWUs were conceived of as “providing the human resources and knowledge 
required by the advanced industrial, social and dominant political order enjoyed 
by the white South African population” (Wolpe and Sehoole,1995:3). By contrast, 
the HBUs were shaped to “provide the human resources deemed to be necessary 
for the occupations available in the urban areas to black people and to the 
‘development’ of the Bantustans - this being unrelated to any broad conception of 
the knowledge and skills required for their ‘real’ economic and social 
development” (Wolpe and Sehoole, 1995:3). In this instance, UWC was meant to 
serve the interests of the so-called ‘coloured community’ in keeping with the 
political aim to “reproduce the apartheid project” (CHE, 2010:126). However, 
UWC resisted the apartheid project with all its intentions.  
 
Wolpe (1995a:286) identified four elements that characterised the resistance 
tradition of UWC prior to 1994. First, UWC rejected the racially based ideology 
of separate education for different ethnic/racial groups. Second, the university, 
struggling to transform itself, recognised the dual hint and Third World structure 
of South African society and the obligation of the university to serve this society - 
although this did not include a specification of functions in terms of science and 
technology versus human sciences, basic and applied research, undergraduate 
versus graduate teaching. Third, it became clear that the inadequate education of 
the mass of students placed a particular obligation on the university to redefine its 
identity and conceptions of its teaching role.  
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Finally, the university defined itself as the home of the intellectual left. This was 
partly intended, as Gerwel put it, to “create the possibilities of a “post-apartheid 
social space during the repressive apartheid times” (Gerwel, 2009:1). In 
consequence, UWC stakeholders were able to engage with one another and in 
particular, students and management (especially the Rector) frequently met 
through ‘weekly forums’. The emergent democratic environment was a clear 
antithesis to the apartheid project.  
 
The transition to democracy (1990-1993) challenged UWC to “define its role in 
the light of its history” (Wolpe, 1995a:287). The debate on the establishment of 
the new School of Government (SOG) in 1993 reflected this challenge. The 
debate focused on different approaches needed for the SOG. Two arguments were 
presented and each had a different reading and interpretation of the new 
government’s all-important (but short-lived) RDP. The first argument proposed an 
approach based on the overriding objective, which was to “produce technically 
qualified personnel for public administration” (Wolpe, 1995a:287). This was in 
line with the RDP’s call for human resources needed for national and provincial 
governments.  
 
The second argument advocated public administrators who “should be steeped not 
only in technical skills (although these are indispensable) but also in the values of 
democracy, the ethos of accountability and service, etc” (Wolpe, 1995a:287). This 
was based on the view that RDP went beyond simply seeking to bring economic 
growth and enhanced quality of life, but that “transforming social relations in the 
society (non-racist, non-sexist, democratic, transparency in administration etc.) 
implies a different conception of education and training” (Wolpe, 1995a:287).  
 
According to Wolpe, the importance of technical excellence “cannot be 
sufficiently stressed. This is necessary if UWC's graduates are to compete in the 
labour market and offer high-level skills to the reconstruction process and do so in 
such a way as to contribute to social transformation” (Wolpe, 1995a:288). 
However, this placed major new demands on the university both to “develop new 
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strengths - that is both new disciplines and high levels of technical competence 
and, at the same time, to link this to social concerns” Wolpe, 1995a:288).  
 
Wolpe characterised this institutional task as “obviously a difficult task full of 
tensions for both teaching and research, yet in the best traditions of the university 
- in particular, its commitment to being an intellectual home of the left - and 
deeply ingrained in the RDP (1995a:288). The SOG debate was about a “critical 
role for the university.” (Burawoy, 2004: 31). It also reflected UWC’s internal 
dynamics and “may present a mirror image of the society where it is located, in 
terms of the diversity of ideological influences and material interests” (Sall, 
Lebeau and Kassimir, 2003: 128).  
 
Having briefly described the trajectory from its origin to 1994, in the next section, 
I shall examine how it sought to redefine its role in relation to the new state, and 
how it dealt with a range of challenges such as leadership, financial crisis and 
student access and debt.  
 
The post-1994 UWC context: leadership, institutional and student financial 
situation  
Professor Jakes Gerwel played an important role in steering the university’s 
transformation project until his appointment as the first Director General of 
President Mandela’s Presidency in 1994. He was succeeded by Prof. Cecil 
Abrahams, who served as rector until 2000. However, by mid-October 1998, Prof. 
Abrahams was the object of an “unprecedented vote of censure from the senate; 
faculty meetings passed motions of no confidence; academic and administrative 
staff associations demanded his resignation” (Helen Suzman Foundation, 1999: 
1). 
 
Prof. Abrahams infuriated students with his ‘firm’ resolve to deal with the 
university’s financial crisis. He demanded that students should settle or reduce 
their debts. Students were so incensed with Prof. Abrahams’s insistence that they 
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engaged in high levels of student activism, which I discuss in detail in the next 
section. 
 
The university also imposed a “voluntary severance programme that reduced 
employee numbers by 456” (UWC, 2007: 6). This corporatist model or market-
based solution privatised and outsourced non-core activities in both academic 
faculties and administrative departments (UWC, 1999: 3). In consequence, in 
eight months Prof. Abrahams had “managed to turn not just the students against 
him but the whole of the university community” (Helen Suzman Foundation, 
1999: 1).  
 
At the beginning of 1999, UWC was characterised by a high level of disillusion 
with Prof. Abrahams (Helen Suzman Foundation, 1999: 1). There were also fears 
that more staff layoffs (both academic and administrative) would follow the 1998 
retrenchments. Academic staff members who were retrenched in late 1998 sued 
the university and a full and final settlement was reached in August 2000. The 
total liability was R4.8 million; R2.5 million was paid in 2000 and R2.3 million 
was paid in instalments from 2001-2004. The settlement costs, combined with the 
deficits in the pension and provident funds, led to UWC having “very significant 
financial commitments to meet in the early 2000s” (UWC, 2007: 6).  
 
Given its historical role in the struggle against apartheid, UWC also “heeded the 
call from ANC government to allow indigent students to enrol without paying” 
(UWC, 2007: 6). This resulted in increased student debt. At the same time there 
was an all-time decline in student enrolment at HBUs nationally.  
 
Individual academic successes and leadership efforts at planning were undermined 
by “general and sometimes public crises of confidence and morale” (UWC, 2007: 
6). The university was unable to replace employees who had left. Because of all 
these factors, UWC conceded that it “had lost its way” (UWC, 2007: 6). The ‘loss 
of vision’ deprived UWC of an opportunity to further its transformation agenda 
and to define its identity in the context of democracy and social change. It also 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
made the university miss out in terms of consolidating its position in relation to 
other institutions nationally and internationally.  
 
The ‘atmosphere of suspicion and distrust’ contributed to the antagonistic 
relationship between management and students that prevailed from 1994 to 2000, 
which resulted in high levels of non-normative action, especially student activism. 
For UWC the budgetary erosion of the late 1990s and early 2000s and the need to 
recover vision and make strategic choices to advance the institution’s goals and 
ambitions highlighted the need for new and “dynamic leadership” (UWC, 2007: 
6). In 2001, Prof. Brian O’Connell succeeded Prof. Abrahams as rector and vice-
chancellor.  
 
In its 2007 self-evaluation report, UWC argues that Professor O’Connell 
constantly sought to focus “UWC’s distinctive mission and identity by 
emphasising the university’s comparative advantage and using several leverage 
points for strategic change”. It also argued that Prof. O’Connell led the university 
through “a period of consolidation, regaining internal trust and public confidence 
in UWC’s leadership direction” (UWC, 2007: 6). In his inaugural lecture, Prof. 
O’Connell introduced the notion of UWC as an “engaged university capable of 
maintaining the dynamic link between academic knowledge and the realisation of 
society’s hopes”. The UWC community was called to “create an engaging space 
and an opportunity on large scale for its members to grow in hope and knowledge, 
and to develop, in a non-instrumentalist way, a sense of their agency in relation to 
the needs of society” (UWC, 2007: 6). 
 
Prof. O’Connell spearheaded the development of a five-year financial plan, which 
was approved by the university council in 2001. The five-year financial plan was 
intended to assist the university to recover from its financial crisis and to measure 
its financial performance going forward. According to the UWC annual report, the 
five-year financial plan served “a dual purpose as an update of current income and 
expenditure against budget, as well as a five-year financial plan forecast based on 
projected financial outcomes” (UWC, 2005: 27). The five-year financial plan was 
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“aligned with national benchmarks that take into account expected changes in 
general economic factors and institutional-specific factors” (UWC, 2005: 27).  
 
The five-year financial plan defined and set the following key financial drivers 
and targets: (a) admissions should grow at sustainable rates; (b) students should 
pay their tuition and residence fees; (c) employment costs should not exceed 65% 
of total income; (d) operating costs should not exceed 30% of total income (UWC, 
2002: 41).   
 
The 2005 UWC annual report indicated that student enrolment was 14 590, of 
which “almost 11 000 received some form of financial assistance” (UWC 2005: 
15-16). UWC's Financial Aid Office administered a total allocation of 
R88,2million in bursaries, of which R40,7 million was an NSFAS allocation. 
Other contributions included R10 million from the UWC bursary fund and R3,28 
million merit awards for top achiever first-time entrants and senior students 
(UWC, 2005: 15). Other forms of student financial assistance came from student 
assistant credits (R1,251 million), and Edu-loan (R913 000) in 2005. 
Notwithstanding this, some students still failed to meet all their financial needs. 
This contributed to the university’s persistent problem of student debt consisting 
of both recoverable and irrecoverable portions. The latter ended up being written 
off. For instance, in 2005 the UWC gross student fee debt reached R132 million 
from the R77 million in 2001. The university considered some portion of the 
student debt as ‘impaired’, which is an amount that is “irrecoverable after taking 
into account collections subsequent to year end and historic patterns of collection 
by the university as well as by professional debt collectors” (UWC, 2005:49). The 
impairment took into account “the present value of future expected cash flows” 
(UWC, 2005:49). Of the 2005 total student debt figure of about R132 million the 
impairment was R100 410 595 million.  
 
UWC’s recoverable student debt fluctuated between 1995 and 2005 (as illustrated 
in Figure 2). The highest recoverable student debt was about R35 million in 1997 
and the lowest recoverable student debt was about R12 million in 2001. 
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Figure 2 Recoverable student fee debt between 1995 and 2005 
 
Source: UWC Finance Division (2014) 
 
The institution itself had other pressing concerns. Lacking an adequate 
endowment or reserve fund, it needed those same students to make upfront 
payments at the beginning of each academic year to keep afloat before the state 
subsidy arrived in April. Consequently, government had to provide a guarantee to 
help the institution access financial support, especially the overdraft, which 
increased from R4 442 547 million in 1995 to R131 622 thousand in 2005 (see 
Figure 3). The overdraft was intended to keep the university afloat while waiting 
for the payment of the state subsidy to come available in April, coinciding with 
the government financial cycle.  
 
Figure 3: UWC bank overdraft between 1995 and 2005 
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Source 1: UWC Finance Division (2014) 
 
On the one hand, UWC committed itself to address the challenge of financial 
sustainability and accomplishing its mission of “actively pursuing equitable 
strategies for students” (UWC, 2003: 8) in the context of global financial austerity 
and national conservative macro-economic policy thinking. On the other hand, 
UWC was expected to implement the paradoxical policy of simultaneous pursuit 
of expansion of access and limited funding (with cost-sharing being advanced as 
policy solution).  
 
The relevance of some aspects of the institutional context will become evident in 
the discussions on student demands for expansion of access and financial aid. I, 
for instance, refer to issues such the historical role played by the university in the 
liberation struggle, the nature of institutional leadership and the institutional 
approach to financial crises and similar concerns.  
 
Student demand for independent and democratic SRCs 
The term SRC is uniquely South African. Even though it can be described as a 
student government body, the SRC is different from ‘student union’, ‘student 
government’, ‘student congress’, ‘student guild’ or ‘general student association’ 
found on most campuses throughout the world (see Joseph, Chemnjor and 
Ngware, 2008: 197; Luescher, 2005: 5).  
 
The concept ‘SRC’ has historical and political significance and meaning in South 
Africa. South African students established the first SRC in 1906 at the University 
of Cape Town (which was then known as the South African College) (UCT 
Monday Paper, 26 May 2008). This marked the slow genesis of a protracted 
national student struggle for liberation, freedom and social justice, and demand 
for recognition and involvement in national and institutional higher education 
policy and decision-making, which finally culminated in 1997 in the approval of 
the Higher Education White Paper, which formally recognised the role of 
students. 
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The content and form of the SRC changed at various points of South African 
history of student politics or activism; SRCs were largely shaped and influenced 
by the prevailing social and political conditions and higher education institutions. 
The period from 1960 to 1967 can be broadly described as a lull in South African 
oppositional politics. This was due to the imprisonment of political leaders and 
banning of liberation movements such as the ANC and PAC, which was 
accompanied by the intensification of internal repression. Any oppositional 
political activity therefore had to be conducted clandestinely in a climate of fear 
and repression. However, it is during this political lull that students (especially the 
oppressed) regrouped and disaffiliated from the established, predominantly white 
and liberal National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) to establish their 
own organisation, called the South African Student Organisation (SASO) in 1968.  
 
SASO radicalised student struggles or student politics and spurred the emergence 
of an independent and critical black student voice, which rejected the apartheid 
regime, white political dominance and economic privilege and its corollary of 
black domination. Students also rejected the apartheid ideological-political basis 
of higher education institutions, especially historically black institutions (such as 
UWC) and the limited powers of the SRCs, which were seen as instruments of 
control and suppression by the apartheid regime and its predecessors. Part of the 
objective was to transform SRCs into weapons of student activism beyond simply 
representing students on academic and administrative concerns (see Maseko, 
1994; Badat, 1999).  
 
Until then the state-appointed university rectors appointed the SRCs. With the 
exception of the first recorded example of an official student protest at the UWC 
in 1963, which involved male students refusing to wear ties to a social function, 
the SRC activities were tightly controlled. The university councils (at two black 
universities) rejected the requests of the SRCs to become NUSAS affiliates (see 
Gwala, 1988).  
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To deal with the effects of suppression and control, students at some institutions 
(such as the University of Fort Hare in the 1960s) decided not to have SRCs 
because they were perceived to be ambassadors of institutions and apartheid 
government ‘stooges’ (see Bhana, 1977; Welsh and Savage, 1977). Another 
reason was the ‘constant victimisation’ of SRCs by apartheid agents (Mzamane, 
Maaba and Biko, 2006:108).  
 
Student rejection of the apartheid regime, its apparatus and SRCs spread 
throughout the country as disturbances at the Universities of the North, Western 
Cape, Fort Hare and Durban Westville in the early 1970s were linked to calls for 
more representative governing structures, a greater role for black staff and 
academic freedom (see Bhana, 1977; Welsh and Savage, 1977).  
 
Nationally, as Mamdani argues, the ‘decade of peace’ ended with the Durban 
strikes of 1973 and the Soweto uprising of 1976. For the next decade, South 
Africa was in the throes of a protracted and popular urban uprising. The paradigm 
of resistance shifted from “an exile-based armed struggle to an internal struggle” 
(Mamdani, 1996:30).  
 
Students’ demand for autonomous and empowered SRCs was one of the key 
concerns of students in the 1980s (Maseko, 1993: 1; see also Mzamane et al., 
2006). It was “linked explicitly to a demand for greater control over their 
education” (Molteno, 1987: 7), as well as to the demand for broader political 
reform and democratisation of the country on the one hand, and the 
transformation of higher education (especially its governance) on the other hand 
(Cele, 2008: 90-91; see also Gerwel, 2009; Gerwel, 1988; Wolpe, 1994).  
 
In the apartheid era, in the pursuit to secure the acceptance of SRCs, students 
braved expulsion or suspension from educational institutions, and dared injury, 
detention, long prison sentences and even death. The “campaign for the 
recognition of SRCs became in itself an instrument of mobilisation in the struggle 
to end the poor quality of education for blacks, and ultimately to destroy the entire 
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structure of racial/ethnic and class domination” (Maseko, 1993: 1). Yet the 
outcome of the campaign was in various respects neither successful, nor produced 
the form of governance the students envisaged, namely that they should take part 
in the decision-making structures. At some tertiary institutions this campaign was 
relatively successful, although at other institutions, such as the Universities of 
Fort Hare, the North and Transkei, SRCs were short-lived owing to state 
repression and harassment in collaboration with the authorities of these 
universities. At UWC the SRC had a longer life span, but its existence scarcely 
led to the representation of students in the governing structures (Maseko, 1993: 1).  
 
UWC students managed to establish an independent and democratic SRC in 1981. 
However, the first two years of the formation of the UWC SRC were marked by 
intense student debate on the role and importance of having an SRC on campus. 
As a result there was little political or any other activity on its part. There were 
two dominant and opposing student views on the role of the SRC. The first view 
came from those who adhered strongly to the ‘non-collaborationist’ principle, a 
hallmark of the New Unity Movement tradition (Maseko, 1993: 10). This tradition 
was pessimistic about the efficacy of the SRC at a campus whose administration 
they mistrusted and regarded as hostile, hence they argued that the SRC would 
merely be a “puppet of the administration” (Maseko, 1993: 10-11).   
 
The other view argued that the recognition of the SRC provided space for students 
to conduct their activities in a ‘legal way’. As evidenced in many debates, these 
different views were never completely resolved (Maseko, 1993: 11). These 
student differences were partly ideological and political, resembling those existing 
between the ANC and AZAPO, Black Consciousness Movement and PAC 
(Interview with the UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).  
 
Reflecting on this, a former UWC SRC president argued that the UWC SRC was 
therefore “ideologically very narrow because for a number of years it was 
dominated by an ANC-aligned student organisation. I think that had a major 
influence on how we dealt with students on the campus” (Interview with UWC 
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SRC president, 26 October 2004). The former UWC SRC president nevertheless 
argued that they did not “deny other student political organisations access to 
students. As organisations, they were also not denied access to the UWC. But in a 
way, since they were in the minority, they had less influence on policy matters of 
the SRC at that time” (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004). 
 
Maseko argues that after its formation in 1981 the UWC SRC adopted a 
‘confrontational approach’ to the university authorities. This approach was largely 
influenced by the conviction that the apartheid origins and interests served by the 
university placed the two parties on a collision course. Students argued that the 
functioning of the university could not just be reformed but had to be radically 
changed (Maseko, 1993: 7-8). This was motivated by a view of UWC as a “site of 
struggle against the apartheid state but also against the very nature of the 
university” (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004). The 
transformation of the apartheid state (including its ideological state apparatuses 
such as UWC) into a democratic state thus remained a “priority for students” 
(Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004). 
 
At the same time, students needed to deal with their own challenges related to 
racial and ethnic divisions among the student body. This was despite the fact that 
the majority of students at UWC could be described as black. The liberation 
movement had defined black people as “those who are by law or tradition, 
politically, economically and socially discriminated against” (Badat, 1999: 377). 
In pursuit of white supremacy and the quest for ‘hegemony’, the apartheid regime 
used ethnicity as its political and ideological weapon (Sikwebu, 2008: 122). Thus, 
Maseko argues that towards the end of the 1980s, “coloured students were 
accused of dissension, while African students were depicted as the militant group 
on campus” (1993: 17). In consequence, the concept of ‘African leadership’ was 
justified, which led to the “withdrawal of many coloured students, including some 
who were notable activists because they considered their involvement in student 
politics was being trivialised” (Maseko, 1993: 17). The issue of racial and ethnic 
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division remained part of the narrative and a challenge facing the UWC during the 
period under review (1995-2005).  
 
In summary, UWC students had a long history of struggle for an independent and 
democratic SRC. UWC students managed to establish their own SRC in 1981. 
The SRC, however, took long to become effective owing to inter-student groups' 
ideological and political differences on the role of the SRC in advancing student 
interests and transformation of the UWC. In consequence, a highly political and 
democratic SRC structure emerged and became a contested terrain of struggle for 
student power. All student organisations (including political and religious) sought 
better representation and control of student government. Individuals could also 
contest the SRC election as independent candidates. The SRC was at the apex of 
student governance and supposed to serve the interests of all students, irrespective 
of political, ideological or even racial and gender differences. The SRC was 
therefore a collective voice representing diverse student views and interests. In 
other words, once elected, the SRC members were supposed to put the interests of 
all students first and always seek to serve such interests above their narrow 
sectional interests, which included the political organisations from which they 
came. However, as this study shows, the UWC SRC did not always manage to 
establish a balance between the interests of all students versus individual or 
organisational interests. Understanding the origin, nature and role (or lack thereof) 
of the SRC is important in any analysis of student action against unmet financial 
need.  
 
The post-apartheid higher education policy acknowledged that the democratic 
government inherited a higher education system characterised by “fragmentation, 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness, with too little co-ordination, few common goals 
and negligible systemic planning” (Department of Education, 1997: 8). 
Concomitantly, there were contestations around the democratic participation and 
the effective representation of staff and students in governance structures at an 
institutional level (Department of Education, 1997: 8). The post-apartheid higher 
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education policy response included the adoption of democratisation as one of its 
underlying principles. 
 
At the heart of the principle of democratisation was the requirement that the 
governance system of higher education and of individual institutions should be 
“democratic, representative and participatory and characterised by mutual respect, 
tolerance and the maintenance of a well-ordered and peaceful community life” 
(Department of Education, 1997: 12). The policy therefore created an expectation 
and demand for institutional governance to “ensure that those affected by 
decisions have a say in making them, either directly or through elected 
representatives” (Department of Education, 1997: 12). There was strong emphasis 
on ensuring transparency and accountability in decision-making across all levels 
(systemic and institutional) (Department of Education, 1997: 12).  
 
To capture and operationalise the vision of transformed higher education 
governance, the policy preferred the model of co-operative governance of higher 
education in South Africa based on the “principle of autonomous institutions 
working co-operatively with a proactive government and in a range of 
partnerships” (Department of Education, 1997: 36). This was in part because of 
the recognition of “the need to transcend the adversarial relations between state 
and civil society arising from the apartheid era” (Department of Education, 1997: 
36).  
 
Co-operative governance is best conceptualised as a “social contract between a 
wide range of stakeholders in the interests of national reconstruction and 
development” (Hall et al., 2002: 43). The post-apartheid higher education 
governance policy guarantees higher education institutions with “appropriate 
levels of autonomy and academic freedom” (Hall et al., 2002: 43). The post-
apartheid higher education governance policy created a “bicameral system of 
responsibilities in which accountability for governance is shared between two 
primary parties – lay members of Council, acting as trustees in the public interest, 
and professional academics, taking responsibility for teaching, learning and 
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research through the Senate and Faculty Boards” (Hall et al., 2002: 43). In 1997 a 
third agency was added to this traditional model: the Institutional Forum (IF), a 
statutory advisory committee of Council (Hall et al., 2002: 43). 
 
The co-operative governance framework necessitated the transformation of 
institutional governance structures such as council, senate and SRC into 
democratic bodies and the creation of an IF where none had been established 
previously. The new framework sought to formalise the role of students as 
participants rather than bystanders in the process of higher education change. This 
provided a platform for students to engage with the university management in 
establishing common frameworks to address student access, retention, exclusion 
and individual financial difficulties (Cele, 2009: 64). At the same time, new 
challenges for UWC students emerged, such as lack of knowledge or inadequate 
knowledge and understanding of post-1994 legislative frameworks and national 
policy processes and the lack of financial resources or an inadequate SRC budget 
to commission research or receive expert-type assistance when engaging in policy 
actions (Cele, 2009: 67).  
 
As indicated earlier, since 1990, expansion of access and financial aid has been a 
major issue concerning UWC students and student organisations such as the SRC. 
I shall examine these two issues in the next two sections, starting with access and 
then financial aid.  
 
Student demand for expansion of access 
At UWC the demand for the expansion of access was an integral part of student 
struggles for the transformation of the institution in the 1980s. Students embarked 
on institution-focused student activism or collective non-normative action to 
demand expansion of access. According to Gerwel, student activism or collective 
non-normative student action provided "the necessary energy and the driving 
force" (1988: 3), which challenged the "dominant ethos and practices of the 
institution as it was originally conceived and operated, and created the counter 
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ethos and the space and will for other transformative efforts in the institution" 
(1988: 3).  
 
Following the appointment of Prof. Gerwel as the UWC rector in the late 1980s, 
the SRC and rector used to meet, 
 
 “on a weekly basis (during weekly forums) and discuss a range of issues 
pertaining to student affairs. These meetings would sometime happen 
before the formal meetings between students and senior management. We 
informed the UWC rector of our mandated position from mass meetings or 
general council so that he could first see how he can handle the situation. 
[Students’ relationship with the rector was not] adversarial and hostile, we 
both realised that we could agree on certain issues. But we also made it 
very clear that at the end of the day we are there to represent students’ 
interests first” (Interview UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).  
 
The lack of transformation or limited transformation affected the relationship 
between the UWC SRC and management in the late 1980s. According to the 
UWC SRC president, there were  
 
 “sharp differences which led to the stalemate because some members of 
the university management could either not understand or did not want to 
accommodate the students’ position. The situation was strange because we 
had a very progressive rector on the one hand and some members of his 
executive that were not very progressive, in fact conservative” (Interview 
with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004). 
 
Students found themselves in an invidious position, as the former SRC president 
mentioned: “we thought that we have to contest but also assist the university” 
(Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004). The SRC had to fight for 
what was in the ‘best interest’ of students and sometimes took the struggle to the 
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university management, led by Prof. Gerwel, whom students saw as “a very 
progressive rector” (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).  
 
The transformation process undertaken under the leadership of Prof. Gerwel 
facilitated the ability of staff to work together for change. This resulted in the 
university's decision and commitment to 'democratise access' in order to allow 
African students, which contributed to the growth in student enrolment and 
transformation of the social composition of the student body (Gerwel, 1988: 3). 
Thus, according to Cooper and Subotzky, UWC African and coloured headcounts 
comprised 13% and 82% of total enrolments in 1988. In 1993, these had changed 
to 38% and 55% and by 1998 the figures were 58% and 36%. In absolute number 
terms, African headcounts increased from 1 398 in 1988 to 4 761 in 1993, 
followed by a smaller increase to 6 267 in 1998, while coloured headcounts fell 
from 8 762 to 6 890 between 1988 and 1993 and then fell further to 3 851 by 1998 
(2001: 49).  
 
Student demand for the expansion of access to higher education was also a 
national issue. At national level, SASCO demanded “removal of the language and 
admission criteria barriers, relief overcrowding pressure from the historically 
black institutions (HBIs), enhancing articulation and mobility between and within 
tertiary institutions and facilitating the course of the life-long learning ideal” 
(1995: 8). It called for an “expansion and widening of access to higher education 
for the poor and the black majority” (South African Student Congress, 1995: 31). 
SASCO and other student political organisations led both state- and institution-
focused student activism, including marches on Parliament and the former 
Department of Education, protests, placard demonstrations and class boycotts in 
demanding expansion of access.   
 
The post-1994 government acknowledged that there was “an inequitable 
distribution of access and opportunity for students and staff along lines of race, 
gender, class and geography” (Department of Education, 1997: 8). Government 
then set out a vision of a transformed, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist 
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system of higher education that would advance “equity of access and fair chances 
of success to all who are seeking to realise their potential through higher 
education, while eradicating all forms of unfair discrimination and advancing 
redress for past inequalities” (Department of Education, 1997: 10).  
 
Concomitantly, government committed itself to the ‘planned expansion of the 
system’, arguing that a major focus of any expansion and equity strategy “must be 
on increasing the participation and success rates of black students in general, and 
of African, coloured and women students in particular, especially in programmes 
and levels in which they are underrepresented” (Department of Education, 1997: 
21). Nevertheless, government warned that increased access “must not lead to a 
‘revolving door’ syndrome for students, with high failure and drop-out rates” 
(Department of Education, 1997: 22). Government then committed itself to ensure 
that public funds earmarked for achieving redress and equity were “linked to 
measurable progress toward improving quality and reducing the high drop-out and 
repetition rates” (Department of Education, 1997: 22). The following section deals 
further with the issue of student funding. 
 
Student demand for expanded financial aid at UWC 
The demand for expanded and equitable financial aid was at the forefront of UWC 
student action. I have mentioned that UWC students identified funding and access 
as two critical issues of concern, which they had tried to address since the late 
1980s. According to the former SRC president, UWC “admitted large numbers of 
working class students who could not afford to pay tuition fees and residence fees. 
So UWC had to balance its political objectives with its academic objectives” 
(Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004). This showed UWC’s 
commitment to social justice. UWC did not “seek only students who could pay 
their way or those with the highest proven record of academic success, but sought 
to provide an intellectual home for the oppressed, with particular attention to 
working class students who showed potential” (UWC, 2002: 19).    
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In consequence, although the UWC won a “special place in the history of higher 
education in South Africa, and deserved reputation for its role in the creation of 
democratic order, it came at a cost” (UWC, 2002: 19-21). The ‘cost’ came from 
two fronts. First, the apartheid regime reduced its budget subsidy to UWC and 
other HBUs that had defied it and adopted an open access policy. The regime 
revised its funding policy following the decision of UWC (and other HBUs) to 
open access to all students irrespective of colour, ethnicity and origin. However, 
the revised policy combined student enrolment growth (which was the most 
important factor in the old subsidy formula) and student success as two major 
factors for consideration in the allocation of resources to institutions. UWC rector 
Gerwel was candid and recognised the negative consequences that the apartheid 
policy was going to have on the “UWC philosophy of democratising access and 
its deliberate policy of growth” (Gerwel, 1988: 27).  
 
Second, given the fact that most students who benefited from the UWC’s 
democratisation of access were poor and unable to pay, the university was “unable 
to collect from all its students their full contribution to their education, and a 
student debt developed over time” (UWC, 2002: 21). In consequence, UWC’s 
challenge of financial sustainability and student affordability started to deepen. In 
response to the university’s financial challenge, students “took a very responsible 
position because we felt that UWC is progressive higher education institution and 
we did not want to contribute to its downfall of UWC” (Interview with UWC SRC 
president, 26 October 2004).  
 
Students attributed UWC resources problem to the apartheid regime.  
 
...the lack of resources at UWC was orchestrated by the apartheid state in 
the 1980s. So, while UWC took a progressive stance, in resisting apartheid 
regime, students also had to resist the conditions created on UWC. For 
instance, many members of staff were still remnants of the old apartheid 
era. There was a lot of financial and academic exclusions on campus and 
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those were things that the SRC had to deal with" (Interview with UWC 
SRC president, 26 October 2004).  
 
The former UWC SRC president argued, unsurprisingly, that the apartheid state 
 
...did not make provision for students from working class background to 
attend at places like UWC. Notwithstanding, UWC should be 'credited' for 
accommodating students who could not afford tuition fees. So when I say 
that UWC became a site of struggle, it was a site of struggle against 
apartheid, against the state but also against the very nature of that 
university (Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004).  
 
The statement below illustrates this point: 
 
...UWC cannot afford to go bankrupt - and in order for it to stay viable, 
students have to make a contribution towards their debt. As the SRC, we 
said to students. “Look, you have to pay. You can’t study for free.” And I 
think that was also a position where we differed with our own opposition” 
(Interview with UWC SRC president, 26 October 2004). 
 
The demand for expanded and equitable financial aid was national, not just a 
UWC concern. At the 1994 launching conference of the South African 
Universities - Students’ Representative Council (SAU-SRC) student leaders from 
across the country characterised the student funding crisis as the “manifestation of 
the apartheid colonial education system intensified by an inability to develop a 
nationally co-ordinated, coherent policy and approach to university funding and 
student financial aid” (SAU-SRC, 1994: 2). Students noted that the funding crisis 
“affects disadvantaged students more acutely and jeopardises a programme to 
widen access to universities and ensure redress” (SAU-SRC, 1994: 2).  
 
SASCO had been demanding free higher education since the early 1990s (UWC 
SRC, 2000: 15; see also Wangenge-Ouma, 2011; SASCO, 2010). In 1995, 
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SASCO identified and included funding as one of the key component of its 
national programme of action. It demanded a moratorium on financial exclusion, a 
moratorium on unilateral fee increments, immediate establishment of a national 
bursary and loan scheme, a HBIs-biased emergency relief and subsidy formula, 
financial accountability and transparency on the part of tertiary education 
institutions and re-allocation of departmental budgets to education, especially 
military budgets (1995: 8).  
 
In implementing its programme of action, SASCO embarked upon collective non-
normative action, especially state-focused and institution-focused student activism 
against financial exclusions, which were viewed as an “attack on collective access 
to higher education” (2006: 59). SASCO also engaged in collective normative 
action, especially “a process of negotiations at a national level with the aim of 
securing a national student bursary fund” (Naidoo, 2006: 59; see also UWC SRC, 
2000).  
 
The combination of collective non-normative student action and collective 
normative student action represented SASCO’s principle approach to the post-
apartheid government (including the GNU), which it characterised as “both 
confrontation and cooperation” (SASCO, 1994: 1). In other words, SASCO 
confronted or even contradicted government when they differed, but 
complimented it when they agreed. The UWC SASCO branch dominated the 
UWC SRC between 1995 and 2005.  
 
Given its role and contribution to the liberation struggle and persistent financial 
challenge of institutional sustainability and student affordability, it is possible that 
UWC students had legitimate expectations for some relief from the post-apartheid 
higher education policy. In the next section, the nature of the post-apartheid 
higher education policy in relation to student demand for expanded and equitable 
financial aid is examined.  
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The post-apartheid higher education policy: rejection of fee-free higher education 
and implementation of cost-sharing and NSFAS  
As indicated in Chapters One and Two, government argued that fee-free higher 
education for students would not be “an affordable or sustainable option for South 
Africa” (Department of Education, 1997: 46) and thus embraced cost-sharing as a 
policy solution, whereby students and their parents were expected to contribute to 
study costs. Both the 1996 NCHE Report and 1997 Higher Education White Paper 
are explicit about their support for cost-sharing. In particular, the NCHE accepted 
the argument in the literature on the economics of education that “higher 
education generates significant benefits for the student concerned as well as for 
the public at large - the private/public benefits position ... and believes that the 
cost of higher education should be shared by the student and by the public 
(government)” (Department of Education, 1996: 220; see also Department of 
Education, 1997, 4.39).  
 
Notwithstanding its acceptance of cost-sharing, government recognised the 
existing severe limits to the capacity of many students and their families to pay, 
particularly first-generation students from poor families. Government then 
recommended that capable students should not be “excluded from access to higher 
education because of poverty, it is essential to have in place a well-functioning, 
comprehensive student financial aid scheme” (Department of Education, 1997: 
6.39). In consequence, government established the NSFAS in 1999, which was an 
income-contingent loan scheme and part of a policy of cost sharing (Johnstone, 
2003: 8-9). Government transformed the then Tertiary Education Fund of South 
Africa (TEFSA) into NSFAS. 
 
TEFSA, initiated in 1991 was not a true national financial aid scheme because of 
its limited reach (see SAU-SRC, 1994; SASCO, 1995). Higher education 
institutions had been raising their own funds through local and international 
donors. Some of these funds were allocated to financial aid. The Independent 
Development Trust provided R50 million for student financial aid granted in the 
form of loans to needy students from historically disadvantaged backgrounds 
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during the 1991 and 1992 academic years. TEFSA had legislative power to offer 
loans and recover debts (see NSFAS, 2009).  
 
In 1999, the National Student Financial Aid Scheme Act (No. 56 of 1999) was 
passed. This Act established the NSFAS, incorporating TEFSA. The change 
formally occurred in August 2000 with the appointment of the first board of 
NSFAS (see NSFAS, 2010 for more details).  
 
An important aspect of NSFAS is that up to 40% of each award to a student is 
converted into a bursary, which does not have to be repaid to the scheme, unlike 
loans. The extent of this conversion is dependent upon academic results. In 
theory, NSFAS may appear to level the playing field by enabling poor students to 
gain access to grants and loans that would cover their tuition. To some extent, 
NSFAS mitigated the cost-sharing pressures. However, several concerns were 
raised and in fact students had regularly been involved in collective non-
normative student actions because of NSFAS.  
 
The financial exclusion of many poor black students from university education 
after 1994 has been attributed to inadequate NSFAS funding. According to 
Bunting, the majority of students affected by financial exclusions were “black 
students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds” (2002: 166). Although 
the purpose of the NFSAS was to “help these poor students register at and remain 
registered at higher education institutions, the exclusion of many from university 
or technikon studies was a clear signal that the national financial aid scheme was 
being funded at inadequate levels” (Bunting, 2002: 166).  
 
Breier wrote that despite NSFAS having a means test to establish whether a 
student qualified for funding, there was “no test to determine whether a student 
had the means to pay upfront amounts” (2007: 9). Breier further argued that some 
students “genuinely did not have money to pay” (Breier, 2007: 9).  
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Students also complained about the interest charged on NSFAS loans. For 
instance, a third-year UWC B Com student interviewed for the study wondered if 
NSFAS interest, 
 
 ...could be cut out or else if they cannot cut it out if they just wait until 
you have a job and then that interest kicks in. Because to me it creates a 
very worrying situation every time that I apply because I know that they 
are giving me a R15 000 now they are going to give me R40 000 as a 
bursary but the other R6 000 by the time I get a job will already have 
accumulated towards R50 000 as the years go (Interview with third-year 
UWC B Com student, 28 August 2006).  
 
Another student who was interviewed suggested that changes to NSFAS should 
be considered:  
 
...I think the government should let students not to pay back NSFAS if 
they pass. But, if the student failed, by then, the student must pay because 
the financial assistance didn’t assist. So, I think also if students 
continuously passed NSFAS must just cancel their debts, but if the 
students fail they must let the student pay back the student debt (Interview 
with second-year B Admin student, 29 August 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to analyse student demands for independent and democratic 
SRC, expansion of access and financial aid at UWC. I situated this analysis within 
the broader political and institutional university context. Students demanded the 
establishment of independent and democratic SRCs, access and financial aid. 
Students campaigned for the establishment of independent and democratic SRCs 
for decades and this call was linked to the national struggle for democratisation of 
the state and transformation of higher education governance. At UWC, students 
managed to achieve their objective by establishing an independent and democratic 
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SRC in 1981. The UWC SRC continued to exist as a highly political and 
contested terrain of student control and influence.  
 
During Gerwel's era, the relationship between the UWC rector and the SRC was 
crucial to the university's challenge of simultaneously ensuring both institutional 
financial sustainability and student affordability. Students and the university 
gained from this relationship in different ways. The relationship facilitated 
collaborative normative student action whereby students regularly met with the 
rector in order to persuade him and his executive to agree to certain student-
related decisions. At the same time, the relationship facilitated students’ 
understanding of the university’ financial crisis and need for students to ‘save’ the 
institution by paying.  
 
I also showed that student demand for expanded financial aid was a national issue 
that was taken up by national student organisations such as SASCO and SAU-
SRC. The post-apartheid higher education policy acknowledged and recognised 
the need to (a) expand access and (b) address student funding problems through 
establishing a comprehensive and sustainable financial aid scheme (NSFAS).  
 
However, the post-apartheid higher education policy did not accept that students 
should study for free, nor agreed to provide redress funding to HBUs such as 
UWC. Instead, it embraced and promoted cost-sharing, thus requiring parents and 
students to share the burden of study costs. In an effort to mitigate the negative 
effects of study costs, especially for poor students, the post-apartheid higher 
education policy recommended the establishment of NSFAS, which subsequently 
happened in 1999. NSFAS has been helpful and supported number of historically 
disadvantaged students (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012: 832).  
 
Conversely, various studies have found NSFAS to be inadequate and identified it 
as a source of various incidents of campus student unrest. UWC and other higher 
education institutions increased fees in order to deal with a declining state subsidy 
and student debt. Wangenge-Ouma argues that the existing funding context 
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(declining government funding, regular tuition fee increases and inadequate 
NSFAS funding) is “one that is arguably inimical to wider access and 
participation, and therefore, the achievement of equity of access in South Africa’s 
higher education” (2011: 5).  
 
Overall, I have demonstrated that the policy response regarding access and 
funding seen together amounts to a problematic, indeed a paradoxical 
combination of policies, which, as I will show in the following chapter, produced 
the problem of acute unmet financial need for many students and consequently 
various and changing student actions in response. 
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CHAPTER SIX: STUDENT ACTION TO ADDRESS ‘UNMET 
FINANCIAL NEED’ 
 
Introduction 
In keeping with the conceptual framework established in Chapter Three, I shall 
show in this chapter that UWC students under the leadership of the SRC used 
collective non-normative student action, institution-focused student activism and 
collective normative student action in a complementary manner to address their 
problem of unmet financial need. This will be illustrated through the analysis of 
the 1998 UWC conflict triggered by the impending financial exclusion of 7 000 
students. I shall also show that UWC students embarked on various individual 
normative student actions and individual non-normative student actions in order to 
address their problem of unmet financial need. Individual student stories will shed 
some light on the “social origins of students or the solidarity networks they 
mobilise to gain access to higher education which have often been ignored or 
assumed to be largely elite-based without empirical evidence to support these 
beliefs” (Sall, Lebeau and Kassimir, 2003: 138). As I said in Chapter Two, the 
individual student stories represent in many respects what Jansen called “unseen 
pains of transition” (2004: 118).  
 
The chapter consists of four sections. The first section examines collective student 
action between 1995 and 2000, and the second section looks at students’ use of 
collective student action between 2000 and 2005. In the third section, the analysis 
focuses on individual actions – both normative and non-normative in nature. 
Finally, the fourth section provides a brief interpretative reflection on the results.  
 
Student use of collective student action between 1995 and 2000  
The conceptual framework developed in Chapter Three provides for different 
types of student action, that is, collective and individual. Collective student action 
can be divided into normative and non-normative forms. I indicated that student 
activism can be considered as collective non-normative student action and formal 
student participation in higher education governance as collective normative 
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student action. UWC students tended to use student activism and formal student 
participation in higher education in a complementary manner to address their 
problem of unmet financial needs. In the next section, I am going to examine the 
1998 UWC student activism, which was the most important instance of student 
activism in the 1995-2005 period. I consider different aspects of the event, starting 
with providing a context for understanding the 1998 UWC conflict. Second, I 
explore student action of lobbying used to garner support from external 
stakeholders. Third, I focus on the actual events of institution-focused student 
activism, which issues finally in an analysis of the resolution to the conflict.   
 
The case of the 1998 UWC conflict 
 
Origin of the dispute and the use of Type 1: collective normative student action  
As a matter of course, the UWC management and SRC held fee negotiations 
annually in the 1990s. These negotiations tended to commence immediately after 
the election of a new SRC, which used to be held between September and October 
each year. I consider these negotiations as a particular form of the kind of formal 
student participation in university decision-making operative at the time; it can 
thus be understood as a normative kind of collective student action in the context 
of this institution. The intended outcome of the negotiations was a financial 
agreement for the coming academic year. The negotiations between the UWC 
management and SRC did not always lead directly to the intended outcome. This 
was the case in 1998.  
 
The 1998 UWC conflict arose after protracted negotiations between student 
leadership and university management collapsed, as they could not reconcile their 
differences about the issue of students with outstanding fees and debts. UWC had 
indicated that it was “owed some US$10 million (R50 million at the time) by 
7000 students too poor to pay” (Green Left, 1998:1). The UWC SRC was made 
up of SASCO members and negotiated primarily on behalf of these 7 000 poor 
students. Therefore, the manner in which this matter was going to be crafted in the 
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financial agreement was clearly going to pose a challenge or become highly 
contested.  
 
The main contested points of negotiation between the UWC SRC and 
management related to certain provisions in the draft 1997/98 financial 
agreement. The UWC SRC argued that the bone of contention in the draft 1997/98 
financial agreement related to what they described as “Clause 4 or safety valve” 
(UWC, 1998: 11). In the past the clause used to read  
 
... in the event students experiencing difficulty in meeting the required 
minimum contribution towards their outstanding fees their cases will be 
assessed individually to determine how further assistance can be extended 
(UWC, 1998: 11).  
 
However, in the draft1997/98 financial agreement, the clause read, “in the event 
students experiencing difficulty in meeting their outstanding fees their cases will 
be assessed individually to determine affordability” (UWC, 1998: 11). According 
to the 1998 SRC, 
 
 …an impression was created that affordability meant how much 
students can afford only to learn later that affordability meant whether 
or not the university could manage to register students without the 
stipulated amounts. Clearly, this was a recipe for exclusion and we 
consequently declared a dispute and that agreement was subsequently 
nullified (UWC, 1998: 11).  
 
The source of the dispute between the UWC SRC and management thus centred 
on how they understood and used the notion of ‘affordability’. The UWC SRC 
approached ‘affordability’ from students’ financial standpoint, arguing whether or 
not students (possibly ‘all those affected’) could ‘afford’ to pay and if so, how 
much they could ‘afford’. The UWC management approached ‘affordability’ from 
the institutional financial standpoint by asking whether the university could 
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‘afford’ to admit students who could not pay. UWC student leaders would 
possibly be pushing for more students to be admitted without regard to that 
definition of ‘affordability’. The UWC management, on the other hand, was more 
concerned with ensuring overall financial sustainability, given the vast amount of 
student debt (R50 million). Therefore I may say that the dispute was a 
manifestation of the difficult reality of managing the paradox of expanding access 
and limited funding; it demonstrated the tension between affordability (for 
students) and financial sustainability (of the institution).    
 
A frosty relationship between UWC students and university management, 
especially with the rector, Prof. Abrahams, exacerbated the situation. Students 
argued that they met with an administration that was “resolute on excluding 
students on financial grounds based on students not having met their financial 
obligations towards the institution” (UWC, 1998: 11). They acknowledged that 
UWC management had ‘a point’ from the legal perspective. However, students’ 
contestation was premised on the view that the 
 
... escalation of the student debt was a direct consequence of 
management’s mismanagement of the university in general and the 
financial quagmire it was embroiled in, as it never put any systems in 
place of ensuring that students meet their financial obligations (UWC, 
1998: 11).  
 
UWC SRC further argued that university management was unable to come up 
with new ideas and solutions to the ongoing institutional financial crisis. It was 
left to the UWC SRC to come up with proposals, including 'parental involvement' 
and establishment of SCM (UWC, 1998: 11). 
 
Lobbying for external student support 
UWC SRC and management fell into a deadlock. UWC students then tried to 
explore other options in a bid to find solutions. They went outside the university, 
where they engaged and lobbied the Chancellor, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 
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officials of the Department of Education and the ANC headquarters, all MDM 
organisations (SACP, SANCO, COSATU and ANCYL) and other civil society 
bodies such as churches and the Red Cross (UWC, 1998: 3).  
 
These efforts, however, were in vain. They were told that they had “no justifiable 
cause” (UWC, 1998: 3). Students received “only one response: you have to pay. 
We were called names, a bunch of fee dodgers, irrational students who want free 
education, cell phone-toting youth who belabour their poverty in order to lead a 
posh lifestyle on campuses” (UWC, 1998: 3). This characterisation of students 
was an opposite to the pre-1994 characterisation of students as “shock troops of 
the revolution” (Wolpe, 1994: 7) and “energy driving force” (Gerwel, 1988: 3) for 
transformation of UWC.   
 
According to the SRC, students were 
 
literally left on our own. The crucial challenge of the time was to be 
united. An honest re-examination of our positions and their attendant 
tactics was needed. This is the challenge that some did not comprehend 
(UWC, 1998: 3).  
 
In Chapter Three, I argued that different types of student actions are interrelated 
and can be used in a complementary manner. In 1998 UWC students began taking 
Type 1 collective normative student action, especially using negotiations and 
lobbying in order to address their problem of unmet financial need. Eventually, 
students decided to shift from Type 1 to Type 2, which is collective non-
normative student action, or in this case, student activism. As I shall show, the 
shift did not imply complete abandonment of Type 1. Rather it was a tactical shift 
whereby students used Type 2 to put more pressure on the university to accede to 
their demands. UWC students combined Type 1 and Type 2 as they sought to 
resolve the impasse. In the next section I shall analyse student activism as it 
happened and its resolution.  
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The use of collective non-normative student action 
Having failed to find sympathy and support or external intervention to unlock the 
impasse after four months of negotiations, the UWC SRC convened a general 
council in which all student organisations were requested to make proposals on 
how to resolve the impasse (UWC, 1998: 3). By January, it was “clear that a 
different approach was required to make a breakthrough” (UWC, 1998: 4). 
Students opted for collective non-normative action, especially student activism; 
hence I call it institution-focused student activism. According to the UWC SRC 
annual report, the student actions sought to protect about 7 000 students (out of a 
total student population of about 12 000) who were facing financial exclusion. In 
anticipation of student unrest, the UWC management suspended all academic 
activities and ordered students to vacate the campus premises on 30 January 1998 
(UWC, 1998: 4).  
 
However, the following day, on 31 January 1998, the UWC SRC convened a 
general mass meeting at which students resolved to defy the university 
management. On 1 February 1998, students staged a five-hour sit-in at the 
university (Green Left Weekly, 1998: 1; see UWC, 1998). They refused to vacate 
their residences when ordered to do so by the university administration. After 
students ignored the final notice to leave the campus, the university management 
called in the police. Heavily armed police came and “bundled students into 
armoured cars and police vans” (Green Left Weekly, 1998: 1). More than 300 
students were arrested (Green Left Weekly, 1998: 1; see also SAPA, 1998). The 
remaining students marched to the UWC front gates, where a vigil of several 
hundred students and staff continued (Green Left Weekly, 1998: 1).  
 
Hundreds of students marched to the Bellville magistrate’s court when those 
arrested were due to appear on Tuesday, 03 February. SAPA reported that 
students toyi-toyied and sang freedom songs outside the court and held aloft 
banners proclaiming: “We are not criminals”, and “We do not have the money, 
please help” (1998 February 03). The arrested students were released on bail 
(Green Left Weekly, 1998: 1).  
 
 
 
 
127 
 
 
According to the UWC SRC annual report, first-year students who were still to 
register volunteered themselves to the police for arrest. Other students “encamped 
on the campus boundary and slept outside the main university gates on 
Modderdam Road” (UWC, 1998: 4). Students showed solidarity and were 
prepared to do anything to support one another, especially those who could not 
pay. Solidarity and willingness to sacrifice were thus critical dimensions of the 
1998 UWC conflict.  
 
The police and their dogs guarded the university premises against the students 
sleeping at the entrance gates. This followed a meeting in which the “Minister of 
Education assured Vice-Chancellors that in case of an emergency, police will be 
supplied, and indeed, they were supplied” (UWC , 1998: 3).  
 
Students did not wash for two days while sleeping outside and depended on the 
SRC to “buy food from the nearby fisheries” (Interview with former UWC student 
leader, 30 August 2006). Sympathetic faculty and staff also assisted some of the 
stranded students (Interview with former UWC student leader, 30 August 2006). 
 
Students blockaded vehicles from entering the university. The situation was a 
“nightmare to the first-year students who were coming from as far as the Eastern 
Cape in buses because they also had to disembark at the gates” (Interview with 
former UWC student leader, 30 August 2006).  
 
Some parents eventually fetched their children, especially the first-years. These 
parents arrived from various parts of the country. Some students ended up going 
to relatives in nearby townships. Others made their way back forcefully to sleep in 
the residences.  
 
While institution-focused student activism was continuing, the UWC SRC and the 
university management re-opened and continued negotiations in a bid to reach 
consensus and agreement. The fact that students were embarking on both forms of 
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collective action further highlights their complementarity dimension. As student 
activism was continuing, the student leadership realised that their struggle was 
“losing its moral high ground” (UWC, 1998: 3). The UWC SRC acknowledged 
that the continuation of activism had a negative impact on public support. This 
was evident: “if you read papers extensively, you would have realised that our 
cause was slowly running out of sympathisers” (UWC, 1998: 3). Then South 
African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki went out to “say that African students are 
not as poor as they portray, so they must just pay” (UWC, 1998: 3).  
 
It would seem students could only rely on themselves to ‘win’ and had to defy the 
ANC government and especially their ‘comrades’ or ‘leadership’. They had lost 
political support as key sectors of society and government converged on the view 
that students should pay. The fact that civil society and the liberation movement 
disagreed with the students’ view in itself lent credence to the strong and harsh 
words used by the Deputy President in dismissing the students’ notion of being 
‘poor’ and insisting that they should pay.  
 
The attitude, language and tone used in the above extract were unexpected and 
harsh for a democratic government, which had just been elected into office. 
Again, similar trends could be observed on the rest of the African continent, 
where student activism not only threatened those in power, but those involved 
were severely punished. Clearly student activism had what Altbach called a 
“surprising impact on the authorities” (Altbach, 1998: 162).  
 
According to Jansen, government had taken a ‘strong interventionist stance’ 
against those institutions it considered “completely ungovernable and found its 
very authority, if not legitimacy, threatened by an unstable, volatile higher 
education sector” (2004: 304). The message of the government to students and 
managements of higher education institutions was clear. Students were expected 
to pay their fees. Higher education institutional managers were expected to collect 
such fees. Only “academically-deserving students from poor backgrounds would 
receive funding; disruption would not be tolerated” (Jansen, 2004: 305).  
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Government further absolved itself from responsibility over student debts. It 
shifted such responsibility to higher education institutions. This approach can be 
characterised as 'neo-liberal' in keeping with the GEAR macro-economic policy 
framework, in that it was no different from the notion that government only 
creates conditions and markets will grow the economy and bring development to 
the people. Thus, the 1997 White Paper on Higher Education argued that the 
Ministry of Education “bears no liability for debts contracted between students 
and their institutions or funding agencies, but accepts that a study of the scope and 
dynamic of student debt in relation to institutional debt and liquidity has become 
necessary” (Department of Education: 1997: 4.46). This government stance needs 
to be understood in relation to the discussion on the NSFAS and without any 
doubt had a significant impact on the UWC’s paradox of pursuing expansion of 
access despite limited funding (with cost-sharing being advanced as solution). 
 
The relationship between the UWC SRC and student body was critical in support 
of the 1998 Type 2 action, institution-focused student activism. At the end of 
January, all students were informed of the decision. Students then participated in 
singing and ‘toy-toying’ and carried placards around campus, including 
residences. Students appeared to be determined to achieve their objective through 
peaceful protest. As indicated in Chapter Three, by its very nature institution-
focused student activism is ‘illegal’. UWC students did not seek permission to 
protest and were not operating within ‘rules’ and directives of the university 
management, which had demanded that they should vacate the campus. Student 
actions included defiance, sit-ins, protests, marches and placards.  
 
Resolution of campus conflict and reaching of a financial agreement  
After two weeks of simultaneous institution-focused student activism and 
negotiations, the UWC SRC and university management reached a consensus that 
resulted in the resumption of classes on 23 February 1998. The UWC 
management “regretted measures that had to be taken through the long negotiation 
period but was confident that efforts to attain the new comprehensive agreements 
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would ensure financial sustainability and a quality academic programme for the 
university” (SAPA, 11 February 1998).  
 
For its part, the UWC SRC felt that the executive did “not act in goodwill over the 
past two weeks, however they were willing to go forward to ensure that the 
student body was made fully aware of the financial implications of non-payments 
of 1998 fees and debt” (SAPA, 11 February 1998).  
 
The UWC SRC signed two agreements with management on 3 December 1997 
and 10 February 1998. They required all returning students with outstanding debt 
to pay a registration deposit of R2 500 for resident students and R 2 000 for non-
resident students, as well as an additional minimum contribution towards unpaid 
fees (UWC, 1998:31; SAPA news, 11 February 1998). The UWC SRC insisted 
that while the February agreement was “not the best ever to be signed, we, 
however, believe that it was the best that could be arrived at in the context of 
1998” (UWC, 1998: 12). This position was accepted at a student mass meeting 
held on 10 February 1998. UWC students then mandated their SRC to sign the 
agreement (UWC, 1998: 12).  
 
I need to emphasise the significance of the UWC SRC taking the proposed 
settlement to a mass meeting for the student body to deliberate and decide if such 
a settlement should be approved. It is also significant that the UWC student body 
'mandated' its SRC to sign the agreement. This was evidence of student 
democracy and accountability of the leadership. Students who were to be affected 
were involved in decision-making and approved the type of settlement they were 
faced with, which the SRC had to carry through to its logical conclusion. As I 
shall show later, this relationship between the student body and the SRC changed 
after 2000.   
 
At the end of the conflict the SRC thanked the student body for having been 
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 …behind us when we vowed to remain in Cecil Esau and Cassinga 
residences when the university gave us an ultimatum to leave. You have 
been with us when we appeared on national television, led into the yellow 
gumba-gumbas reminiscent of the bad old days of apartheid (UWC, 1998: 
2).  
 
UWC SRC also stated that the student body  
 
...backed us when we defiantly marched from Bellville police station 
unbroken and more determined than ever. You slept with this very SRC in 
the main gate, guarded by drunk and dangerous police officers, with dogs 
as big as calves, using the yellow speed humps as pillows. You peacefully 
moved from student centre to Mitchell’s Plain Residence, back to the gate, 
again to Mitchell’s Plain, to Pentech like wolves (UWC, 1998: 2).  
 
Further, the UWC SRC thanked “the courageous students who after all the 
sacrifices voted in the student centre that this SRC should sign the February 10 
agreement and it did” (UWC, 1998: 2). The SRC reported that it had assisted 
4 000 out of 7 000 students who were facing financial exclusion. It argued that the 
assisted students were the only ones on its list of needy students, and claimed 
ignorance of the 3 000 students who were probably excluded. For this, the UWC 
SRC blamed its opposition, the Anti-Financial Exclusions Committee (constituted 
mainly by those who opposed the UWC SRC) "for misleading some students by 
putting their names on a separate assistance list, which was different from its own 
list" (UWC, 1998: 12). As I indicated in Chapter Five, since its inception, the 
UWC SRC always had those who opposed it on political and ideological grounds. 
The differences would manifest themselves more especially when the student 
body had to decide on an approach to resolving financial disputes with the UWC 
management. The SRC was after all a highly contested terrain for different 
student political organisations vying for SRC elected seats. It is a typical feature 
of student politics across different campuses in South Africa. However, this 
behaviour becomes destructive when it weakens or hampers students’ collective 
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ability to address funding problems or where sectional or narrow self-interest 
subverts collective interest.   
 
Lessons from the 1998 UWC conflict 
The 1998 UWC institution-focused student activism was critical in several ways. 
First, it was meant to ensure that the university did not financially exclude 
students. Students initially embarked on collective normative student action, in 
particular negotiations with the university management. The UWC SRC had 
hoped that it would reach an agreement with management on the issue of 
‘affordability’ of poor students with outstanding fees. However, when no 
agreement was reached, the way was paved for collective non-normative student 
action. Eventually about 4 000 out of 7 000 students with outstanding fees were 
re-registered after the student activism. UWC students used both collective 
normative and non-normative student action in a complementary manner to 
achieve this goal. Both forms of action sometimes occurred simultaneously. 
Second, it highlighted the importance of the relationship between student leaders 
and the student body. The UWC SRC had to rely on the student body for support, 
energy and direction throughout the student activism and negotiations with the 
university management. The student body supported the UWC SRC even when 
the police invaded the campus and arrested hundreds of students. The student 
body was the only source of support to the UWC SRC after almost all 
stakeholders disapproved of the student action.  
 
Third, the 1998 conflict exposed the paradoxes of the post-1994 democracy in 
general and the higher education policy in particular. Both the national 
government and UWC supported the expansion of access, especially to poor 
students, but they did not match their support with adequate financial assistance. 
Rather, poor students were still expected to make substantial contributions to the 
costs of their study. In consequence, some students had to be re-registered after 
embarking on student activism and thus missing quality time for learning. Other 
students did not return to campus, probably because of their inability to settle 
outstanding fees.  
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Fourth, the student activism was as much about whether students would ‘toe the 
line’ of the national political leadership (in the form of government) and in the 
process abjectly surrender, or fight against injustice caused by financial 
exclusions. Students chose to fight, defied the authorities and embarked on mass 
activism. Not even the police invasion of campus and subsequent arrests could 
deter them.  
 
Fifth, the student activism highlighted difficulties that students experienced when 
trying to find support from their former allies in civil society, churches and 
liberation movements. Students had to stand on their own and fight.  
 
Students’ use of collective student action between 2000 and 2005 
In the previous section, I showed how UWC students combined student activism 
and formal student participation in higher education governance to resolve 
students’ financial problems in 1998. However, non-normative student collective 
action did not recur between 1999 and 2005. I characterise this as a “period of 
retreat” (Boudon, 1979: 669). Instead, students primarily relied on formal student 
participation in higher education governance – within the emerging framework of 
‘co-operative governance’ in higher education (Hall et al., 2002) - to address their 
financial problems. UWC student leaders (SRC) were partly responsible for this.  
 
During the 1999/2000 period the UWC SRC argued that they had to ensure that 
students “did not embark on ‘toyi-toyi’” [student activism] before reaching an 
agreement with the university management. The purpose of the agreement was to 
ensure that students would be registered (UWC, 1999/2000: 6). One year after the 
1998 institution-focused student activism, the UWC SRC declared that “we are 
proud to announce that students have registered without any physical struggles 
(toyi-toyi)” (UWC, 1999/2000: 6).  
 
The UWC SRC’s position was bound to be challenged by the student opposition 
groups consisting of the Pan Student Movement of Azania (PAZMA), linked to 
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the PAC, AZASCO, linked to AZAPO, and some splinter groups such as the 
Student League (linked to socialist international groups) and United Student Front 
(USF), which was made up all organisations opposed to SASCO, including some 
religious organisations. Between 1995 and 2005, SASCO only lost SRC elections 
once to the USF in 2003. According to a former UWC SRC president,  
 
...whenever students faced problems, the opposition would say let us 
boycott. We would oppose it, because we were convinced that boycott was 
not the only option, and secondly boycott is not a principle. Boycott is a 
tactic, so it means that it is not compulsory for you to go to boycott 
(Interview with former UWC SRC president, 02 March 2002).  
 
It was further argued that “if there is still a room or willingness on the side of the 
management to engage on issues, then there is no need to boycott” (Interview with 
former UWC SRC president, 02 March 2002). Timing was important in 
determining if student activism should be used or not. Willingness of the UWC 
management was not the sole determinant factor. The UWC management could be 
willing to engage without changing their original position. It would seem from 
anecdotal evidence that the UWC student leaders might have been bowing to 
outside pressure from the ruling party to create stability in higher education 
institutions by accepting a neoliberal view of the national economy. The UWC 
SRC acknowledged that that SASCO had been demanding free higher education 
for many years, but it “will not be blindly pursued in the name of advancing the 
socialist cause” (UWC, 2000: 16). The UWC SRC further argued that “slogans 
aside and let’s face it the South African economy as it is today cannot afford the 
provision of free education however socially desirable it is to do that” (UWC, 
2000: 16).  
 
Changes in the nature of student leadership might have been a contributory factor 
as well. The UWC SRC itself seemed to have suggested this point by arguing that 
they should not be compared with their predecessors because they were in “an era 
of policy formulation and engagement and no amount of blind militancy will take 
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us anywhere”. The UWC SRC characterised the era in which it found itself as a 
“battle of ideas which requires a dedicated cadreship and not merely a bunch of 
populists who find solace in the chanting of slogans and pious declarations about 
free education” (UWC, 2000: 20).  
 
It seems that the 1999/2000 UWC SRC had sought to define itself differently 
from its predecessors by focusing mainly on the ‘battle of ideas’ and 
‘engagement’ or preferring collective normative action instead of collective non-
normative action, student activism, or what it called ‘blind militancy’. The UWC 
1999/2000 SRC demonstrated lack of appreciation and support for the demand 
and campaign for free higher education, which it described as the ‘chanting of 
slogans and pious declarations’. Given the fact that I did not systematically focus 
on this issue, the extent to which this view of the UWC SRC represented the 
majority of the student body or even the political organisations remains unclear. 
Its pervasiveness and influence on UWC student politics and governance during 
the period between 2000 and 2005 remain unclear.  
 
The increasing size and values of NSFAS loans could also be a factor. NSFAS 
funding grant parameters ranged between R13 300 (minimum of R1 100) in 1999 
and R30 000 (minimum of R2 000) per student in 2005, as shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Funding grants parameters between 1999 and 2006 
Year 
 
Maximum Minimum Interest Rate 
1999 R13 300 R1 100  8.9% 
2000 R14 600  R1,200  8.5% 
2001  R16 000 R1,300  7.3% 
2002 R17 600  R1 400  7.6% 
2003 R20 000  R1 500 10.4% 
2004 R25 000  R2 000  7% 
2005 R30 000 R2 000  5% 
Source: www.nsfas.org.za accessed on 02 May 2010 
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As indicated in the previous chapter, the ‘seed’ had been planted in the late 1980s 
for students to understand the university’s financial situation and accept 
responsibility for paying fees or making financial contributions. After 1994, the 
UWC SRC continued to encourage students to pay for the costs of their studies if 
they could afford it, given that higher education was not free. At the same time, 
the UWC SRC insisted that those who could not afford to pay should be assisted.  
  
There are students who cannot pay, and students who can pay but they 
don’t want to pay. So those who can pay but they don’t want to should 
pay. Those who cannot pay because they can’t, they should be assisted one 
way or other until we get free education (Interview with former UWC 
SRC president, 19 September 2007).  
 
An analysis of various financial agreements between the UWC management and 
SRC showed that the underlying principles of the financial agreements between 
1995 and 2006 remained consistent. The financial agreements reflected consistent 
acceptance and understanding of the need for both students and management to 
find solutions to the institutional financial crisis. The expectation that students 
should make minimum payments was also reflected in the financial agreements 
between the UWC management and the SRC.  
 
...to ensure financial sustainability of the university ... we therefore 
commit ourselves to ‘encourage’ students owing to make their 
contribution to alleviate our desperate financial situation. Students who 
were unable to settle their accounts are expected to make minimum 
contribution. The minimum contribution depended on the total amount 
owed, for instance, a student with debt under R1 000 was expected to 
settle in full, while a student with debt between R10 001 and R15 000 was 
expected to pay R 3 500 (UWC, 1996: 2).  
 
The financial agreements also stipulated that all students should make upfront 
payment at registration each year, in order to ensure that the university has 
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adequate operating funds for the first three months of the year before it receives 
its first subsidy payment. The agreement further jointly committed the UWC 
management and the SRC to approach the government for decisive intervention in 
the resolution of the financial crisis (UWC, 1996: 3).  
 
According to the financial agreement between the UWC management and the 
SRC, by 2005 there were three different payment regimes for students (UWC, 
2005a: 2). First, all new and returning students who were not being 
accommodated in residences in 2005 had to make an upfront payment of R2 600, 
except where such students were full cost bursary holders. However, full cost 
bursary holders would still be required to pay a cash registration amount of R500 
at registration. Second, all students who were granted accommodation in the 
residences in 2005 for the first time, or after a break, had to make an upfront 
payment of R3100, as well as a refundable fee of R550 (R3650 in total), except 
where such students were full cost bursary holders.  
 
Third, returning students who were in residences in 2004 and were granted 
accommodation by the university in the residences for 2005 had to make a 
minimum upfront payment of R3100, except where such students were full cost 
bursary holders (UWC, 2005a: 2).  
 
Students with high levels of debt were expected to make payments over and above 
the required minimum upfront payments. These payments had to be made during 
the month-long registration period at the beginning of the term. The schedule 
indicated in Table 4 was developed for 2005 debt payment. 
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Table 4: Minimum payment that students were expected to make towards 
their outstanding debt, 2005 
Outstanding debt Minimum percentage to be paid 
R1 500 or less 85% 
R1 501 - R 3 000 65% 
R3 001 - R8 000 50% 
R8 001 - R12 000 40% 
R12 001 – above 35% 
Source: 2005 UWC and SRC financial agreement 
 
The 2004/05 UWC SRC started fee negotiations with management immediately 
after its election in 2004. The UWC SRC argued that the process was not “an easy 
one given the deep financial crisis that the institution was faced with and our 
negotiations were based on what was objectively necessary for the students and 
the institution” (UWC, 2005a: 5- 6).  
 
At the end of the negotiations, the UWC SRC claimed victory on two issues. 
Firstly, the university would increase fees by 8.5% instead of 9% as it originally 
proposed. Secondly, the upfront payments would remain the same as those of 
2004. In the latter case, UWC SRC argued that it based its analysis on the 
understanding that upfront payments were the cause of most student financial 
exclusions (UWC, 2005a: 6).  
 
Another important change that occurred after about 2000 was a breakdown in the 
unity of most UWC students and the SRC. The UWC SRC constitution prescribed 
different political accountability mechanisms such as an AGM and mass 
meetings. The AGM was the highest student decision-making body of the UWC 
SRC, its affiliates and sub-structures. Between AGMs, UWC SRC was 
constitutionally required to call mass meetings at least once per quarter “to report 
to students and receive mandates from them” (UWC, 2002: 27).  
 
In 2004 the UWC SRC annual report (UWC, 2004: 9) highlighted lack of 
attendance as a key reason for the failure of mass meetings. During the 2003/04 
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term of office, the UWC SRC only organised one meeting, which was poorly 
attended. Nevertheless, a progress report on the registration process was given to 
the students who attended. The UWC SRC tried to organise a second mass 
meeting but failed dismally, as students did not attend the meeting (UWC, 2004: 
9).  
 
The post-2000 UWC SRC called student mass meetings not to receive a mandate 
but to inform and receive support from the student body for what the SRC was 
doing to address student financial and registration problems. This is captured in 
the following interview excerpt:   
 
… well the post 2000 UWC SRCs have real never consulted its 
constituency, student body with regard to getting a mandate. They always 
consulted their constituency with regard to how registration was going. 
This was necessarily acute problem to announce that we have this 
problem. It was therefore not necessary for the SRC to call students at one 
place to tell them we have this problem and ask how we are moving on. 
Rather the SRC has always said, we have this problem and this how we 
deal with it. Let agree to this (Interview with former UWC SRC president, 
19 September 2007). 
 
I wish to highlight a few issues in respect of the statements of the UWC SRC 
annual report and interview with the former UWC SRC president. I established in 
Chapter Three that formal student participation in higher education governance 
presumes the existence of a relationship between the UWC SRC and the student 
body. The UWC SRC should operate on the basis of a mandate from the student 
body, which would guide its negotiations with the university management.  
 
It is evident from the 2004 UWC SRC report that the SRC did not have a good 
relationship with the student body and therefore negotiated with the university 
management without a mandate. In fact, as the former SRC president stated, the 
SRC did not need a mandate from the student body but instead viewed 
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consultation as platform that the SRC used to inform students about its decisions 
and direction; it was therefore seeking endorsement. Put crudely, the UWC SRC 
expected the student body to rubber-stamp its decisions. This raised the question 
of legitimacy at two levels, that is, at the level of the UWC SRC as ‘legitimate 
student voice’ and at the level of decisions that were accepted. The attitude of 
indifference on the part of the student body was not helpful either. It could not 
prevent the UWC SRC from committing students to certain agreements with the 
university management without a mandate. Moreover, it could not prevent the 
university management from implementing such decisions.  
 
In the next section I examine student negotiations and experiences with SCM, a 
critical division of the university funding regime. SCM is vitally important to the 
understanding of the UWC funding policy. It is an important instrument that 
UWC used to deal with the challenge of financial sustainability and student 
affordability. It was implicated in the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, given 
its responsibility to determine financial eligibility of students to access and 
continued study. SCM was also central to the negotiations and implementation of 
financial agreements between the UWC management and the SRC.   
 
Student negotiations with Student Credit Management  
The UWC management-student financial agreement reached on 10 February 1998 
led to the establishment of the SCM office, which was unique to UWC at the time. 
Students had initially conceptualised SCM. According to the UWC SRC annual 
report, the students conceptualised SCM as “a concrete means test mechanism in 
our bid to verify the financial credentials of the student body” (UWC, 1998: 13).  
 
Students thought SCM would do three things. First, students viewed SCM as an 
instrument to determine the eligibility of students, especially those considered 
‘poor’. Second, students viewed SCM as an instrument that would “bring to an 
abrupt end the fee-dodging and show the seriousness of students to reduce debt” 
(UWC, 1998: 13). Students expected SCM to “devise strategies of how to retrieve 
fees owed by ex-UWC students other than credit listing” (UWC, 1998: 13). It is 
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important to highlight two aspects of the students’ intervention (through SCM). 
On the one hand, student leaders were responding to two student concerns, 
namely 'black-listing' of students (by TEFSA initially and NSFAS later) or the 
submission of names of students considered to be defaulters to national credit 
bureaus, which would make such information available to any creditor, and lack 
of an institutional eligibility mechanism to assist poor students. Student leaders 
were acting in the interest of and as defenders of students. They were also trying 
to show their commitment to saving the university from bankruptcy by seeking to 
contribute to debt reduction involving students who were still studying and those 
who had completed their studies. Again, this position was consistent with 
previous positions that student leaders had taken since late 1980s.  
 
Having proposed the establishment of SCM, students sought to influence the 
decision-making of SCM in relation to student registration, financial exclusions 
and similar issues. In particular, the UWC SRC insisted on being consulted on 
‘extreme cases’ where students faced a real possibility of being financial excluded 
because of poor academic performance or high debts. This was not 
uncomplicated. According to a former UWC SRC official,  
 
...some of the affected students “do not come to UWC SRC, they go to 
SCM, and they were told that they could not negotiate and then give up 
and just go home and they do not come to UWC SRC” (Interview with 
former UWC SRC president, 19 September 2007).  
 
In an interview conducted for this study, the Head of SCM argued that “if the 
student does not pass he/she cannot be assisted financially by the institution and 
the reality is that if for any other reason if that student finishes the studies, that 
student still won’t be in a position to be assisted because the student is carrying 
the debt of the previous academic years” (Interview with Head of SCM, 30 
September 2007). According to this argument a student would not be financially 
assisted as long as he or she owed money to the university. It would seem 
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academic performance was not considered the key criterion for financial 
assistance.  
 
However, it must be pointed out that this view was contradicted by the Vice-
Chancellor. In an interview, the university Vice-Chancellor discussed some of the 
challenges that he usually confronted when considering the lists of students to be 
cleared for registration, which should also satisfy audit requirements. He followed 
a case-by-case approach, preferring to “start with students who had passed [their 
courses] but did not have money. That one goes quickly and I agree to let them 
register” (Interview with UWC Rector, 16 November 2004). 
 
The Vice-Chancellor indicated that the second list would consist of first-year 
students who would “have just arrived and life is so hard. For those I look at what 
have they passed and then decide as long as I can have reasons to explain to the 
auditors” (Interview with UWC Rector, 16 November 2004). The primary focus 
of the Vice-Chancellor was to register students without risking negative audit 
findings. Presumably the Vice-Chancellor sought to avoid anything that could 
affect financial sustainability and to ensure that any readmission should be 
justifiable in audit terms.  
 
Finally, the Vice-Chancellor indicated that the third list would generally consist of 
“senior students who have been here for about ten years who are carrying first-
year courses but do not have money. They have built up a huge debt because 
residence is expensive, before you know it, they will be owing the university 
about R80 000” (Interview with UWC Rector, 16 November 2004).  
 
The UWC SRC had identified several factors as basis for the university to 
consider individual cases of students with unmet financial needs. These included,  
 
Some students applied late for financial assistance applications because 
they owed the university and others struggled to find people who could 
sign in place of parents who had passed away. Others have problems with 
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their parents, and their parents were divorcing, in such cases, nobody will 
encourage and help affected students to solve their problems. Some 
students have good academic records and just don't have money and as 
such the university can’t ignore them. The last one was people who were 
doing final years had academic record (Interview with UWC SRC 
president, 19 September 2007).  
 
The UWC SRC also dealt with students with a dual challenge of academic and 
financial ability.  
 
...The last people we had to deal with were those who are questionable 
academically. These are students who are failing. In such cases, we say to 
management, if a student is doing your final year but struggling to 
complete a module, such a student should be tolerated and allowed to 
register and if necessary extra support should be provided. The university 
does not look problem of academic failure at the beginning of the year, but 
it starts paying attention to them at the end of the year because they have 
to deal with the exclusion (Interview with UWC SRC president, 19 
September 2007).  
 
UWC further argued that there was a link between problems related to students’ 
academic performance and their financial situation.  
 
 ... it was difficult to me to divorce the issue of academic performance to 
finances, because when students don’t pass they are going to accumulate 
debts that they will not pay for, and as result, when they are to be re-
admitted, they have to go and negotiate for funds (Interview with UWC 
SRC president, 19 September 2007).  
 
The UWC SRC and SCM relationship was characterised by disagreements, 
conflicts and challenges. This was largely because the UWC SRC and SCM had 
different objectives and mandates. According to the head of SCM, 
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...as much as it is necessary we register as many students but the reality is 
that we cannot register all students that wish to be registered. Then UWC 
SRC will come with their own mandate and they will also want to pull in 
students for the sake of just pulling in students. That situation will increase 
our debt (Interview with Head of SCM, 30 September 2007).  
 
The management of these differences would pose serious challenges to both the 
SCM and UWC SRC. In particular, the two parties were expected to negotiate 
about students who needed to be ‘cleared’ before they could be registered.  
Whether the UWC SRC and SCM agreed or disagreed, they were expected to 
approach the Deputy Vice-Chancellor for Student Support and Development to 
endorse their recommendations before these could be submitted to the Vice-
Chancellor for approval. It did not matter whether students had performed well 
academically or not, the UWC SRC still needed to negotiate with the university 
on their behalf. Students with high academic performance stood a better chance of 
being financially cleared to register.  
 
In some cases the UWC SRC’s efforts earned grudging respect from management. 
The UWC Deputy Vice-Chancellor Student Support and Development indicated 
that in 2004, when she was meeting with two UWC SRC members and SCM 
officials about fees and considering different cases, 
 
 I’ve never seen two student representatives who advocated for students as 
much as those two did. They would not take no for an answer. You will 
not believe it, maybe the list had about 94 people; they left out about five 
and were able to justify each case. They came with real live situations. 
(Interview with UWC Deputy Vice-Chancellor Student Support and 
Development, 20 September 2007).  
 
Although the UWC SRC was assigned the responsibility to negotiate with the 
SCM on behalf of students, the reality was that students still had to be assessed 
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and cleared individually by the SCM. I argue that this clearance process 
deliberately or unwittingly contributed to the demobilisation of students as a 
collective force and facilitated ‘atomisation’ of students. In consequence the SCM 
process contributed to the shift from Type 1 and Type 2 collective student action 
to Type 3 and Type 4 individual student action.  
 
The weaknesses of SCM 
Some students managed to identify and exploit weaknesses in the process. SCM 
lacked appropriate systems to centralise a student database, verify information and 
facilitate fee collection. From an official standpoint, students were “smart to 
outmanoeuvre both UWC SRC and SCM repeatedly, because we do not have 
proper systems, students lie. Students come and rock in the offices and pretend 
that they do not have required documents” (Interview with Head of SCM, 30 
September 2007). In taking this attitude, SCM was trying to shift the blame to 
students instead of taking full responsibility for failing to satisfy the original 
purpose for which it was established. This raised questions about the efficacy and 
relevance of SCM, given the period of its existence.  
 
After 2000, the UWC SRC had expanded its role in a process of trying to help 
students with their problem of unmet financial need. This expanded role included 
the UWC SRC members calling parents and students’ relatives to verify 
information provided by the students concerned. The question remained open 
whether or not the UWC SRC should have assumed and performed this expanded 
role. During the interview, the former UWC SRC president tried to clarify the role 
of the UWC SRC by stating that,  
 
...we are not there to determine either a person got money or not. We are 
there to help cases of individuals. Should a student come to UWC SRC 
and say I do not have money, one of the things that we do would be able to 
call his or her family to verify just how much the family can afford to pay 
(Interview with UWC SRC president, 19 September 2007).  
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The UWC SRC seemed to have overstepped its boundaries by assuming the 
university' s responsibility to ensure that students provided accurate, relevant and 
complete information. Understandably, the UWC SRC could be doing this out of 
goodwill to serve the student body. However, in my view, SCM was supposed to 
have robust and effective verification mechanisms. This could have addressed 
some of the UWC SRC’s concerns, including, 
 
...that some students did not tell the truth about their financial status, and 
there are quite few people that we found who claimed they did not have 
money, but actually did. As a result, this compromised those students who 
really do not have money to pay their fees (Interview with former UWC 
SRC president, 19 September 2007).  
 
The UWC SRC was also concerned that 'false information' would “compromise 
the financial state of the university" (UWC, 2005a: 10). Again, this is an 
indication that the UWC SRC viewed its role as ensuring accessibility and 
affordability of higher education for students, while at the same time ensuring the 
university's financial sustainability.  
 
According to the Head of SCM, UWC management could not run the institution 
on its own and therefore saw a need to involve the UWC SRC in the registration 
process. The purpose was to ensure students “end up not having any other offices 
to go to lie, and say things that are not happening” (Interview with Head of SCM, 
30 September 2007). However, the Executive Director Finance also indicated in 
an interview that in “all forums wherein UWC SRC participates, it commits itself 
to support the university’s efforts to collect debt, but they accommodate and 
advise junior students how to manoeuvre the system around” (Interview with 
Executive Director of Finance and Services, 25 February 2005). I suppose the 
UWC SRC found itself in a difficult situation in which it had to perform its 
historical role as the collective voice and champion of student interests on the one 
hand, as well as the newly assumed function as an ‘appendage’ or extension of the 
university’s administrative services on the other.  
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There was inherent tension between these two roles, which had emerged largely 
owing to the co-operative governance framework. Successive UWC SRCs were 
confronted with the challenge of managing the tension while dealing with student 
funding problems. This challenge can partly be attributed to some students 
seeking alternative strategies to address their unmet financial need without UWC 
SRC assistance. In the next section, I examine the different individual actions that 
students used to address their problem of unmet financial need after 2000.   
 
Individual student actions 
 
Individual normative student actions (Type 3)  
 
Focus on the university registration process 
Students negotiated with different key university student funding structures (i.e. 
SCM, the bursary office and the student enrolment office) to address their funding 
concerns. It was through student funding structures that the university exercised 
and implemented its student funding policy. However, these structures lacked co-
ordination, strategic alignment and a shared approach in dealing with students in 
financial difficulties. The 2004 UWC SRC noted: 
 
We experienced problems during registration. We had seen lack of co-
operation and co-ordination between the financial aid office and student 
credit management. This relates to the exorbitant amounts being needed by 
SCM regardless of amounts (NSFAS) confirmed by the financial aid office 
(UWC, 2004: 10). 
 
The 2005 UWC SRC noted that the SCM demanded that students pay more 
money despite the NSFAS policy that students who held loans from it could 
register without making upfront payment. In Chapter Five, I indicated that in 
2005, 11 000 UWC students (out of a total of 14 590) received some form of 
financial assistance to the amount of R88,2 million, of which R40,7 million was 
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allocated by NSFAS. The SCM’s argument was that the money came from the 
state, and as such, it was not a parental contribution. It is therefore evident that 
most UWC students had NSFAS loans, and thus found themselves caught 
between two contradictory policies (NSFAS and SCM) in respect of the required 
upfront payments. Nationally, it seemed as if institutions did not know whether 
they could allow NSFAS students to register without paying registration fees.  
 
The UWC SRC (2005: 10) indicated that clarity should be sought from 
management with respect to power relations between the SCM and residence 
administration. It stated that some students were cleared for registration by the 
SCM and the SRC, but still encountered accommodation problems, as the 
residence administration demanded additional money.  
 
Similarly, a former UWC SRC president argued that the student administration 
unit “should be able to find [those] who can afford and who cannot afford to pay, 
given that they have a student database. In that case, every year they will be able 
to ask students if their situation has changed. If the situation has not changed, they 
give such student NSFAS”. To the extent that there was “no student 
administrative relationship between the administrations and the financial aid, 
which is quite key, the financial aid office does not use the student database 
housed in the administration. The system is not the most efficient” (Interview with 
former UWC SRC president, 20 September 2007).  
 
The former UWC SRC president made an important point about the need for the 
university structures to harmonise and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of 
their systems and processes for the benefit of students. He was also correct to 
insist or demand that student administration should have been able to determine 
who was poor or not. However, as indicated above, this was one of the original 
responsibilities assigned to SCM. The SRC should have demanded more 
accountability and ensured that SCM did not abdicate its responsibility.  
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Individual students had many concerns about the way the university managed the 
payment of fees. They indicated that it would seem to them that the university 
structures (especially the SCM) applied different eligibility criteria to different 
students when considering their cases. Some students had outstanding balances 
and could not pay full registration fees, but they were allowed to register, while 
others who owed less money were denied the opportunity. This is illustrated in the 
following interview. 
 
I was refused to register with R1000 but other people came with R500 and 
they still have balances from the previous year and they still are registered 
(Interview with third-year UWC B Com student, 28 August 2006). 
 
Despite its weaknesses, SCM should not have allowed such a practice to develop 
from the beginning because it was unfair to students and undermined the purpose 
of SCM. In this case it could not be described as students ‘exploiting’ the system, 
but as an ineffectual system.  
 
Students raised concerns about the nature of the registration and clearing process 
and the attitude of some university officials working in student funding structures. 
A UWC BA third-year student could not hide her disappointment and frustration 
with the manner in which she was treated, as “if you do not exist, as if you are not 
even there. You know it is so inhumane.” She felt that SCM was her last hope and 
she asked if “they cannot help you in the SCM, where else do you go? If they say, 
they cannot help you what do you do?” Her main anxiety was facing the prospect 
of having to go home or “to call home and what do you say?” (Interview with 
third-year UWC BA student, 29 August 2006). Perhaps the student was more 
concerned about the negative impact that such a call would have on her parents, 
given the fact that she was doing her final year and could be able to take care of 
them as well as her siblings, or worse, that society might mock the family for 
having wasted money.  
 
 
 
 
 
150 
 
A second-year UWC B Admin student struggled to determine whether it was the 
SCM office or its management who “failed to listen to my situation. I outrightly 
failed” (Interview with second-year UWC B Admin student, 29 August 2006). He 
was simply told that he did not meet certain criteria and therefore “you are out”. 
This seemed to have confused him, because he had assumed the role of SCM to be 
“to look into students’ problems because we all have individual problems, 
sympathise with students and then play a sort of mediatory role between the 
students and the management” (Interview with third-year UWC BA student, 29 
August 2006).  
 
A third-year UWC BSc student said that she arrived back from holidays before 
the university opened in mid-January. She was aware of her outstanding fees from 
the previous year and decided to go and seek assistance from SCM. When she 
presented her request, staff members said, “we cannot help you. There is nothing 
we can do for you. You just had to pay the balance and I am like, my mother only 
has this much”. She tried the SRC and failed. She then decided to return to SCM, 
hoping that things might be different. She “kept on going to SCM for the whole 
month without any luck” (Interview with third-year UWC BSc student, 19 
September 2007). 
 
A third-year UWC B Pharm student stated that the registration process took long 
and was “emotionally bad but I managed to perform well”. He continued to attend 
classes while waiting for his registration to be finalised. However, there were 
problems. He said, “I remember at one time in one of my classes, there were 
certain practicals that we had to do in the hospital, lecturers said those who had 
not registered they cannot go to the hospital.” This was going to have a huge 
impact on the student, as he explained that “everything we do as final-year 
students is hospital-based and they have to group us.” Lecturers told us, "if you 
have not registered, they are not going to put you in anything. Imagine, now my 
whole life has to come to a halt because I have not registered." The student said he 
waited for about two months, the whole of February and March, before he could 
be registered during the last week of March. He had returned to campus on 15 
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January, and had been battling since then (Interview with third-year B Pharm 
student, 29 August 2006). 
 
While waiting for his registration to be finalised, he also ran out of money and 
food and this affected him. He wanted to “study but something would tell me that 
I am hungry and I need to eat. I knew what I needed to do, but my mind was not 
really on what I should be doing it was concentrating on my other unsolved 
problems.” He felt that if the registration process did not drag on for so long he 
would be “free”. However, his anguish continued while university officials kept 
on asking for the registration fees when his situation had not changed, and he 
“told them whatever cent they want to squeeze out of me or out of my mother, I 
just do not have it” (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 29 August 
2006).  
 
The university and poor students thus both found themselves in a difficult 
situation. On the one hand, the university remained committed to expanding 
access to the poor, but to survive it required money, which it hoped somehow 
these poor students would be able to raise. On the other hand, students had been 
admitted and their expectations of escaping poverty and underdevelopment had 
been raised; they rested all their hopes on the financially strapped university to 
take care of their study costs. In between there were university officials who 
seemed less interested in the historical and socio-economic deprivation of students 
and were bent on meeting the ‘set targets’ of fee collections.  
 
The head of the SCM accepted that the registration and clearance process was 
tedious, and that the behaviour of his staff members was painful at times. 
However, he argued that students should “realise … that we do have the mandate, 
which is to ensure that all students pay as part of their contribution in order for the 
university to survive before the state subsidy comes in. Yes, people might see us 
as being harsh but the reality is that students have been told many times about the 
portion of their contribution for registration (Interview with Head of Student 
Credit Management, 30 September 2007). This highlights the difficulties that 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
UWC encountered in implementing the paradoxical government policy of 
expansion of access and limited financial assistance, with cost-sharing being 
advanced as funding policy solution. It is evident from the statement of the Head 
of SCM, that the paradox created or deepened the existing challenge of financial 
sustainability and student affordability. In trying to deal with this challenge, it 
would seem the university was hoping that the cost-sharing approach would help. 
The university tried to get poor students to make their contribution towards the 
costs of their study. It did so well aware that the majority of its students were poor 
and could not afford to pay. The university was driven by the single motive of 
‘organisational survival’ and SCM became a critical instrument. It can be argued 
that the university too, willingly or unwillingly, not only became the ‘victim’ but 
also played an active role in the furtherance of the paradox through the 
functioning of the SCM.  
 
Some students felt that the university merit awards did not help them either. 
According to a second-year UWC BSc student, the merit awards or bursaries were 
“only for the top achievers which leaves out those who get the [marks of] Cs and 
the Bs, and for us who are B and C students, then there is no help, therefore the 
merit awards are not enough.” This student argued that the Financial Aid Office 
should be “realistic because they cannot expect someone who is unable to buy 
myself a book to suddenly become an A grade student.” His reason for this was 
that “half the time there are projects that you must do and you need to go and 
research in certain books and at times you go into the library, there are only five 
of those books and when they are booked out there is nothing you can do.” 
Students without sufficient and necessary study materials would therefore be 
placed at a “disadvantage when compared to the top achievers who tend to have 
all the required materials” (Interview with second-year UWC BSc student, 30 
August 2006). 
 
Students highlighted negative implications deriving from the registration process. 
According to the UWC SRC annual report, the fact that students registered late 
had a negative impact on their academic progress. Teaching would have 
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commenced by the time students who registered late joined classes. The UWC 
SRC dealt with the problem of lecturers and tutors refusing admission to students 
who were still solving their registration problems. The UWC SRC found that it 
was difficult to de-link academic exclusions from financial exclusions because 
students spent time in long queues, missed classes and lost valuable time (UWC, 
2004: 11).  
 
The above discussion highlights a number of actions that students took to solve 
their unmet financial need individually. These include individual students 
negotiating with university officials representing SCM in an effort to be 
registered. Some of these students also consulted the SRC for help. Students 
attended classes while they were still trying to register. They did not want to be 
left behind. In other words, students were trying to ensure that they had both 
formal access and epistemological access. As the SRC report states, students 
possibly wanted to reduce the number of financial exclusions based on poor 
academic performance, hence they did not want to miss classes.  
 
Students had to be ‘cleared’ by SCM, including those who had external bursaries 
and NSFAS beneficiaries. The NSFAS beneficiaries were supposed to pay 
registration fees or upfront payment because NSFAS did not cover it prior to 
2003. Without making upfront payment, NSFAS beneficiaries would not be 
allowed to register or to be ‘cleared’ by SCM. Students applied for NSFAS 
through the Financial Aid Office, which kept all records and made decisions on 
loan allocations. In the next section, I examine student action in respect of the 
Financial Aid Office.  
 
Student negotiations with the UWC Financial Aid Office 
The Financial Aid Office was responsible for administering student bursaries and 
NSFAS. Therefore it had a huge responsibility and was a critical part of the UWC 
funding regime. Some students’ experiences with the office were not as pleasant 
as they should have been. For example, a third-year UWC B Pharm student 
indicated that when he was doing his second year, he had posted home the 
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NSFAS application form. His parents received it, but they could not find it when 
they were supposed to complete and return it to UWC. His parents eventually 
managed to find it and sent it late. It then transpired that his father had “signed on 
the wrong place and those people at financial aid office just did not want to take 
it.” As a result, the student was “stressed about where to find money to pay for 
this semester as well as next year. I have not really been talking about it even to 
my friends. My academic work really suffered. It has been hectic because now my 
only worry is getting a job” (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 29 
August 2006).  
 
Students also complained that the Financial Aid Office did not help them to 
understand the NSFAS loan agreement details. A fourth-year UWC B Pharm 
student mentioned that when he submitted the NSFAS loan agreement form 
“nobody told me or explained the terms and conditions of NSFAS bursary so I 
could understand. Somebody must say this will happen when you start working, 
this is how you are going to pay and this is the amount we are going to deduct 
from your pay. We know we are going to pay when we work but not what are the 
rates.” A student would have appreciated more information to be prepared. “I do 
not want a situation when I get out of here I have huge debt that I do not 
understand” (Interview with fourth-year UWC B Pharm student, 30 August 2006). 
 
Some of the stories of students highlight frustrations and anguish that they were 
going through as they were engaging SCM and the Financial Aid Office. In an 
effort to improve their chances of registration and survival on campus, students 
had to use and rely on their solidarity networks and explore other strategies (such 
as mutual student support and family support), which I explore in the next section.  
 
Self-initiated support 
During interviews students informed me of how the problem of ‘unmet financial 
need’ was affecting them and the actions that they undertook to deal with it. 
Students said that they constantly worried about where to find money to settle 
debts or pay the next instalment of their fees and that this affected their academic 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
performance negatively. Some ended up participating in extra-curricular activities, 
which had become their ‘only choice’. A second-year UWC LLB student 
indicated that in 2005, she "owed R3000 or something so I couldn’t pay up 
because I didn’t have the money." The student had been part of the HIV/AIDS 
group that went to a camp where they met a businessman who was sponsoring 
students who were involved in extracurricular activities with R5000. So "I got that 
R5000 and paid for whatever I was still owing" (Interview with second-year UWC 
LLB student, 29 August 2006). 
 
Other students indicated that they would do anything, including working in dining 
halls,)as long as they could earn something, including food. For instance, a 
second-year UWC B Admin student indicated that he was “very shy to ask for 
money from home because I understood the situation. I used to eat with my 
roommate but I found I’m becoming too much of his burden and more particular 
he is younger than me.” The student then decided that he could no longer be a 
burden and wanted to free himself, so he “went to see the Residence Director and 
I pleaded my poverty”. The Residence Director understood and gave a letter to the 
student granting him permission to “eat once a day up to certain period at 
Mthonjeni residence dining hall” (Interview with second-year B Admin student, 
30 August 2006).  
 
Unfortunately, when the agreement lapsed, the student did not know what to do 
and went back to the Residence Director who said, “we would not give you 
another letter but now you needed to work. Then it is when I got the letter and I 
worked but it was not so much.” The student was working at the residence 
canteen but the owners did not want him to do much, which could affect “my 
academic progress. So I normally used to go when they were about just finished 
then I just clean up the floors” (Interview with second-year B Admin student, 30 
August 2006). 
 
While doing menial jobs, the student was approached by visiting doctors who 
asked him a few questions. They discovered that they all came from Mpumalanga. 
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One day, the doctors called and told the student that they would “pay my meal 
fees until I finish and they said that I must concentrate on my studies rather than 
working for food”. The doctors promised to support the student with everything 
(including books) that he needed at the university. However, the student had to 
“sign a contract with them which was not about repayment but indicating that 
should I fail my studies, they will stop paying. Therefore, I must not blame them 
as if they deserted me” (Interview with second-year B Admin student, 30 August 
2006). The message was loud and clear that the student should focus on his 
studies. A similar message had earlier been communicated when he was working 
at the residence, even though it was rather subtle.  
 
Some students sought university part-time jobs, most of which came through the 
university’s work-study programme. Students worked up to 20 hours per week as 
tutors, drivers, library assistants, administrative assistants etc. A second-year 
UWC B Com student received NSFAS but, 
 
...it did not cover everything. So I have been struggling since my first year. 
However, to make up for difference, I applied and was employed as tutor 
for first-year physics students. At the same time, the SRC appointed me as 
one of the drivers (Interview with second year UWC B Com student, 28 
August 2006). 
 
The university deducted 60% from the work-study stipends and paid these funds 
into student accounts. For instance, a third-year UWC Library and Information 
Science student indicated that she was on the university work-study programme, 
which was “not enough. The policy is that 60% of what you receive is deducted 
and paid into your account and so I do not even get to work enough hours of what 
is required” (Interview with third-year UWC Library and Information Science 
student, 03 September 2004).  
 
Many students viewed part-time jobs as more than providing financial assistance. 
The part-time jobs helped students in settling debts, developing some sense of 
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independence and gaining work experience. A third-year UWC Library and 
Information Science student received NSFAS, which was inadequate and hence 
she needed to find additional funding. She spoke about how her father “saved 
money to pay for my studies while he was working” (Interview with third-year 
UWC Library and Information Science student, 03 September 2004).  
 
Having her father’s savings did not deter her from searching for a temporary job 
so that she could pay for her studies. She worked at Paarl Library on weekends. 
She worked as student assistant at the UWC campus and as a casual worker 
between October and January.  
 
I used my money to pay for my tuition and transport fees. This made feel 
independent and I am also gaining experience which will help me after I 
have completed my studies (Interview with third-year UWC Library and 
Information Science student, 03 September 2004).  
 
This is an interesting story of a student who had a vision and ambition that 
transcended her immediate concerns to study (which can be so consuming) but 
which in her case included completing her studies and finding a job thereafter and 
most importantly, becoming an ‘independent person’.  
 
It would seem to me that almost all cases discussed above show the type of 
students who knew what they wanted, who were brave, who had a passion for 
education and their future, and who rejected victimhood and developed a deep 
sense of hope and optimism. In other words, these students refused fall into what 
Mamdani called “abject surrender” (2007: 18) and possessed a liberating spirit. In 
terms of my conceptual framework, they refused to accept their disadvantaged 
status and to fall into inaction and exclusion. 
 
I have identified self-initiated support as one of the forms of individual normative 
action that students undertook to address their problem of unmet financial need. 
The individual stories of students describe various forms of self-initiated support. 
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They include participation in extra-curricular activities, being prepared to help 
clean residence kitchens and doing various other kinds of part-time jobs on and 
off campus. What seems to be an underlying and commonly shared characteristic 
is their rejection of the victimhood mentality and willingness to do ‘something’, 
‘anything’, as long as they would find the money to contribute to the costs of their 
study. This is despite possible ‘dehumanisation’ experiences they might encounter 
in the process of seeking financial assistance, some of which have been related 
from the students’ point of view above.  
 
Student-family networks 
At the heart of cost-sharing is the requirement that parents should share the 
burden of study costs. I indicated in Chapter Two that some writers argue that 
parents should pay for the education of their children “not only because of the 
personal benefits the parents can expect to enjoy but also because it is their 
responsibility and their obligation as parents” (Merisotis and Wolanin, 2002: 1).  
 
Interviews with students showed that their parents ‘understood’ the need to 
contribute and tried everything possible to pay for the education of their children 
however trying their own circumstances. Some managed to find the required 
funding, but others struggled to make financial contributions towards the 
education of their children at UWC owing to their poor socio-economic situation. 
I indicated earlier that UWC was an institution that admitted predominantly black 
and poor students. As a legacy of apartheid, black South Africans still suffer the 
socio-economic inequality deliberately created by the system. Therefore education 
can be seen as part of a solution to address socio-economic inequalities. Some of 
these parents were single parents looking after more than one child. For instance, 
a third-year UWC B Pharm student said that for two years “my mother had paid 
for me and then there was one year when she just could not because she was also 
paying for my other siblings” (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 
29 August 2006). 
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A fourth-year UWC B Pharm student spoke highly of his father’s support to his 
studies. This is despite the fact that his father had last worked when the student 
was doing Standard 2 (i.e. primary school). However, his father had “connections 
and somehow always managed to find money. My father is my Superman. I 
always say there are some people that are in worse positions than I am. 
Complaining really will not help you” (Interview with fourth-year UWC B Pharm 
student, 30 August 2006). Given that searching for funding can be emotionally 
draining, the student said that his mother provided emotional and moral support 
and she “will say, you will be fine and all of that” (Interview with fourth-year 
UWC B Pharm student, 30 August 2006). 
 
A second-year B Admin student indicated that her father “is not working anymore 
and he borrowed money from my cousin. I will have to pay it back once I have 
finished my studies” (Interview with second-year B Admin student, 29 August 
2006). 
 
While it is important not to generalise uncritically from these observations, one 
should not miss the determination in the manner in which parents sought 
assistance for their children. It might seem obvious that parents should support 
their children, but it is not necessarily possible in poor communities, where 
parents lack the means of survival and have to support several children. It requires 
someone to have character and a positive attitude.  
 
One can see from the above cases that parents used different means of securing 
financial contributions for their children’s education. Parents used their savings, 
relied on old established networks for assistance and even borrowed from 
relatives and friends to make financial contributions for their children. Moreover, 
parents placed their hopes firmly on the shoulders of their children when they 
made financial contributions. Once the children would have completed their 
studies, parents expected them to support their siblings. In other words, the failure 
or success of some students could close or open doors of higher learning for their 
siblings. In this respect students reported in interviews: 
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I am always told that I have to finish school. I have to take care of my 
other sibling. Nothing much you know (Interview with third-year UWC B 
Pharm student, 30 August 2006). 
 
I already have two people that I would have to fund their studies and look 
after them when I am done (Interview with third-year EMS student, 28 
August 2006). 
 
Some students who were interviewed indicated that their parents had high 
expectations and insisted that they should complete their studies on time.  
 
My parents are expecting a lot. Every year, they expect that I should have 
progressed to the next level and that I should finish in record time. So with 
all of those expectations I have learnt to make them outweigh all my 
worries of having a better life here on campus so it is something that has 
just kept me going (Interview with second-year UWC LLB student, 29 
August 2006). 
 
My parents do not really say much. Sometimes I get a call in the middle of 
the night and my grandmother telling me, ‘I’m still praying. But I hang in 
there till you finish, you know’ (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm 
student, 29 August 2006). 
 
I can broadly categorise the student-family networks students described as falling 
into the normative dimension. Some parents had to borrow money from relatives 
and friends. In some instances parents were expecting their children to repay the 
borrowed money once they had completed their studies. In other instances parents 
had to find ways of repaying the money. Student stories related to family support 
have exposed the harsh realities of poor families whose effect was being felt by 
students and their parents as they sought financial assistance. In the main, the 
stories show parents’ commitment and willingness to do whatever possible for the 
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education and future of their children. Notwithstanding the financial difficulties, 
parents had ‘high’ hopes and expectations and motivated their children to soldier 
on and understand that they would have to take care of their siblings. 
 
Individual student actions (Type 4) 
 
Student solidarity 
Needy students also found support from their fellow students. This support took 
various forms, including the sharing of residence rooms (which is a practice 
known as squatting), sharing books, study materials and laboratory equipment. 
For instance, a third-year UWC B Pharm student indicated he “sacrificed a lot” 
(Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 29 August 2006). He could not 
buy the laboratory coat and “often used my cousin’s lab coat who is also studying 
here” (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 29 August 2006). The 
third-year UWC B Pharm student had to use “the little money that I receive from 
home to buy study notes every week. While it’s special the money that parents 
give you, it’s like you don’t have money for everything” (Interview with third-
year UWC B Pharm student, 29 August 2006). He said, “I don’t complain like 
other people when they don’t have money to go buy clothes. I just spend R150 on 
buying basic food and other essentials that I know that even if I don’t have 
money, I could still eat and go to class. Nobody would know that I am eating such 
basic food or something” (Interview with third-year UWC B Pharm student, 29 
August 2006). It would seem the primary focus of this student was to learn while 
ensuring that he survived hardship. He also had a sense of prioritising and 
separating his ‘needs’ from ‘wants’. Most importantly, the student understood his 
family background and did not allow peer pressure to affect him.  
 
Another student had a mother who had worked as a domestic worker for 12 to 13 
years. The mother used “her wages to pay for some of my studies. However, that 
is not enough” (Interview with first-year UWC B Admin student, 29 August 
2006). The mother could only afford to pay for tuition fees. As a result the student 
could “not stay in the residence. I am squatting with a friend at Cape University of 
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Technology [former Peninsula Technikon]” (Interview with first-year UWC B 
Admin student, 29 August 2006). The Cape Peninsula University of Technology 
friend thus risked his or her future by allowing someone to squat who was not 
even studying at the same university. To me, this indicates a deep sense of 
solidarity among students. Students had to choose between achieving education 
and conforming to the rules of the university, and they chose education.  
 
In line with the conceptual framework for this study, I describe student solidarity 
as both individual normative and non-normative student action. In some instances 
students are willing and prepared to risk their studies (by implication their future) 
to help those in need. Actions that fall under the normative dimension include the 
sharing of resources such as text books, laboratory coats, study guides and food. 
Actions that fall under the non-normative dimension include sharing of 
accommodation or ‘squatting’. Students also struggled through great hardship on 
their own, rationing food and living on the barest necessities. Indirectly students 
were rebelling against established university rules and exposing the inadequacies 
of university student funding aid.  
 
Interpretative reflection on the results  
 
Collective student actions before 2000 
In relation to the purpose of this chapter, which examines student actions aimed at 
addressing the student problem of ‘unmet financial need’ at UWC, I found that 
students combined both, collective normative student action (Type 1) as formal 
participation in higher education governance, and collective non-normative 
student action (Type 2), that is various types of student activism, in order to 
address their problem of unmet financial need prior to 2000. The 1998 student 
activism provides the model case of the manner in which students transited from 
one type to another.  
 
Students began with Type 1, where they negotiated with the university 
management in a bid to reach financial agreement, which among others was 
supposed to help students with debts and outline payment options. When the 
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negotiations failed, students lobbied their former liberation allies, including 
political organisations, civil society organisations and non-governmental 
organisations, without any success. Moreover, there was a distinctive change in 
the conception of students as political actors. Students were no longer seen as 
‘catalysts’, ‘shock-troops of the South African revolution’, ‘energy driver of 
change at UWC’ but as a ‘bunch of fee dodgers’, ‘irrational students who want 
free education’, ‘cell phone-toting youth who belabour their poverty in order to 
lead a porch lifestyle on campuses’. The response that students received was that 
they should pay their fees. Having exhausted all possible Type 1 options, students 
opted for Type 2 collective non-normative student action, the 1998 student 
activism. The intention was to put more pressure on the university management in 
the hope that it would budge from its original position. Eventually the university 
management and the SRC reopened negotiations while student activism 
continued. This resulted in a compromise and financial agreement.  
 
Conceptually, the analysis of the 1998 UWC student activism has highlighted a 
few points. First, it has enhanced our understanding of the relationship between 
Type 1 student action and Type 2 student action, in particular the fact that 
students combine and use these actions in a complementary manner. Another 
important dimension is that Type 1 and Type 2 action were used in parallel or 
sequentially. They were not mutually exclusive.  
 
Second, it reflects the importance of the relationship between the student body 
and student leadership in collective student action. The SRC sought a mandate 
from the student body from beginning to end. This included the decision to 
embark on protest and eventually a mandate to accept and sign the final agreement 
with the university management. The bulk of the student body supported the SRC, 
even when some students were arrested by the police for defying the university’s 
instruction to leave the campus.   
 
The 1998 UWC conflict was also important in other ways. It was institution-
focused student activism, i.e. a sub-type proposed in Chapter Three, aimed at 
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ensuring that the university did not exclude students financially. More than half of 
the students (about 4 000 out of 7 000) facing exclusions were reportedly saved 
from exclusion and could re-register. The remaining 3 000 students, however, 
could not be accounted for, at least from the students’ perspective. Possible 
explanations given of their whereabouts included that some of the affected 
students could have given up and be sitting at home, thus accepting their 
disadvantaged position, while others may have been ‘misled’, as the UWC SRC 
claimed. Lack of institutional records makes it difficult to express an informed 
view on the matter. Based on what the UWC SRC reported, I can conclude that 
the 1998 UWC institution-focused student activism helped most, although not all, 
students in addressing their problem of unmet financial need with respect to 
gaining formal access to the institution.  
 
The 1998 UWC conflict exposes the paradoxes of the post-1994 democracy in 
general and higher education policy in particular. Both the national government 
and UWC supported the expansion of access, especially to poor students, but they 
did not match their support with adequate financial assistance. Rather, poor 
students were expected to make a contribution to the costs of their study. In 
consequence some students had to embark on student activism to be re-registered 
and thus missed valuable time for learning. Other students did not even return to 
campus, probably because of inability to settle outstanding fees. The action of 
these students can be described as non-action in terms of my conceptual 
framework.  
 
A conclusion can be made based on this non-action of students. This is that the 
dreams and aspirations of a black and poor child to access higher education may 
be shattered before entering or after entering a higher education institution as long 
as such a child is unable to contribute to the cost of his or her study. This is 
notwithstanding collective student action, which may take place.  
 
The 1998 UWC conflict challenged student leaders to choose whether to ‘toe the 
line’ of the national political leadership (in the form of government) and in the 
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process risk ‘abjectly surrendering’ or to fight against potential injustice as a 
result of financial exclusion. Students chose to fight, defied authorities and 
embarked on student activism. Government took a very harsh stance towards 
student action. Among others, government issued a strong warning and brought 
the police to campus as part of crushing student activism. This type of government 
response was similar to what had been reported in most African states (Altbach, 
2004, Alidou; Caffentzis and Federici, 2008; Byaruhanga, 2006). This point may 
highlight a limitation in the conceptual framework for this study in that it does not 
capture the transition from one type of student activism to another. For instance, 
while UWC students primarily targeted the university, the intervention of national 
government brought the state into campus, which then created a situation in which 
students fought against the police, but most importantly defied the national 
government order against embarking on student activism.  
 
Collective student action after 2000 
There are two distinctive features of UWC collective student actions between 
2000 and 2005. First is the absence or non-use of student activism in addressing 
the problem of unmet financial need. Second, the relationship between the SRC 
and student body necessary for any collective student action was weak or non-
existent. The SRC struggled to convene student mass meetings where they could 
have received a mandate to guide their negotiations with the university 
management. Consequently, the SRC defined its own terms and conditions of 
negotiations and subsequent settlement with the university management. The SRC 
tried as much as it could to ensure that poor students accessed the university; 
however, some students were excluded because of poor academic performance, 
while others allegedly did not return after their initial attempts to register failed. 
The SRC argued that these students would not have approached the SRC offices 
for assistance. Although I was unable to obtain the necessary documentation on 
financial exclusions from the SRC or university management to verify the SRC’s 
claims, it is possible that some of the affected students would still have been 
excluded, even if they had come to the SRC, for various unknown reasons 
including poor academic performance. 
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Individual student actions  
A third prominent feature of the post-2000 period is the prevalence of both, 
normative and non-normative individual student actions in addressing their unmet 
financial needs. This is not to say that there were no individual student actions 
prior to that period; rather, it appears that in the combination of different types of 
student actions, individual student actions became a much more significant feature 
after the experience of 1998 and the establishment of NSFAS and SCM. To 
illustrate this point, I presented the stories of a number of individual students that 
I gathered during interviews. These individual student stories bring to light what 
Jansen described as “unseen pains of transition” (2004: 118). The stories reveal 
different kinds of normative action that students used as individuals to address 
their ‘unmet financial need’. First, it was individual negotiations with the 
university authorities. Some individual stories showed that students had to endure 
some harsh, painful and ‘almost dehumanising’ conditions. Some students had to 
wait for almost two months before they could be registered, while they went to 
class and then visited SCM to negotiate their situations after standing in endless 
queues. Potentially, this could have affected students psychologically and 
academically.  
 
Second, there was self-initiated support. Students showed a great sense of 
commitment to their studies by seeking financial assistance from many different 
sources. Students sought part-time jobs both within and outside the university. 
Some of these part-time jobs came in the form of participating in the university’s 
work-study programme where a certain percentage (60%) of their stipends went 
into repaying student debts. Students tutored, worked in libraries, performed basic 
administrative functions in university offices, drove SRC cars, and so forth. 
Students also volunteered their services to community-oriented projects such as 
the Bra Wam Sis Wam and HIV/AIDS projects of the university. Other students 
related their experience of doing menial jobs such as cleaning the dining hall or 
washing dishes at the residence canteen. Again, whatever they earned contributed 
to settling debts.  
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Third, student-family networks consisting of the immediate family, family 
relatives, friends and neighbours were sought for assistance. Students approached 
their parents for help, which came in different forms. Some parents borrowed 
from immediate and even extended family members or ‘networks’ to support their 
children. Others tried to save from their meagre salaries. While these savings 
played an important role in supporting students, they were often inadequate; hence 
students applied for NSFAS assistance and sought part-time jobs.  
 
Student solidarity played an important role as both normative and non-normative 
action. In some instances student solidarity constituted a form of non-normative 
action, which involved, for example, illegally sharing university accommodation, 
i.e. ‘squatting’. This could have resulted in the students being expelled from 
campus residences. Nevertheless these students went ahead and helped each 
another. Students shared their pain and suffering. In some instances student 
solidarity constituted a form of normative action, which involved students 
supporting one another through sharing study materials, clothes (such as 
laboratory coats) and food. 
 
Student solidarity has highlighted a limitation in the conceptual framework for 
this study. In particular, the conceptual framework did not anticipate that one 
student action can assume both normative and non-normative forms: the question 
is: whose norms apply? This emphasises a need for a more careful 
conceptualisation of the framework in future studies, as well as flexibility and 
elasticity in characterising student action types, which may be represented through 
dotted rather than rigid connecting lines.  
 
Conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter was to address the research question by 
investigating different actions that students took to address their problem of unmet 
financial need. I applied four ideal types of student action and subtypes of 
conceptual framework to analyse and interpret data. This has provided a way of 
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understanding some of the dynamics involved in the manner in which students 
addressed or sought to address their problem of financial need.  
  
As indicated in Chapter Three, the relationships between four ideal types of 
student action (Type1, Type 2, Type 3 and Type 4) should be understood as 
complex and characterised by interrelatedness and interdependency. The analysis 
of the 1998 UWC conflict revealed interrelatedness and interdependency of 
student actions. UWC students combined and used Type 1 and Type 2 to address 
their problem of unmet financial need in a complementary manner. Type 1 
included negotiations with the university management. Type 2 included 
institution-focused student activism protest, defiance, sit-ins, marches, placard 
demonstrations and mass meetings. The elaboration of Type 2, especially student 
activism, into three sub-types (state-focused, institution-focused and student-
focused) can be considered as another contribution of this study.   
 
Type 3 and Type 4 were helpful in analysing and interpreting individual student 
stories related to how students sought to address their problem of unmet financial 
need. Some of the Type 3 student actions included negotiations with SCM and the 
financial aid office, solidarity networks involving sharing of study materials, 
laboratory coats and food, student family networks consisting of friends, relatives 
and community members and self-initiated support consisting of part-jobs on and 
off campus, work-study programmes, participation in extracurricular activities and 
similar activities. Type 4 student actions included solidarity networks, especially 
sharing of accommodation without official permission or ‘squatting’. 
 
However, the conceptual framework showed a limitation related to its inability to 
accommodate student solidarity behaviour, which could be categorised as both 
normative and non-normative. In an attempt to address this weakness, I had to 
reconfigure and connect the different ideal types of the framework, using dotted 
lines instead of the original rigid connecting lines. This was done in order to 
ensure the flexibility and elasticity of the student action types.  
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Having analysed individual students, I have recognised the possibility of further 
elaborating Type 3 and Type 4 in terms of whether students were using internal 
(within a university) or external (outside the university) sources or means to 
address their unmet financial need. As such, four types of individual student 
actions were identified: Type 1 internal-directed individual normative student 
action; sub-type 2: external-directed individual normative student action; Type 3: 
internal-directed individual non-normative student action; and Type 4: external 
individual non-normative student action.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION  
 
Introduction 
This study has examined various ways in which UWC confronted the paradoxical 
post-apartheid higher education policy of expansion of access and limited funding 
and in which UWC students addressed the resulting problem of unmet financial 
need between 1995 and 2005. It was set within the broader context of political and 
social change and higher education transformation between 1995 and 2005. It has 
been argued that the pursuit of transformation in higher education led to a post-
apartheid higher education policy that represented a paradoxical simultaneous 
pursuit of (1) a massive expansion of higher education for black students (which 
in effect meant creating opportunities of access to higher education for historically 
disadvantaged students who came mostly from working class and poor 
backgrounds), and (2) a self-imposed commitment to fiscal 'austerity' reflected in 
the rejection of free higher education provision and provision of limited financial 
assistance and the adoption of cost-sharing, which required that students, 
including the working class and poor, pay a significant share of the costs of study. 
The implementation of this paradoxical policy further deepened and compounded 
challenges that already persisted at UWC in the mid-1990s. The paradox was 
most severely experienced by poor students whose constrained ability to pay a 
portion of their cost of study could not be mitigated by institutional resources or 
funds from family and relatives.  
 
By 1995, UWC had already a long-standing challenge of balancing financial 
sustainability and student affordability. This partly originated from the 
university’s historic decision to ‘democratise’ access to its educational 
programmes in order to increase the number of African students in the late 1980s. 
The opening of access to all racial groups by some higher education institutions 
such as UWC was an antithesis to the policy of academic segregation at the time. 
The apartheid regime responded to this development by introducing changes in 
the higher education funding formula, in particular the addition of a success 
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factor, the implication of which was that those institutions with a low pass rate 
would receive a reduced state subsidy. UWC was one of these institutions.  
 
The key research questions of this study were: 
 
a) How did UWC respond to the paradoxical post-apartheid higher education 
policy of expansion of access and limited funding?  
b) How did UWC students address their problem of unmet financial need? 
 
The study proceeded at different levels. I approached the research problem by 
developing a conceptual-analytical framework with four ideal types of student 
actions relevant to student funding problems. This was further enhanced by the 
conceptualisation of student activism in various sub-types, which represents one 
of the ideal types of student action. This framework was applied in an empirical 
case study exploring how students sought to address their problem of unmet 
financial need at UWC between 1995 and 2005. The case study has provided a 
rich tapestry of student responses – in the form of collective and individual 
actions embedded in their ‘lived experience’ of unmet financial need - to the 
dissonance between their demands and national and institutional policy responses. 
The empirical findings of this study presented in Chapters Five and Six constitute 
in my view the main contribution to knowledge of this thesis and thus advance 
this particular field of research.  
 
This concluding chapter summarises the earlier chapters, reflects on the findings 
and recommends areas for further investigation. 
 
Summary of chapters 
Chapter One presented the general introduction and context of the case study. It 
identified the research problem, purpose and research question and provided the 
rationale and methodological framework for a case study. The chapter outlines 
were also presented.  
 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
Chapter Two presented a literature review focusing on cost-sharing, student 
activism, student participation in higher education governance and access. The 
literature review of cost-sharing clarified the notion that students (and parents) 
should share in the burden of the costs of study and outlined related policies of 
financial assistance, such as loans schemes. The literature review highlighted that 
cost-sharing is premised on the notion that higher education has both public and 
private benefits, thus suggesting that any public funding policy needs to entail 
both, a state subsidy as the public contribution and tuition fees as the private share 
of the burden of financing higher education. Cost-sharing takes different forms 
whose acceptability varies from one country to another.  
 
The literature review showed that some African countries voluntarily accepted 
and promoted cost-sharing as a funding policy. In most African countries, 
however, cost-sharing was imposed as part of SAP conditionalities driven largely 
by the World Bank. South Africa is one of the few African countries with a long 
history of cost-sharing, which predates the advent of the concept itself, and which 
was (unexpectedly for some) continued in the post-apartheid era. The literature 
review further noted that cost-sharing continues to experience implementation 
challenges, especially in developing countries. As the literature shows, students in 
numerous African countries have undertaken various forms of collective action 
against different forms of cost-sharing. The dominant form of collective student 
action against cost-sharing has tended to be non-normative, especially forms of 
student activism.   
 
The literature review on student activism noted differences in terms of the impact 
of student activism in developing countries compared to developed countries. It 
highlighted the catalytic role that student activism played in the social and 
political transformation of various countries, including the overthrow of 
oppressive regimes and resistance to them before and after independence. 
However, in the course of time, the meaning of 'student' was transformed from 
students as the ‘hope’ or ‘future’ of a nation or 'shock-troops of the revolution' to 
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being ‘menaces’ on the established body politic and eventually to become seen as 
mere ‘consumers’ or ‘clients’ of higher education.  
 
Given the interface between access and the problem of unmet financial need, I 
reviewed selected literature on access. The main outcome was the identification of 
three dimensions of access, namely formal access, epistemological access, and the 
importance of linking access to success in order to achieve equity. Funding 
constraints inhibit student access in more than formal terms. As the case study 
eventually showed, funding issue delayed formal access, which exacerbated 
existing constraints to epistemological access, and would become in these and 
other respects a major factor for the success of disadvantaged students in higher 
education.  
 
The literature review concluded with the identification of the gaps in the existing 
literature. These gaps included, firstly, that literature on student activism in Africa 
is limited. It tends to collapse student activism into youth activism. Inherently, 
there is nothing wrong with this given the fact that students constitute a critical 
segment of the youth and in some instances the boundaries become blurred in the 
‘actual course of struggle’, as happened during the national liberation struggle 
against apartheid. However, the weakness of this approach manifests itself in 
many ways. There is generally a lack of conceptual clarity on the notion of 
students. The role of students as an autonomous force is not considered critically. 
And student involvement in national politics tends to be overemphasised while 
their contribution to higher education politics is frequently overlooked. 
 
Secondly, the literature tends to use concepts of student activism, student strikes, 
student politics, student boycotts and student riots interchangeably and without 
sufficient clarification. This has been highlighted even though it was not the 
purpose of this study to address this weakness in the literature. Thirdly, although 
the literature does provide some account of student activism in Africa against 
tuition fees, abolishment of student allowances, poor living and accommodation 
conditions (whether as part of fighting against cost-sharing or SAPs and their 
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effects), which resulted in some instances in student arrests, killings and 
expulsions from campuses, references to student funding seem nevertheless 
mostly coincidental, partly because the interest tends to be more in the role of 
students in dealing with big social and political concerns (such as repressive 
regimes, SAPs) as mentioned above.  
 
Finally, the literature rarely describes students’ individual experiences or gives 
detailed accounts of intra-student body politics, the roles of SRCs, student guilds 
or student unions, and their relation to the student body. This is even more so the 
case in relation to specific topics like how students – individually or collectively - 
address the problem of sharing the burden of study costs. Hence I noted that 
students generally remain treated at a student body level, thus limiting access to 
intra-student dynamics such as the relationship between the leadership and the 
rank and file.  
 
Chapter Three developed a conceptual framework for the study to analyse and 
interpret data. The framework served as a guide to data collection, analysis and 
interpretation. It was inspired by Wright et al.’s framework (1990) and sought to 
conceptualise student actions as the possible behaviours of disadvantaged group 
members in terms of different ideal types. On the basis of this, I developed a 
matrix consisting of horizontal and vertical continuums. The horizontal continuum 
consists of collective and individual elements at the end of each extreme. The 
vertical continuum consists of normative and non-normative elements at the end 
of each extreme. I examined and found the relationship between the continuums 
to be complex and characterised by interrelatedness and interdependency. 
Theoretically, four ideal types of student actions emerged from the matrix, namely 
(1) collective normative student action; (2) collective non-normative student 
action; (3) individual normative student action; and (4) individual non-normative 
student action. Furthermore, I magnified the typology by developing sub-types of 
student activism, which provide a more detailed perspective on collective non-
normative student action. For this purpose, I refined Koen et al.’s (2006) typology 
of student activism and constructed three ideal sub-types, namely, (a) state-
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focused student activism; (b) institution-focused student activism; and (c) student-
leadership-focused student activism. The framework was applied empirically in 
the case of UWC and the results were presented and discussed in Chapter Six.  
 
Chapter Four presented the methodological framework for the study. I adopted a 
qualitative case study approach, selecting UWC as a case for various reasons. I 
described my use of a variety of data collection methods (such as interviews, 
documentation and observation) and rationale for this, and my choice of 
respondents at the university. Interviewees included persons who were directly 
involved in the key concerns of the study, in particular UWC management, staff 
and students (both leaders and ordinary students). I interviewed diverse students 
in terms of origin, race, gender and study fields and levels of qualification. The 
interviewees included former student leaders in order to ascertain the historical 
student perspective on the pre-1994 era. Staff interviews targeted mainly those 
members who were directly involved with student financial issues or who were 
responsible for making student funding decisions. I recorded and transcribed the 
interview material, and stored it in a safe place.  
 
Observation and documentation played an important role as sources of data, both 
as sources of information in their own respects and for the purpose of 
triangulation. In the case of observation, having been a staff member at the 
institution, I managed to observe various student activities on campus, including 
student meetings and workshops where they discussed student funding concerns. 
In the case of existing documents, I collected different types of official 
documents, including UWC SRC annual reports, minutes, discussion documents, 
the university annual reports, financial statements and similar documents.  
 
As mentioned, by using multiple data collection methods I was able to carry out 
methodological and source triangulation, which is an important way of ensuring 
the ‘trustworthiness’ of a case study report. In addition, I took extensive notes 
during observations and interviews as part of ensuring the trustworthiness of the 
study. I also had good rapport with students and university management, given my 
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role as researcher and activist on campus during my tenure between 2000 and 
2005. This rapport facilitated access to all kinds of data that I needed.  
 
The limitations in terms of data are, however, related to the availability of 
historical data on student funding and governance issues. UWC could not provide 
data related to fee increases, student debt and financial exclusions prior to 2000. I 
needed the data to quantify the extent of the problem of unmet financial need. 
Students did not have a proper records management system either. In 
consequence, I could not find UWC SRC AGM reports and minutes. Hence it was 
difficult to fully comprehend some decisions that the SRC took with regard to the 
problem of addressing unmet financial need.  
 
Chapter Five delved into the first part of the case study by analysing the pre-1994 
student demands and expectations for the establishment of independent and 
democratic SRCs, expansion of access, and equitable financial aid, along with a 
discussion of post-apartheid higher education policy responses. I provided a 
historical context to both student policy expectations and policy responses. I 
identified moments of dissonance between student policy expectations and post-
apartheid higher education policy responses in all cases. Finally, I demonstrated 
that the policy response regarding access and funding, seen together, amount to a 
problematic, indeed a paradoxical combination of policies, which, as I show in 
Chapter Six, reproduced or even produced in some respects, a problem of unmet 
financial need and consequently various and changing student actions as ways in 
which students engaged with this problem.  
 
Thus, Chapter Six investigated different actions that students took to address their 
problem of unmet financial need. I provided both the political and institutional 
context in which to locate and understand student action. The first of two main 
aspects of this chapter is the UWC 1998 student activism, spurred by a desire on 
the part of students to protect about 7 000 students with outstanding fees who 
were facing financial exclusion from the university. I examined collective student 
action and the dynamics concerning this. This included focusing on the role of the 
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UWC SRC and its relationship with the student body. I also examined collective 
normative student action, especially student negotiations with the university 
management and officials, the relationship between students and funding 
structures (such as the SCM and Financial Aid Office). Secondly, I presented and 
analysed interviews with individual students who shared their stories of how they 
sought to address their problem of unmet financial need. Some students negotiated 
directly with the university officials regarding their unmet financial need. The 
SCM and Financial Aid Office were the main offices with which students had to 
negotiate individually. Other students had to find ways other than engaging the 
university officials.  
 
Summary of findings 
 
Government’s paradoxical policy  
The post-apartheid higher education policy evolved in the context of an 
unsupportive macro-economic policy, fiscal austerity and belt-tightening driven 
through GEAR, which “imposed fiscal constraints on higher education 
institutions” (Gibbon and Kabaki, 2006: 128). In consequence government’s 
progressive commitments to increasing student enrolment, participation, access 
and equity were hindered (Badat, 2004: 46). The post-apartheid government 
accepted and supported the idea of expanding access targeting historically 
disadvantaged, black and poor working class students as part of the broader 
transformation process to eradicate the historical and social inequalities in higher 
education. Conversely, government rejected the long-standing student call for free 
higher education. Instead, it accepted cost-sharing as one of the key principles of 
post-apartheid higher education policy, which further entrenched the already 
existing practice whereby students (and their parents) and the state share the 
burden of the costs of study. Government subsequently established NSFAS in an 
effort to assist academically deserving poor students financially to access higher 
education. I have argued that NSFAS should be considered and understood within 
the logic of cost-sharing policy. NSFAS managed to assist many students but 
remained inadequate to address all student financial needs (Breier, 2007; HESA, 
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2008; Wangenge-Ouma, 2012). Therefore, I have conceptualised as paradoxical 
the government’s simultaneous pursuit of the expansion of access to historically 
disadvantaged students and limited financial assistance (with cost-sharing being 
promoted as policy solution).  
 
Cost-sharing 
As shown in Chapters Five and Six, the notion of sharing the burden of the costs 
of study was the most contested aspect of the apartheid higher education policy 
and post-apartheid higher education policy and produced conflict and tensions 
between the university management and students at UWC. The university has 
always attracted mainly working class and poor students since its decision to 
‘democratise access’ in the 1980s following high levels of student activism. Some 
of these poor students could not pay, thus increasing institutional student debts, a 
portion of which was declared ‘impaired’. Affordability then became a critical 
concern for students and the institution, although in the case of students 
affordability was conceptualised in terms of their ability to access higher 
education while from the institutional perspective, affordability referred to the 
institutions’ ability to grant access to students with limited capacity to pay and 
thus was a matter of financial sustainability for the institution. The apartheid 
regime had already reduced its state subsidy to institutions committed to granting 
access to disadvantaged students by including a success factor in its revised 
funding formula in addition to student enrolment. Institutions such as UWC, 
which admitted students who were not only poor but also academically 
underprepared, were the most severely affected by this policy, which posed a 
threat to the university’s financial sustainability. The paradoxical post-apartheid 
higher education policy did not resolve but perpetuated UWC’s financial 
challenge of ensuring both financial sustainability and student affordability. 
Because it was being implemented at institutional level, its negative effects were 
to some extent viewed as the reflection of poor institutional leadership or 
institutional failure to deal with the concerns of poor students. This was evident in 
the manner in which students responded to their unmet financial needs, such as 
during the 1998 conflict, which became what I have described as institution-
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focused student activism according to the conceptual model presented in Chapter 
Three.  
 
Balancing financial sustainability and student affordability  
The analysis in Chapters Five and Six showed that both the university and 
students responded to the challenge of financial sustainability and student 
affordability in different ways. First, from the late 1980s to 1994 the relationship 
between UWC students (and in particular student leaders) and the Rector, Prof. 
Gerwel, was an amicable one, and a catalyst in managing the worst effects of the 
challenges facing the institution. The Rector and students shared similar political 
and ideological perspectives and belonged to the ANC-led liberation movement. 
The Rector’s vision of UWC as the ‘intellectual home of the left’ resonated with 
student leaders. Students viewed their plight as a consequence of apartheid, rather 
than blaming the university. The apartheid regime consequently became the object 
of students’ struggles, anger, frustrations and resentment. The mere fact that 
students identified the apartheid regime as the primary cause of their financial 
problems and the institutional financial crisis was important to the university 
management’s strategy. It provided a basis for compromises in respect of students 
understanding of the need to make minimum payments and this was codified in 
various financial agreements entered into by the UWC management and the SRC. 
Moreover, the university’s long-standing commitment to expand access to poor 
students played an important role in enabling the university management and 
students to reach agreements both before and after 1994.  
 
Prof. Cecil Abrahams succeeded Prof. Gerwel as Rector. There was antagonistic 
relationship between management and students, which resulted in high levels of 
non-normative action, especially student activism. Affordability was a source of 
dispute between the UWC SRC and management. The UWC SRC approached 
‘affordability’ from students’ financial standpoint, arguing whether or not students 
(possibly ‘all those affected’) could ‘afford’ to pay and if so, how much they 
could ‘afford’. The UWC management approached ‘affordability’ from the 
institutional financial standpoint by asking whether the university could ‘afford’ 
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to admit students who could not pay. The UWC management was more concerned 
with ensuring institutional financial sustainability. The failure to reach consensus 
around affordability and resolve tension between affordability and institutional 
financial sustainability led to the 1998 conflict. At the heart of the conflict was 
students' resolve to defend about 7 000 students who were facing financial 
exclusions.  Eventually, 4000 students successfully managed to register again.  
 
 
Notwithstanding the conflict, UWC continued to face the challenge of balancing 
student affordability and institutional financial sustainability. The 2001 university 
five-year financial plan also played a role. This plan was approved by the 
university council in 2001. The five-year financial plan defined and set the 
following key financial drivers and targets: (a) admissions should grow at 
sustainable rates; (b) students should pay their tuition and residence fees; (c) 
employment costs should not exceed 65% of total income; (d) operating costs 
should not exceed 30% of total income (UWC, 2002: 41). Cost-sharing was 
deeply ingrained in the financial plan, which implied that the challenge of student 
affordability would continue to confront students. Coincidentally, the 
implementation of the five-year financial plan happened at the same time that 
students decided against using student activism in conjunction with negotiations, a 
major difference from the pre-2000 era, especially the 1998 student activism, 
which was an institution-focused subtype.  
 
Collective student actions 
This study shows that students used and combined collective normative and 
collective non-normative student actions in a complementary manner between 
1995 and 2000. In particular during the 1998 UWC conflict, students initiated 
Type 1 collective normative student action, especially using negotiations and 
lobbying in order to address their problem of ‘unmet financial needs’. Eventually, 
students decided to shift from Type 1 to Type 2, which is collective non-
normative student action or student activism. The shift did not imply the complete 
abandonment of Type 1. Rather, it was a tactical shift in which students used Type 
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2 to put more pressure on the university to accede to their demands. Students 
therefore combined different types of collective action.  
 
Between 2000 and 2005, UWC students predominantly used collective normative 
student actions. I established in Chapter Three that formal student participation in 
higher education governance presumes the existence of a good working 
relationship between the UWC SRC and student body. The UWC SRC should 
operate on the basis of a representative ‘mandate’ from the student body, which 
would guide its negotiations with the university management. The UWC SRC did 
not have a relationship with the student body of the kind that could give the it an 
explicit mandate in this respect, and therefore negotiated with the university 
management without such mandate. Potentially this could raise legitimacy 
questions at two levels, that is, at the level of the UWC SRC as ‘legitimate student 
voice’ (given the previously established norm of receiving mandates and 
accounting to mass meetings) and at the level of decisions that were taken in 
negotiations with management. The attitude of indifference (or apathy) on the part 
of the student body was not helpful either and may signal changes in the political 
culture of South African youth beyond the confines of this thesis. In any case, the 
new practice did not prevent the UWC SRC from committing students to certain 
agreements with the university management even if its ‘mandate’ only derived 
from having been elected into office. It would also not prevent the university 
management from implementing such decisions.  
 
The 1998 UWC conflict 
The 1998 UWC conflict played an important role in this study. In the main, it 
provided scope to analyse and understand the conditions and nature of students 
actions used to address student funding problems at a particular moment of the 
university’s history, which provides a turning point in student politics at UWC. 
The 1998 UWC conflict happened soon after the elaboration of the post-apartheid 
higher education policy framework, the adoption of the 1997 White Paper on 
Higher Education and the Higher Education Act of 1997. The latter granted 
students legal stakeholder status and a formal role in higher education governance 
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across all institutions. This newly assigned role and status of students as 
stakeholders should at least have resulted in better ‘formal communication lines 
and consultation’ between students and management, the effect of which would 
have been the prevention of the 1998 student activism as some writers seemed to 
suggest (Alence, 1999; Bergan, 2004, Boland, 2005; Luescher-Mamashela, 2011; 
Mathieu, 1996; Munene, 2003; Nkomo, 1984). This clearly did not happen.  
 
The 1998 UWC institution-focused student activism highlighted a number of 
important points. First, students combined collective non-normative action and 
collective normative action in a complementary manner to resolve the problem 
that led to the 1998 institution-focused student activism. Students (led by the 
SRC) initially embarked on collective normative student action, in particular 
negotiations with the university management. The UWC SRC had hoped that it 
would reach an agreement with management on the issue of ‘affordability’ for 
poor students with outstanding fees. However, the negotiations collapsed before 
an agreement could be reached, thus paving the way for collective non-normative 
student action, institution-focused student activism.  
 
Second, the relationship between the student leaders and the student body was 
important. The UWC SRC had to rely on the student body for support, energy and 
direction throughout the student activism and negotiations with the university 
management in the face of a wide-spread public rejection of students’ demands. 
The student body supported the UWC SRC even when the police invaded the 
campus and arrested hundreds of students. Even first-year students ‘volunteered’ 
to be arrested. The student body was the only source of support to the UWC SRC 
after almost all other stakeholders, including the government, publicly 
disapproved of the student action.  
 
Third, and in direct response to the research question posed, the 1998 UWC 
conflict exposed the paradox of post-1994 higher education policy. Both the 
national government and UWC supported the opening of access, especially to 
poor and black students, but this commitment was not matched with adequate 
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financial assistance. Rather, poor students were expected to contribute to the costs 
of their study. Indeed, the pains of transition uncovered in this study bear witness 
to a sense of ‘abandonment’, reminiscent of Biko’s famed struggle slogan, “Black 
man, you are on your own”. While many students were able to re-register after 
embarking on student activism, they had missed quality time for learning; many 
other students never returned to campus.  
 
Fourth, the role of students is critical in society in its emancipatory potential, be it 
under a repressive or democratic regime. The review of literature in Chapter Two 
has shown that students jealously guard and are often ready to defend democratic 
rights, spaces and principles, and often also a commitment to social justice. The 
1998 UWC institution-focused student activism was about issues specific to 
students as much as it was about rolling back the post-apartheid government’s 
imposition of unpopular policies and rolling back of civil society participation in 
policy-making; with respect to student politics, the 1998 conflict defied 
government’s drive to clamp down on student activism across higher education 
institutions as ordered by the former President Mandela, Deputy President Mbeki, 
and Minister of Education Professor Bhengu. The 1998 student activism exposed 
the emerging post-apartheid government’s disposition towards student activism, 
which was characterised by intolerance. Government’s response could be seen as 
surprising given the euphoria of democracy, and perhaps people found it 
unthinkable that the ANC-led government could turn its back on poor students so 
soon after the 1994 elections. However, when viewed in the broader context, 
government’s response shared similarities with that in other post-colonial African 
countries, where coercive and control measures were introduced, coupled with the 
issuing of stern warnings and discrediting of student activism, together with 
name-calling of students labelling them a ‘menace’, ‘spoilt’ with unrealistic 
demands and so forth. Like elsewhere, the police was readily brought to campuses 
to suppress students’ voicing their demands (see Alidou et al., 2008; Chikwanha, 
2009; Diouf, 1996, 2003). UWC students were called ‘fee-dodgers’, a term in 
stark contrast to ‘energy drivers’ (Gerwel, 1988: 3) or ‘shock-troops’ of the 
revolution (Wolpe, 1994: 7).  
 
 
 
 
184 
 
 
Individual student actions 
Once SCM had been established, the SRC had the responsibility to negotiate with 
SCM on behalf of students on student funding issues. However, SCM still had the 
power to assess and clear students individually. I argue that this clearance process 
inadvertently contributed to the demobilisation of students as a collective force 
and facilitated political ‘atomisation’ of students in relation to addressing their 
unmet financial needs. In consequence the SCM process may have played a role 
in the shift from Type 1 and Type 2 collective student actions to Type 3 and Type 
4 individual student actions. I argue that UWC students came to use Type 3 
individual normative student actions predominantly after 1998. The individual 
student efforts manifested themselves in a variety of ways, including students 
seeking part-time employment on and off campus, and showing solidarity with 
each other (sharing or lending books or study notes, squatting, sharing food and so 
forth). Students mobilised additional funding from family members, friends of 
parents and through direct engagement with the university’s newly established 
funding structures, such as SCM and the NSFAS Financial Aid Office, for 
possible bursaries, a relaxation of payment rules, or entering into arrangements for 
a payment plan.  
 
In conclusion, while the findings of this study can be regarded as an 'empirical 
contribution' to knowledge, they clearly also provide much material for 
conceptual clarification and reflection. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise 
that an important accomplishment of the study has been to give voice to some of 
the 'unseen pains' of the transition in post-apartheid South African higher 
education. Be it collective student actions or students’ individual actions such as 
negotiations with SCM and the Financial Aid Office in pursuit of addressing their 
unmet financial need, they were at best humbling experiences for a young person 
who seeks access to higher education towards a better life, at worst dehumanising 
ordeals. The study reports, for example, how students’ experience of delays in the 
finalisation of registration affected them academically as well as psychologically. 
Some students had to wait for almost two months before they knew if they should 
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go back home or continue their studies. Others continued to stand in the long 
queues in front of the offices, attend their classes so that they would not miss a lot, 
while continuing to hope for a solution to their problem of unmet financial need.   
 
The findings of the study address research questions and thereby contribute 
towards improving understanding of various ways in which UWC confronted the 
paradoxical post-apartheid higher education policy of expansion of access and 
limited funding and in which UWC students addressed the resulting problem of 
unmet financial need between 1995 and 2005.   
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